(a) How does India-Israel bilateral ties reflect the autonomy of India's foreign policy choices? (20 marks) (b) Discuss the…

(a) India–Israel Ties and Foreign Policy Autonomy

India recognised Israel in 1950, but for decades its engagement was constrained by NAM-era solidarity with the Palestinian cause. The decisive shift came in January 1992, when P.V. Narasimha Rao’s government established full diplomatic relations, while continuing to support Palestinian statehood. The explicit "de-hyphenation" of Israel and Palestine policy came later: Narendra Modi's 2017 visit was the first by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel and did not include Ramallah, which he visited separately in 2018. This was not a realignment with the West, it was a policy innovation that allowed India to pursue defence, technology and developmental cooperation without abandoning its traditional Arab and Islamic world ties. Defence links—Barak-8/MRSAM air defence, Phalcon AWACS, Heron and Harop drones, and Spice bombs (used at Balakot in 2019), with Israel's support during the 1999 Kargil war—show how India uses Israel to fill capability gaps. The Indo-Israel Agricultural Project and water-management cooperation show the same logic in civilian sectors. India’s autonomy is also evident in its balancing: it maintains relations with Iran, abstained on a 2015 UNHRC resolution critical of Israel, and keeps Arab engagement alive through its partnerships with the UAE and Saudi Arabia and in minilaterals such as I2U2 and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (2023). After 7 October 2023 India condemned the Hamas attack as terrorism but voted for the December 2023 UNGA resolution demanding a humanitarian ceasefire, sent humanitarian aid to Gaza, and in June 2025 distanced itself from an SCO statement condemning Israel's strikes on Iran, while in September 2025 it signed a bilateral investment treaty with Israel. The result is a calibrated engagement: cooperation where interests converge, distance where they do not. In neoclassical realist terms (Gideon Rose), the end of the Cold War and domestic economic reform widened India’s room for manoeuvre, and Israel ties became a selective partnership rather than an alliance.

(b) Consequences of Illegal Cross-Border Migration in the North-East

Illegal migration has made the North-East a site of demographic, security and ecological stress. In Assam, prolonged illegal migration from Bangladesh has altered the demography of several districts, weakened indigenous political representation and intensified land alienation and wage depression. The Assam Agitation (1979-85) culminated in the 1985 Assam Accord: Clause 5 provided for identification and deportation of foreigners who entered on or after 25 March 1971 (with 1966-71 entrants disenfranchised for ten years), while Clause 6 promised constitutional, legislative and administrative safeguards for the Assamese people. The Supreme Court struck down the IMDT Act in Sarbananda Sonowal (2005) for making detection nearly impossible, and in October 2024 upheld Section 6A of the Citizenship Act that gives legal form to the Accord's cut-off. The final NRC of August 2019 left out about 19 lakh people but has not been notified, and the Citizenship Amendment Act (2019, rules notified March 2024) reopened protests in Assam. Tripura shows the long-run effect most starkly: post-Partition migration reduced its indigenous tribal communities to a minority, fuelling insurgency. Beyond Assam, illegal migration from Myanmar, especially the post-2021 influx of more than 30,000 Chin refugees into Mizoram, has added pressure on border states, and in Manipur perceptions of migration from Myanmar fed into the ethnic violence that began in May 2023, leading the Centre to end the Free Movement Regime and begin fencing the border in 2024. Porous borders facilitate smuggling, trafficking and insurgent cross-border movement, creating an insurgency nexus that complicates internal security. Socio-economically, migration strains local labour markets, displaces communities and increases pressure on forests and riverine ecosystems, as in encroachment around Kaziranga. The consequence is not merely a legal problem but a challenge to regional stability, indigenous identity and environmental carrying capacity.

(c) India’s Vision of a New World Order

India’s 21st-century vision is a multipolar, rules-based order in which the Global South has greater voice. It rejects unilateralism and seeks institutional reform rather than bloc politics. The G-4 demand for UNSC reform captures this: India wants a permanent seat and a more representative Security Council. India also advocates WTO reforms, stronger multilateralism through the UN, and leadership of the Global South, as seen in the Voice of the Global South Summit. India calls this "reformed multilateralism" and backs it with institutions of its own making, such as the International Solar Alliance, the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure and the Global Biofuels Alliance, as well as the African Union's G20 membership won during its 2023 presidency. Normatively, it frames this order through Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, the LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment) movement and SDG leadership, presenting itself as a bridge between developed and developing countries. India’s preference is for a managed multipolarity, where power is diffused but institutions remain central. Crucially, India pursues strategic partnerships without alliance entrapment, preserving freedom of action.