(a) State the functions of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Do you think that UNCTAD has been…

(a) UNCTAD: Functions and Record UNCTAD, set up in 1964 with Raúl Prebisch as its first Secretary-General, is the UN body for trade and development. Its functions include promoting trade and development, providing technical cooperation, monitoring trade and investment, LDC support mechanisms, facilitating trade negotiations, assisting countries in using GSP schemes, debt management, and developing investment policy frameworks. It also supports the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance and provides a forum for developing countries, especially through the Group of 77 and the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP).

UNCTAD has had partial success in extending economic cooperation among developing countries. It gave the South a collective voice, helped coordinate G77 positions, and promoted South–South preferences through GSTP. Its technical assistance, LDC support and investment policy frameworks have improved policy capacity; its support for GSP utilization has helped developing countries access preference schemes; and the Integrated Framework has helped vulnerable countries build trade capacity. However, UNCTAD is not fully successful as an engine of deep South–South integration. It lacks binding dispute resolution, unlike the WTO, and remains marginalised in global trade architecture. GSP schemes are administered by developed countries, not UNCTAD; UNCTAD only provides technical support and analysis, so preferences remain conditional and politically variable. Its commodity agenda, the Integrated Programme for Commodities and the Common Fund for Commodities (in force 1989), achieved little price stabilisation, and the GSTP São Paulo Round (2010) has not been widely ratified. South–South trade has grown with the rise of China and India, but mainly through markets and bilateral deals rather than UNCTAD instruments. Thus, UNCTAD has been more successful as a consultative and capacity-building platform than as an institution that transforms developing-country cooperation into enforceable economic integration.

(b) Uniform Pollution Standards Developing countries often specify a permissible level of pollution and impose it uniformly on similar units because administrative simplicity, limited regulatory capacity, information asymmetries and the political economy of standard-setting make uniform rules easier to adopt and enforce. A single standard avoids complex cost-benefit calculations and reduces discretion, which is useful where monitoring institutions are weak.

The problems are significant. Uniform standards ignore heterogeneity in abatement costs and therefore violate the equimarginal principle: the same emission limit may be cheap for a large modern plant but prohibitively costly for a small older unit. This creates inefficiency, may force exit of smaller firms, and can raise prices. Monitoring and verification remain difficult, especially where data systems are weak. Uniform standards are also static and may not capture technological progress, because they do not reward firms that can abate cheaply or innovate. In India, uniform emission norms can simplify regulation, but they may not achieve the same environmental outcome at minimum cost as differentiated or market-based instruments.

(c) COP26 (Glasgow, 2021): Achievements and Failures COP26 achieved several outcomes. The Glasgow Climate Pact included explicit language on coal phase-down and phase-out of inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies. It completed the Paris Rulebook, including Article 6, and secured pledges on methane reduction, deforestation, and enhanced NDCs, with parties requested to revisit and strengthen 2030 targets by end-2022. It also asked developed countries to at least double adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025, and India announced its Panchamrit, including net zero by 2070.

Its failures were equally important. The $100 billion a year climate finance goal, due by 2020, had not been met (the OECD later reported it was reached only in 2022). Loss and damage remained weak: the Santiago Network was established at COP25, while COP26 only launched the Glasgow Dialogue and did not create a dedicated funded facility. Article 6.4 carbon market rules contained loopholes that raised concerns about double counting and environmental integrity. Overall ambition remained inadequate for a 1.5°C pathway.