Paper I — Q6
(a) "Constitutionally reconciling the Fundamental Rights with the Directive Principles of State Policy has led to frequent…
(a) "Constitutionally reconciling the Fundamental Rights with the Directive Principles of State Policy has led to frequent amendments of the Constitution and judicial interventions." Comment. 20 (b) The role of the President of India becomes more significant during a minority government and a coalition government. Explain. 15 (c) Do you think that despite having significant limitations the Panchayati Raj Institutions have strengthened the process of democratic decentralization? Give your views. 15
हिंदी में प्रश्न पढ़ें
(a) "राज्य के नीति-निर्देशक सिद्धांतों के साथ मौलिक अधिकारों के संवैधानिक रूप से सामंजस्य स्थापित करने के लिए संविधान में निरंतर संशोधन और न्यायिक हस्तक्षेप की आवश्यकता पड़ी।" टिप्पणी कीजिए। 20 (b) अल्पमत सरकार और गठबंधन सरकार के समय भारत के राष्ट्रपति की भूमिका अधिक महत्त्वपूर्ण हो जाती है। व्याख्या कीजिए। 15 (c) क्या आपके विचार में महत्त्वपूर्ण सीमाओं के परचात भी पंचायती राज संस्थाओं ने लोकतांत्रिक विकेंद्रीकरण की प्रक्रिया को सुदृढ़ किया है? अपने मत प्रकट कीजिए। 15
Directive word: Comment
This question asks you to comment. The directive word signals the depth of analysis expected, the structure of your answer, and the weight of evidence you must bring.
See our UPSC directive words guide for a full breakdown of how to respond to each command word.
How this answer will be evaluated
Approach
The primary directive is 'comment' for part (a), while parts (b) and (c) require 'explain' and analytical evaluation respectively. Allocate approximately 40% of time/words to part (a) given its 20 marks, and roughly 30% each to parts (b) and (c). Structure with a brief integrated introduction, then three distinct sections addressing each sub-part sequentially, followed by a synthesizing conclusion that connects constitutional tensions in (a) with institutional resilience in (b) and grassroots democracy in (c).
Key points expected
- Part (a): Evolution of the Fundamental Rights-DPSP relationship from Champakam Dorairajan (1951) to Minerva Mills (1980) and beyond, including the 42nd, 44th, and 86th Amendments
- Part (a): Judicial balancing through the 'harmony' and 'balance' doctrines, with specific reference to Golak Nath, Kesavananda, and post-1990s liberal interpretation
- Part (b): President's discretionary powers under Articles 74, 75, 85, 356, and 360, with concrete examples from minority governments (1979 Charan Singh, 1990 Chandra Shekhar) and coalition eras (1996-1998 United Front, UPA-I 2004)
- Part (b): Distinction between formal constitutional position and actual political constraints, including the Bommai judgment's impact on Article 356 discretion
- Part (c): Structural limitations of PRIs—irregular elections, inadequate devolution of funds (13th vs 14th Finance Commission), bureaucratic dominance, and 'proxy' representation
- Part (c): Empirical evidence of democratic deepening: increased participation of SC/ST/women (reservation impact), social audit mechanisms (MGNREGA), and state variations (Kerala's People's Plan vs Bihar's delayed implementation)
Evaluation rubric
| Dimension | Weight | Max marks | Excellent | Average | Poor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Demand-directive understanding | 20% | 10 | Correctly interprets 'comment' in (a) as requiring balanced critical assessment with evidence; 'explain' in (b) as systematic causal exposition; and the evaluative thrust in (c) as requiring judgment with qualifications—no directive confusion or mechanical treatment | Addresses all three parts but treats 'comment' as mere description or conflates 'explain' with 'describe'; shows partial awareness of differing cognitive demands across sub-parts | Misidentifies directives (e.g., treats all as 'describe') or ignores the evaluative element in (c); produces generic responses without directive-appropriate treatment |
| Content depth & accuracy | 20% | 10 | Demonstrates precise constitutional knowledge: correct article numbers, accurate chronology of amendments (42nd, 44th, 86th), specific presidential actions (K.R. Narayanan's 1998, 1999 decisions; A.P.J. Abdul Kalam's 2006 office-of-profit stance), and nuanced PRI provisions (Part IX, XI Schedule, PESA extension) | Generally accurate but with minor errors (e.g., conflating amendment numbers, vague on presidential discretion limits, generic PRI description without state-specific variation) | Substantial factual errors (wrong case law dates, incorrect constitutional provisions), confused institutional relationships, or superficial treatment of all three parts |
| Structure & flow | 20% | 10 | Clear tripartite organization with visible sub-headings or paragraph transitions; logical internal sequencing within each part (e.g., chronological for FR-DPSP evolution, institutional-processual for President's role, problem-solution-assessment for PRIs); smooth thematic bridges between parts | All three parts present but with uneven development; some organizational clarity but weak transitions between (a), (b), and (c); occasional repetition or disjointed argumentation | Poorly organized with merged or missing parts; rambling structure without identifiable sections; failure to respect the three-part division of the question |
| Examples / case-law / data | 20% | 10 | Rich evidentiary base: for (a) cites Minerva Mills, Unnikrishnan, Mohini Jain, and post-2000 cases; for (b) references specific presidential interventions (1998 Vajpayee government formation, 2006 Bihar dissolution); for (c) uses empirical studies (World Bank PRI assessments, Election Commission data on reserved seats) and state comparisons | Some case law and examples but limited specificity (e.g., mentions 'Kesavananda' without articulating ratio, generic reference to 'coalition era' without dates, standard PRI examples without data) | Minimal or no concrete evidence; reliance on assertion over documentation; incorrect or invented examples; failure to support any sub-part with specific illustrations |
| Conclusion & analytical edge | 20% | 10 | Synthesizes the three parts into a coherent thesis about Indian constitutionalism's adaptive tension between rights, institutional discretion, and participatory democracy; offers original insight (e.g., how judicial creativity in (a) enabled institutional flexibility in (b) and (c)); acknowledges unresolved tensions with sophistication | Separate conclusions for each part without integration; some attempt at broader significance but formulaic or predictable; limited self-critical awareness | Absent or abrupt conclusion; mere summary of points raised; no analytical elevation or synthetic perspective across the three constitutional themes |
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