(a) Critically examine the strengths and weaknesses of industrial relations in public sector. (10+10=20 marks) (b) State the…

(a) Strengths and Weaknesses of Public-Sector Industrial Relations The public sector has several strengths. PSUs, by their public-sector status under the constitutional and statutory framework, are expected to observe public-interest norms, giving workers a stronger claim to fair treatment and social security. Employment is generally permanent, with job security, pensions, medical and other welfare benefits, and an absence of casual hire-and-fire. Grievance redressal is structured through bipartite committees, joint consultative machinery, domestic enquiry and statutory dispute resolution, which makes conflict more institutionalised than in many private establishments. Public-sector bargaining is also welfare-oriented, emphasising wages, service conditions and job protection, and it has helped build a culture of consultation.

However, these strengths have been offset by weaknesses. Excessive bureaucratization makes decisions slow and rule-bound. Political interference in management, transfers and dispute handling weakens managerial authority and turns industrial issues into political contests. Performance and productivity linkage is weak; wage settlements often do not reward efficiency or discipline. Multiplicity of unions fragments bargaining, encourages inter-union rivalry and dilutes collective responsibility. Restrictive labour practices, low flexibility in deployment, and rigid seniority norms reduce competitiveness. As a result, public-sector IR has preserved stability but has not always delivered the productivity and adaptability needed in a changing economy.

(b) Recognition of Trade Unions and Rights of a Recognised Union Recognition must be distinguished from registration. The Trade Unions Act, 1926 dealt only with registration and had no central provision for recognition, so until 2025 recognition rested on the non-statutory Code of Discipline, 1958 and a few state laws (Maharashtra MRTU and PULP Act, 1971, and similar laws in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan). Under the Code of Discipline a union qualified if it had functioned for at least one year after registration and had at least 15% membership of the workers in an establishment (25% in an industry in a local area), and once recognised it held that status for two years. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020, in force from 21 November 2025, repealed the 1926 Act and gave recognition a statutory basis. A union must generally have 10% of workers or 100 workers, whichever is less, be registered, function democratically, maintain financial propriety, be non-communal and avoid unfair labour practices. These are preconditions, not the statutory test for recognition. Under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, recognition is primarily membership-based: a registered union may be recognised as the sole negotiating union if it has 51% of the workers; if no union reaches that level, unions with at least 20% membership may be represented on a negotiating council. State laws may add procedural safeguards, but the central principle is verified majority status.

A recognised union enjoys important rights. It becomes the exclusive bargaining agent for the workers it represents. It may collect subscriptions on premises, represent workers in domestic enquiry and disciplinary proceedings, inspect factory premises, be consulted on retrenchment or closure, file industrial disputes, and participate in tripartite or sectoral bodies. These rights give the union a real institutional role, but they also require responsible use.

(c) Collective Bargaining in India The statement that collective bargaining has not been very successful is largely correct. Coverage remains narrow; trade-union density is low relative to the total workforce, and bargaining is concentrated in organised manufacturing and public utilities. The informal sector, which employs the majority, is largely excluded. Industry-level or sectoral bargaining is weak, so settlements are often plant-specific and easily fragmented. Judicial intervention in strikes, as in T.K. Rangarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, has curbed strike action by government employees, while weak enforcement of settlements and frequent litigation reduce their credibility.

On the other hand, long-term settlements in steel, coal, ports, banking (bipartite settlements through the IBA) and many automobile plants show that bargaining works where unions are representative. To make it effective, the negotiating union and council under the IR Code must rest on fair, transparent membership verification, so that bargaining is representative and accountable. Bargaining should be linked to productivity, profitability and skill development. Sectoral or regional bargaining councils can set minimum standards and reduce plant-level fragmentation. Bipartite committees at plant level should be strengthened for grievance redressal. Judicial intervention should be reduced to exceptional cases, while social dialogue and multi-stakeholder mechanisms should be expanded. Ratification of ILO Convention No. 154 would signal commitment to industrial democracy.