(a) Explain briefly the role of Peasant Movements after 1857 and before independence. (10 marks) (b) Write a note on the Dalit…

(a) Peasant Movements after 1857

After 1857, peasant movements became a central mechanism through which agrarian distress translated into political resistance. Colonial revenue extraction, indigo plantation, moneylender control and zamindari oppression made rural life precarious; when tenants, ryots and labourers organised, they forced concessions and exposed the limits of colonial rule. The Indigo Revolt of 1859 in Bengal challenged plantation contracts; the Pabna Agrarian Disturbances of 1873 and Deccan Riots of 1875 attacked rent and debt. Later, the Champaran Satyagraha of 1917, Kheda Satyagraha of 1918 and Bardoli Satyagraha of 1928 linked anti-colonial protest to anti-zamindari and anti-revenue demands, giving the Congress a mass rural base. The Awadh Kisan Sabha (1920) under Baba Ramchandra, the Eka movement (1921-22) and the Moplah uprising in Malabar (1921) showed peasant grievances that could also outrun the Congress's control. The formation of the All India Kisan Sabha in 1936 gave peasants an organised national voice, and the Tebhaga movement of 1946-47 and Telangana struggle of 1946-51 radicalised agrarian politics by demanding sharecropper rights and land redistribution. Thus, these movements connected local exploitation to national freedom, making agrarian justice a precondition of independence.

(b) Dalit Perspective of Indian National Movement

The Dalit perspective treats the Indian National Movement as both a site of participation and a structure of upper-caste dominance. While Dalits joined anti-colonial struggles, Ambedkar and others argued that Congress nationalism often treated caste as a social problem rather than a political system of exclusion. This critique sharpened the demand for separate electorates, which Ambedkar insisted was necessary to secure Dalit political voice. The Poona Pact of 1932 converted that demand into reserved representation, but it also revealed the tension between caste-based political assertion and Congress-led constitutional nationalism. Ambedkar's Mahad Satyagraha (1927) asserted access to public water, and his What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables (1945) set out the critique in full. Dalit and non-Brahmin movements, including the Self-Respect Movement, challenged Brahmanical hierarchy, temple entry, education and public dignity. The movement therefore shows that freedom was contested not only against the British but also against caste domination, with class and caste oppression intersecting in the demand for a just republic.

(c) Land Reforms and Constitutional Amendments

Land reforms after independence required constitutional change because zamindari abolition, ceiling and tenancy laws were challenged as violations of property rights. The First Amendment of 1951 inserted Articles 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule to protect agrarian legislation from challenge on the ground of violating fundamental rights. The Fourth Amendment of 1955 made the adequacy of compensation non-justiciable, while the Seventeenth Amendment of 1964 widened the definition of "estate" in Article 31A, required market-value compensation for land within the ceiling under personal cultivation, and added more land laws to the Ninth Schedule. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment of 1971 inserted Article 31C to shield laws implementing Directive Principles, especially Articles 39(b) and 39(c), from challenge under Article 19. The Forty-Fourth Amendment of 1978 deleted the right to property from Part III (Articles 19(1)(f) and 31), making it a constitutional right under Article 300A. Judicial review survived throughout: Kesavananda Bharati (1973) struck down the part of Article 31C that barred courts from examining whether a law actually gave effect to those principles, and I.R. Coelho (2007) held that Ninth Schedule laws added after 24 April 1973 remain open to basic-structure review. These amendments show that agrarian reform was not merely legislative; it required constitutional entrenchment against property-rights litigation and political resistance.

(d) Jammu and Kashmir after 2019

The post-2019 political landscape in Jammu and Kashmir was shaped by the abrogation of Article 370 and the cessation of Article 35A, followed by the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, which converted the state into union territories. This changed the constitutional bargain: the central government gained direct control over security, administration and electoral processes. The security paradigm shifted from a state-based security framework to a centralised security and normalisation model. The Domicile Rules, 2020 replaced the old permanent-resident regime for jobs with a domicile test for long-term residents, and the extension of central laws gave groups such as West Pakistan refugees, Valmikis and Gorkhas the right to vote in assembly elections, altering demographic and electoral expectations. The 2022 Delimitation Commission redrew constituencies, while the 2023 G20 Tourism Working Group meeting in Srinagar reinforced the government’s narrative of normalcy. In December 2023 the Supreme Court upheld the abrogation of Article 370 and directed that assembly elections be held by 30 September 2024 and statehood be restored at the earliest; the 2024 assembly elections, the first since 2014, brought a National Conference-led government under Omar Abdullah to power. The Pahalgam terror attack of April 2025 again tested the normalcy narrative. The restoration of statehood remains a major political debate, with parties and leaders contesting the balance between security, representation and regional identity.

(e) NHRC Assessment

The National Human Rights Commission has been partially successful in achieving its objectives. It has intervened in custodial deaths, monitored implementation of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, and issued guidelines on encounter killings (1997, revised 2010), later reinforced by the Supreme Court in PUCL v. State of Maharashtra (2014), thereby creating a public record of state failure. However, its effectiveness is limited by its recommendatory status, as it cannot compel compliance; by delays in disposal of complaints; by limited reach in conflict zones; and by staffing vacancies that weaken investigation. Section 19 of the Protection of Human Rights Act limits investigative powers over armed forces generally, not only in conflict zones, allowing the Commission only to seek a report from the Centre, which complicates accountability. Its independence has also been questioned internationally: the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions deferred the NHRC's re-accreditation in 2023 and again in 2024. Thus, the NHRC has strengthened human rights discourse and visibility, but it remains a constrained institution whose success depends on executive cooperation, timely action and stronger enforcement.