(a) "Tests are useful in predicting the failure rather than success of the candidate on the job." Comment. (20 marks) (b) Explain…

(a) Predictive tests and failure

Selection tests are often treated as neutral predictors of job success, but their stronger use is as screens against failure. In Taylor’s scientific management, workers were matched to tasks by measurable traits, yet this assumed stable, task-bound performance and ignored motivation, context and social factors. Modern psychometric critique shows that tests can identify disqualifying traits—dishonesty, instability, lack of basic aptitude—more reliably than they can certify excellence. This asymmetry is statistical: failure prediction often has clearer cut-offs and higher base rates of poor performance, while success prediction suffers ceiling effects and is diluted by situational variables such as supervision, incentives and team climate. Guion and Gottier’s 1965 review of personality tests in employee selection generally found low validity coefficients, meaning such tests are weak predictors of overall success, though they may help flag risk. Hence the statement is partly true: tests are useful for eliminating likely failures, but they should not be the sole basis for predicting high performers. A balanced selection system combines tests with interviews, work samples, assessment centres and probationary review.

(b) Workers’ participation

Workers’ participation in management (WPM) rests on the human-relations insight associated with Mayo that workers are not mere inputs but social beings whose commitment rises when they feel ownership and voice. It also reflects India’s democratic ethos: if citizens participate in governance, employees should participate in the enterprises that shape their livelihoods. Constitutionally, Article 43A directs the State to take steps to secure worker participation in the management of industries. India has tried works committees (Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, continued under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 for establishments with 100 or more workers), Joint Management Councils (1958), shop councils and joint councils (1975), the comprehensive 1983 scheme for public sector undertakings, worker directors on some PSU boards, and now grievance redressal committees under the IR Code. Most schemes stayed weak because of union rivalry, management reluctance to share information, and workers' lack of training. In practice, WPM can promote industrial peace by giving grievances a forum before they become disputes, and it can raise productivity through better information flow, reduced resistance to change and shared responsibility for efficiency. To make WPM effective, bipartite forums should be strengthened with clear agenda, minutes and follow-up, not reduced to token consultation. The IR Code's negotiating union or negotiating council should be used to choose worker representatives, so that management deals with accountable representatives. Worker representatives need training in finance, safety, technology and negotiation. Financial participation can be expanded through ESOPs, profit-sharing and cooperatives; TISCO and BHEL have experimented with worker participation, while Amul’s cooperative model illustrates member ownership and financial participation, though it is a producer cooperative rather than a classic industrial WPM arrangement.

(c) Union multiplicity

Union multiplicity in India has often weakened collective bargaining. Until 2001 the Trade Unions Act, 1926 let any seven members register a union; the 2001 amendment required at least 10% of the workers or 100 workers, whichever is less (subject to a minimum of seven), and the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, which replaced the Act, keeps this threshold. Because the bar is still low and every major political party has its own central trade union, many small, politically affiliated unions exist side by side. This has encouraged politicization, inter-union rivalry and fragmented bargaining power. Employers may play unions against one another, while workers find it difficult to verify genuine support or elect a representative body. The result is more frequent disputes, weak settlements and delayed negotiations. Remedies include periodic secret-ballot or check-off verification of union membership, limiting outsiders in union leadership, promoting federations or councils that can aggregate bargaining strength, and laying down exclusive recognition criteria for a majority union. The National Commission on Labour has long recommended stronger union recognition and reduced fragmentation. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020, goes further by providing a negotiating union (51% support) or negotiating council (20% support) mechanism in every industrial establishment with registered trade unions; its success depends on credible membership verification. In sum, multiplicity is not inherently wrong, but without credible recognition and federation it retards effective trade-union functioning.