(a) Enunciate the impediments to women's participation in local governance in the process of political decentralisation. (20…

(a) Impediments to women’s participation in local governance

Political decentralisation after the 73rd Amendment for Panchayati Raj Institutions and the 74th for urban local bodies sought to deepen democracy by reserving not less than one-third of seats and chairperson posts for women (Articles 243D and 243T), a share that more than twenty states have raised to 50 per cent, but constitutional representation has not automatically translated into substantive agency.

The first impediment is structural. Patriarchal family norms assign women domestic responsibility, restrict mobility and public speech, and make candidacy or officeholding socially costly. Low literacy, limited access to information, and weaker asset ownership reduce the capacity to contest elections, manage funds, or engage with bureaucracy. These barriers intersect with caste and class: Dalit, Adivasi and poor women face compounded exclusion, while upper-caste women may dominate reserved seats.

The second is institutional. Party structures remain male-dominated, and women are often placed in unwinable constituencies or treated as tokens. Training, mentorship and secretarial support are inadequate. Panchayats and municipalities have limited financial powers, irregular grants, and weak audit/accountability mechanisms, which make office less attractive and more dependent on male intermediaries. Rotation of reserved seats every term also denies women incumbency and the chance to build experience and a political base.

The third is the gap between de jure reservation and de facto participation. The sarpanch-pati phenomenon shows proxy participation, where husbands or male relatives control decisions. Women may withdraw from public spaces, avoid speaking in meetings, or delegate authority. Thus symbolic representation does not ensure substantive empowerment in planning, budgeting, or grievance redressal; an advisory committee of the Ministry of Panchayati Raj (report 2025) accordingly recommended penalties for proxy representation alongside training and peer networks. Where women's collectives are strong, as with Kerala's Kudumbashree, elected women have gained confidence and bargaining power, which shows that the impediments are social and institutional rather than inevitable.

(b) Caste census and political mobilisation

Caste remains a vital axis of mobilisation because it shapes identity, patronage, reservation politics and collective claims. No full caste enumeration has been published since the 1931 Census, and the Socio-Economic and Caste Census of 2011 released no caste data; Bihar's 2023 caste survey (backward and extremely backward classes about 63 per cent) revived the demand, and in April 2025 the Union government decided to include caste enumeration in the next Census, with 1 March 2027 as its reference date. A caste census can address aspirations by converting political identity into evidence-based policy. Reliable data would help identify the size and location of SCs, STs and OBCs, refine sub-categorisation within OBCs (the task of the Rohini Commission, which reported in 2023), and expose creamy-layer complexities that blunt targeted welfare. It could guide equitable distribution of scholarships, housing, credit, land and employment benefits, and make reservation debates less speculative.

Politically, a census may shift mobilisation from symbolic representation to substantive representation, as communities demand measurable outcomes rather than only seats. It may also intensify intra-OBC competition, since sub-castes and dominant OBC groups may contest data and quotas. Hence the census can consolidate social justice if used for redistribution and capability-building, but it can fragment politics if reduced to a contest over numbers. Its value lies in making caste a basis for policy, not merely electoral arithmetic.

(c) Appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners

Article 324 vests the superintendence, direction and control of elections in the Election Commission. The President appoints the CEC and ECs, who serve six years or until the age of 65. The CEC can be removed only in the manner and on the grounds of a Supreme Court judge, while an EC can be removed only on the CEC's recommendation. Article 324(2) left the appointment procedure to a parliamentary law that was not enacted for seven decades, so appointments were made on executive advice alone; the debate is whether this is sufficient for independence. The Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) and the Law Commission's 255th Report (2015) had recommended a collegium including the Leader of the Opposition and the Chief Justice.

Parliament then enacted the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023. A Search Committee chaired by the Union Law Minister, with two officers not below the rank of Secretary, prepares a panel of five names; a Selection Committee of the Prime Minister, a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition (or leader of the largest opposition party) in the Lok Sabha makes the recommendation, and may consider names outside the panel. Supporters see a statutory, collective process; critics argue that replacing the Chief Justice with a Cabinet Minister gives the executive a built-in two-to-one majority. Two Election Commissioners were appointed under the Act in March 2024 and the CEC in February 2025, while challenges to its validity remain pending before the Supreme Court.

Before that Act, the Supreme Court in Anoop Baranwal v Union of India (March 2023) had held that the CEC and ECs should be appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Chief Justice of India, until Parliament enacted a law. This balances executive accountability with institutional independence. Comparative practice, such as the UK Electoral Commission, shows that statutory appointment conventions can coexist with operational autonomy if the Commission is insulated from day-to-day political control.

The way forward is a transparent, multi-stakeholder appointment process that preserves the CEC’s independence, ensures seniority-based leadership, and limits partisan influence.