(a) How far do you agree that the Directive Principles of State Policy are more fundamental than the Fundamental Rights in…

(a) DPSP, Fundamental Rights, and Socio-Economic Justice

The Directive Principles of State Policy (Articles 36–51) represent the core of India’s transformative constitutionalism. While Fundamental Rights (Part III) were traditionally conceived as negative injunctions safeguarding individual civil and political liberties against state encroachment, the DPSPs impose positive obligations on the state to secure the Preamble’s vision of socio-economic justice. Articles 39(b) and (c) (equitable resource distribution and prevention of wealth concentration), Article 41 (right to work and education), and Article 46 (promotion of educational and economic interests of SCs, STs, and weaker sections) provide the substantive blueprint for a welfare state. Article 37 itself declares the Directive Principles "fundamental in the governance of the country", and Granville Austin called Parts III and IV together the "conscience of the Constitution".

Early on, in State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951), the Court held that the Directive Principles must run subsidiary to the Fundamental Rights. The post-independence debate then witnessed legislative efforts to grant DPSPs primacy over Fundamental Rights, notably through Article 31C introduced by the 25th Constitutional Amendment and expanded by the 42nd Amendment. However, the judiciary established an equilibrium. Kesavananda Bharati (1973) upheld the first part of Article 31C but struck down its bar on judicial review, and in Minerva Mills (1980) the Supreme Court invalidated the 42nd Amendment's extension of Article 31C to all Directive Principles, holding that the harmony and balance between Part III and Part IV is a basic feature of the Constitution—the two being, in effect, like two wheels of a chariot.

While Article 37 renders DPSPs non-justiciable in contrast to the enforceable remedies under Article 32, judicial doctrine, as seen in In re Kerala Education Bill (1958) and contemporary welfare jurisprudence, employs harmonious construction. The Supreme Court has integrated socio-economic principles into the expansive interpretation of Article 21, creating enforceable entitlements to livelihood, health, and clean environment. Thus, DPSPs are not hierarchically superior to Fundamental Rights; rather, they are mutually dependent, with DPSPs providing the social goals and Fundamental Rights setting the constitutional boundaries.

(b) Structure and Functions of the National Commission for Women

Constituted on 31 January 1992 as a statutory body under the National Commission for Women Act, 1990, the National Commission for Women (NCW) is tasked with safeguarding women's constitutional and legal rights. Its organizational structure consists of a Chairperson nominated by the Central Government, five Members chosen from fields such as law, trade unionism, management, and social work (with mandatory representation of at least one member each from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes), and a Member-Secretary. The Commission functions from its headquarters in New Delhi and interfaces with state-level women’s commissions.

The NCW performs key functions across four domains:

• Investigative: Examining grievances and taking suo motu cognizance of non-implementation of laws, atrocities, and denial of rights, backed by civil court powers to summon witnesses and requisition public records.
• Recommendatory: Reviewing constitutional safeguards and existing legislation affecting women, such as the Dowry Prohibition Act and workplace harassment statutes, and advising governments on legislative amendments.
• Research and Documentation: Undertaking promotional and educational research to identify gaps in women’s socio-economic status and inspecting prisons, remand homes, and custody centres.
• Legal Aid Coordination: Providing counseling, facilitating mediation, and linking aggrieved women with legal aid services.

Despite this mandate, the NCW’s impact is constrained by its purely advisory character without powers to enforce compliance, financial dependence on Union budgetary allocations, and the executive's dominance in appointments.

(c) Legacy of the Planning Commission in Contemporary Development

Although the Planning Commission was replaced by NITI Aayog on 1 January 2015, and the Five-Year Plans ended with the Twelfth Plan in 2017 in favour of a vision, strategy and three-year action agenda (and now the Viksit Bharat@2047 vision), its institutional legacy continues to shape India’s developmental policy. The five-year planning mindset persists in multi-year target setting, long-term strategic visions, and macro-level development frameworks.

The Planning Commission's discretionary role in plan grants (once governed by the Gadgil-Mukherjee formula) has passed to the Finance Commission's higher devolution, but the architecture of Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) and conditional transfers remains deeply rooted in the Planning Commission's practices, continuing to steer state-level expenditures and build administrative capacities. Furthermore, NITI Aayog’s flagship interventions—such as the Aspirational Districts Programme, the localization of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Governing Council of Chief Ministers, and the Development Monitoring and Evaluation Office—function as modified, data-driven planning mechanisms that evaluate and direct regional development.

This continuity maintains an enduring structural tension: while NITI Aayog emphasizes cooperative and competitive federalism, the legacy of centralized schematic design and conditional resource flows continues to exert top-down influence over state development agendas.