(a) Why South Asia is considered as the world's politically and economically least integrated region? Explain. (20 marks) (b) How…

(a) Why South Asia is the least integrated region

Security rivalry, identity conflict and weak institutions block interdependence; Barry Buzan treats South Asia as a classic "regional security complex" defined by enmity rather than community. The India-Pakistan rivalry, rooted in Partition and Kashmir, creates a security dilemma, and contested borders, including the Durand Line inherited from the 1893 British-Afghan demarcation, keep border politics volatile. Divergent regimes (democracy against military or authoritarian rule) and religious nationalism reduce trust, China's entry through BRI/CPEC adds strategic competition, and there is no ASEAN-like confidence-building framework. SAARC has been paralysed since 2016, and SAFTA (signed 2004, in force 2006) is weak because of long sensitive lists and non-tariff barriers. Intra-regional trade is about 5 per cent of total trade against over 20 per cent in ASEAN; the World Bank's A Glass Half Full (2018) put actual intra-regional trade at about USD 23 billion against a potential of USD 67 billion. Poor connectivity, non-complementary economies and Indian protectionism towards neighbours add to fragmentation, while India's size, as the largest economy and the only state bordering almost all others, makes smaller states wary. The causal loop is clear: insecurity prevents confidence, low confidence keeps trade and connectivity weak, and weak interdependence fails to reduce rivalry. The 2025 Pahalgam attack, Operation Sindoor and India's holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance show how quickly rivalry resets the clock. India therefore prefers sub-regional and bilateral routes, such as BBIN, BIMSTEC and energy trade with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh.

(b) States and India's foreign policy

Foreign affairs are Union subjects: Article 246 read with Union List entries 10–14 places foreign affairs, UN matters and treaties with Parliament, and Article 253 lets Parliament legislate to implement treaties, an implementation power, not a treaty-making one. States therefore influence policy indirectly, through the Rajya Sabha, the Inter-State Council and NITI Aayog, and the MEA set up a States Division in 2014 to support their external engagement, an Indian version of "paradiplomacy". Border states have substantive influence: West Bengal on Teesta (Mamata Banerjee's objection stalled the 2011 agreement), Tamil Nadu on Sri Lanka (its pressure led India to vote against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC in 2012–13 and the PM to skip the 2013 CHOGM in Colombo) and the Northeast on Act East and Myanmar (Mizoram sheltered Chin refugees in 2021 despite central instructions). States also court investment through summits such as Vibrant Gujarat (since 2003) and their own MoUs, though Kerala's 2024 appointment of an external-cooperation officer drew an MEA reminder that foreign affairs are a Union subject. The 2015 Land Boundary Agreement required consultation with Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and West Bengal and the 100th Amendment, showing that border settlements depend in practice on state consent, and in coalition governments state-based parties can condition support for agreements on land, water, migration or border trade.

(c) Evolution of India's role in the global nuclear order

India's trajectory moved from resistance to selective integration. It opposed the 1968 NPT as discriminatory, conducted the 1974 "peaceful nuclear explosion" (Smiling Buddha), kept ambiguity through the 1980s–90s and declared weaponisation after Pokhran-II (1998). Its 2003 doctrine rests on credible minimum deterrence, massive retaliation and No First Use (NFU); remarks in 2016 and 2019 that NFU could change "depending on circumstances" sparked debate, but it remains official policy. After 1998 India converted nuclear status into leverage: the 2008 NSG waiver enabled the US-India 123 Agreement (in force December 2008), followed by civil nuclear agreements with France, Russia and Japan. INS Arihant's first deterrence patrol (2018) completed the triad, and the Agni-V MIRV test (Mission Divyastra, 2024) added sophistication. India joined the MTCR (2016), the Wassenaar Arrangement (2017) and the Australia Group (2018), but its 2016 NSG application remains blocked mainly by China. At home, the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 deterred foreign suppliers until a new law, passed in December 2025, replaced it and the Atomic Energy Act and opened the sector to private participation, alongside a mission for 100 GW of nuclear power by 2047. India supports a non-discriminatory FMCT, though formal negotiations have not begun. It thus accepts export controls and safeguards where they serve its security, but rejects an order that privileges existing nuclear powers.