(a) Compare the main features of development of jute and cotton textile industry in India during the British period. (20…

Jute and cotton under colonialism Colonial industrialisation was uneven, shaped by raw materials, ports, capital and labour. Jute mills clustered in Bengal, especially Calcutta and Hooghly, because raw jute was local, river transport cheap, and Calcutta port served export markets. Cotton mills concentrated in Bombay and Ahmedabad, close to Deccan and Gujarat raw cotton and merchant capital. Jute was export-oriented, making hessian and sacking for Britain and world markets; cotton textiles served a large domestic market. Raw-material dependence differed: jute relied on indigenous fibre, while cotton mills increasingly imported American cotton for finer yarns. Ownership contrasted sharply: jute was dominated by British capital and management, while cotton was largely Indian-owned, with Bombay and Ahmedabad merchants controlling mills. Jute mill labour conditions were generally harsher, with long hours, low wages, child labour and seasonal unemployment; cotton mills also had poor conditions, but Indian ownership produced different wage and discipline patterns. Both displaced handloom weavers and handspinners, but cotton mills hit the Deccan handloom economy harder, while jute mills coexisted with a smaller handloom sector and drew on Bengal’s surplus labour. Technology adoption also differed: jute mills were newer, more capital-intensive and geared to export standards, whereas many cotton units were older, smaller and more flexible to domestic demand.

Primary and capital goods before liberalisation In the Indian industrial classification, primary or basic goods include coal, iron ore, steel, cement, electricity and fertilisers, not consumer textiles. The early plans gave priority to basic goods to create industrial capacity. Coal and iron-ore production rose, steel capacity expanded through SAIL units at Bhilai, Rourkela and Bokaro, and cement and electricity output grew, though bottlenecks appeared. Fertiliser production improved but remained erratic. Capital goods were relatively neglected under the first phase of import substitution until the Second Plan, after which public-sector investment expanded machine tools, tractors, engineering and heavy equipment. However, after 1965 growth decelerated, and the 1970s saw stagnation in capital-goods output due to droughts, oil shocks, licence controls and weak capacity utilisation. Agriculture-linked primary inputs such as fertilisers and agricultural machinery showed uneven or stagnant growth, while mining and metal industries continued to expand. Structurally, consumer goods’ share in manufacturing fell from about 62 per cent in 1951; by 1990–91 basic goods were about 32 per cent and capital goods 12–13 per cent, a combined 45 per cent. This reflected a deliberate shift to basic and capital goods, but gains were uneven and constrained by public-sector inefficiency.

Public sector performance before reform Public sector enterprises were central to pre-reform industrial policy. They expanded in steel, power, fertilisers, oil, heavy engineering and transport, generated employment, supplied strategic goods and helped develop backward regions. In some cases, such as SAIL, BHEL and IOCL, they built large-scale capacity and met social objectives. Yet performance was mixed. Capacity utilisation was often low because of input shortages, poor planning and overcapacity. Technological upgradation lagged, with outdated machinery and limited R&D. Employment generation was high, but overstaffing and rigid labour practices reduced productivity. Political interference in appointments, pricing and procurement was common, and pricing distortions—often below-cost or administered prices—discouraged efficiency. The result was a growing number of sick units before 1991, many dependent on soft budgets and government support. Thus the public sector met developmental objectives but created inefficiencies that made liberalisation and corporate reform necessary.

Conclusion The colonial legacy of export-oriented jute and Indian-owned cotton shaped post-independence policy: the state promoted import substitution, public-sector heavy industry and planned basic goods. Pre-reform India thus built a basic and capital-goods base, but with structural rigidities. The verdict is that public-sector-led industrialisation expanded capacity and employment, but inefficiencies and 1970s stagnation justified 1991 reforms.