(a) Discuss the political economy approach to the comparative analysis of politics. (10 marks) (b) "Political parties and…

(a) Political economy approach The political economy approach treats politics as embedded in economic structures, class relations and modes of production, not as a self-contained set of institutions or individual behaviours. Unlike institutionalism, which studies constitutions, parties and state organs, and behaviouralism, which emphasises observable conduct, it asks who controls material resources and how that control shapes policy, power and legitimacy. Adam Smith links markets, division of labour and state regulation; Marx argues the economic base conditions the political superstructure, while Douglass North shows institutions and transaction costs channel economic and political outcomes. In comparative politics, it explains why similar formal democracies produce different growth, inequality and welfare outcomes. Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966) traced democratic, fascist and communist paths to class coalitions in agrarian transformation; Guillermo O'Donnell linked late industrialisation to bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Latin America; Chalmers Johnson's "developmental state" explained East Asian growth; and Hall and Soskice's Varieties of Capitalism (2001) contrasts liberal and coordinated market economies. For India, Pranab Bardhan's The Political Economy of Development in India (1984) attributed slow growth to competition among three dominant proprietary classes - industrial capitalists, rich farmers and professionals, including the bureaucracy. Dependency theory and Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis extend it globally, showing how core-periphery relations, trade terms and capital flows reproduce underdevelopment. Thus, comparative analysis studies how class, capital, state and global markets co-produce political order.

(b) Parties and pressure groups Sine qua non means indispensable. Parties aggregate interests, recruit leaders, formulate programmes, contest elections and translate popular will into government. In India's multi-party system, parties registered under Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and recognised under the Election Symbols Order, 1968 are the main channel of representation, and the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law) binds legislators to party discipline. Pressure groups articulate specific interests—farmers, industry, environment, labour—where parties may be too broad; in Almond's terms groups articulate interests while parties aggregate them, and group theorists from Arthur Bentley to David Truman saw politics itself as the interplay of groups. The 2020-21 farmers’ protests, which ended with the repeal of the three farm laws in November 2021, showed how organised civil society can test policy, demand dialogue and check executive overreach. Their value lies in pluralism: they deepen participation, provide feedback and prevent majoritarian capture. Yet they can distort democracy through elite capture, money power, lobbying, vote-banking and organised pressure that crowds out weaker groups; Mancur Olson's logic of collective action explains why small, concentrated interests organise more easily than large, diffuse ones. Electoral reforms such as the model code of conduct and party funding transparency - including the Supreme Court's February 2024 judgment striking down electoral bonds - seek to curb these excesses, though India still lacks a law regulating lobbying or internal party democracy. Hence, they are necessary but not sufficient; healthy democracy requires accountable parties, regulated pressure groups and an empowered citizenry.

(c) Marxist IR after the Cold War The Marxist approach to international relations has not become irrelevant after the Cold War, though its emphasis has shifted. It acknowledged that the bipolar era was shaped by class struggle, state capitalism, imperial competition and the global division of labour. The end of bipolarity weakened the simple East-West framing, but did not remove the economic contradictions Marxists analyse. Robert Cox's critical theory - "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" (1981) - and Gramscian hegemony explain how dominant states and institutions secure consent through norms, finance and knowledge, not only coercion. Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis remains useful for core-periphery inequalities, unequal exchange and global value chains. The 2008 global financial crisis revived interest in Marxist analysis, David Harvey's "accumulation by dispossession" explains land and resource grabs, and Hardt and Negri's Empire (2000) theorised a decentred global capitalist sovereignty. Contemporary issues—uneven development, debt, climate imperialism, technology control and resource wars—show power is still deeply material. Critics argue constructivism better explains identity, norms and institutions, while liberal institutionalism explains cooperation through trade, law and international organisations. A balanced view is that Marxist IR is not a complete post-Cold War framework, but remains a critical lens for exposing inequality, dependency and structural power beneath liberal peace.

(d) UN reforms UN reform has been attempted through institutional, procedural and financial changes. The 2000 Brahimi Report guided peacekeeping reform, emphasising mandate clarity, rapid deployment, civilian protection and lessons learned. The 2004 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Kofi Annan's In Larger Freedom (2005) and the 2005 World Summit called for a more effective, representative and accountable UN; the Summit endorsed the Responsibility to Protect and created the Peacebuilding Commission. The Human Rights Council, established in 2006 by General Assembly resolution 60/251, replaced the Commission and introduced universal periodic review. Security Council reform remains central: Intergovernmental Negotiations have run in the General Assembly since 2009, the G4 seeks permanent seats, Uniting for Consensus seeks only non-permanent expansion, the African Union's Ezulwini Consensus demands two permanent seats with veto, and the Pact for the Future (September 2024) committed members to intensify efforts. ECOSOC revitalisation has focused on coordination, development effectiveness and follow-up to summit outcomes. Secretariat reform has pursued transparency, ethics, performance management and gender balance; António Guterres's 2019 reforms restructured the peace and security pillar and delinked Resident Coordinators from UNDP, and the UN80 Initiative launched in 2025 amid a liquidity crisis proposes mergers, relocations and deep budget and staff cuts. Financial reforms address assessed contributions, budget discipline, voluntary funding and peace-operation costs. Yet reform is constrained by veto power, financing gaps and geopolitical rivalry.

(e) India at COP-26 At COP-26 in Glasgow, India advanced a development-oriented climate agenda. Its central announcement was Panchamrit, the “five nectar” elements: 500 GW non-fossil energy capacity by 2030, 50 per cent renewable energy by 2030, a 45 per cent reduction in carbon intensity by 2030, a one-billion-tonne reduction in cumulative CO2 emissions by 2030, and net-zero emissions by 2070. In its updated NDC of August 2022, India formalised two of these as a 45 per cent cut in emissions intensity of GDP from 2005 levels and 50 per cent of installed electricity capacity from non-fossil sources by 2030; the latter was achieved in mid-2025, five years early. India also promoted LiFE—Lifestyle for Environment—as a citizen-level movement to reduce consumption footprints and make sustainable choices mainstream. At Glasgow India also secured the change from "phase-out" to "phase-down" of unabated coal power in the Glasgow Climate Pact, drawing criticism from vulnerable states but reflecting its development needs. These proposals linked climate action to energy security, industrial transition and just transition, arguing that developing countries need finance, technology transfer and capacity building to meet targets.