(a) Parliamentary committees are indispensable to the legislative process. It provides for the opportunity for cross-pollination…

(a) Parliamentary Committees and Bicameral Cross-Pollination

Parliamentary committees act as the operational engine of the legislature, enabling detailed, evidence-based scrutiny away from the adversarial politics and camera-driven rhetoric of the floor. The Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committees (DRSCs), Public Accounts Committee (PAC), and Estimates Committee ensure continuous executive accountability across technical and budgetary matters. While the Estimates Committee remains exclusive to the Lok Sabha to preserve its fiscal primacy, other financial committees and DRSCs institutionalize bicameral cooperation.

Since the DRSC system began in 1993 (expanded to 24 committees in 2004), each standing committee draws members from both the Lok Sabha (21 members) and Rajya Sabha (10 members), with 16 committees serviced by the Lok Sabha under the Speaker and 8 by the Rajya Sabha under the Chairman. This creates a forum for institutional cross-pollination. Joint Parliamentary Committees (JPCs) and Joint Select Committees further facilitate consensus on complex, contested legislations by pooling expertise from directly elected representatives and the Council of States. Joint referrals, concurrent scrutiny of reports, and non-partisan deliberations allow the Rajya Sabha’s federal perspective to temper legislative haste, producing balanced legislative outcomes. The weakness is that referral is discretionary: PRS Legislative Research data show the share of bills referred to committees falling from about 71 per cent in the 15th Lok Sabha to about 27 per cent in the 16th and 16 per cent in the 17th, which erodes precisely the deliberative function that makes committees indispensable.

(b) Constitutional Provisions and Nature of Advisory Jurisdiction

Article 143 of the Constitution empowers the President to seek the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court. Under Article 143(1), the President may refer questions of law or fact of public importance; here, the Court holds the discretion to decline answering. Under Article 143(2), involving disputes arising from pre-constitution treaties or agreements, the Court is constitutionally bound to render an opinion. Procedurally, these references are heard by a Constitution Bench of at least five judges in open court. Opinions delivered under Article 143 are consultative and not binding on the executive; whether they are binding precedent under Article 141 is debated, but they carry great weight and are ordinarily followed by courts.

The Court’s jurisprudence reflects this nuanced nature. The first reference, In re Kerala Education Bill (1958), examined a state bill before assent. In the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal reference (1991), the Court affirmed the binding nature of tribunal orders and curtailed unconstitutional state executive actions. In the Special Reference No. 1 of 1993 (Ayodhya Reference), the Court exercised its discretion under Article 143(1) to decline answering a purely historical and non-legal dispute. In the 2G Spectrum reference (2012), the Court clarified that auction was not the sole constitutionally permissible mode for alienating all natural resources. In the Third Judges case (Special Reference No. 1 of 1998), the Court's opinion enlarged the collegium to the Chief Justice and four senior judges, a framework that governed appointments until and beyond the NJAC case (2015). Most recently, on a reference made in May 2025 after the Tamil Nadu Governor judgment, a Constitution Bench opined in November 2025 that courts cannot prescribe fixed timelines or "deemed assent" for Governors and the President, while leaving room for limited review of prolonged inaction - showing the jurisdiction's use to settle live constitutional questions.

(c) Federal Balance in Contemporary Indian Politics

Recent developments in Indian politics present a contested picture regarding the erosion of federalism. Centralizing tendencies have emerged in fiscal and administrative realms. The structural design of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council and reliance on non-shareable cesses have curtailed the autonomous revenue-raising capacities of states. The invocation of Article 356 in Uttarakhand (2016), Arunachal Pradesh (2016), and Jammu & Kashmir (2018), along with the use of the National Disaster Management Act during the COVID-19 pandemic, raised concerns regarding executive overreach and top-down unilateralism.

Conversely, the resilient architecture of Indian federalism demonstrates robust countervailing mechanisms. Judicial intervention under the S.R. Bommai (1994) doctrine reversed the removal of the elected governments in Uttarakhand and Arunachal Pradesh, reaffirming federalism as part of the basic structure. Fiscal federalism continues to be fortified through Finance Commission recommendations maintaining high tax devolution (41 per cent under the Fifteenth Finance Commission, retained at 41 per cent by the Sixteenth Finance Commission for 2026–31). The Supreme Court has also policed gubernatorial obstruction: in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025) it held that Governors cannot sit indefinitely on state bills. Moreover, institutional platforms like the GST Council still function primarily on consensus, and the Constitution retains asymmetric federal accommodations under Articles 371 to 371-J and the Fifth and Sixth Schedules. On balance, federalism has been strained in practice, through fiscal centralisation and contested gubernatorial conduct, but its constitutional core has held because courts, Finance Commissions and electoral competition continue to check the Centre.