(a) Discuss the relevance of the demand for New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the present era of globalisation. (20…

(a) Relevance of NIEO in the Era of Globalisation

Rooted in UNCTAD (1964) and the Algiers NAM Summit (1973), the New International Economic Order (NIEO) was proclaimed by the UN General Assembly's Sixth Special Session in May 1974 (Resolutions 3201 and 3202) and followed by the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (December 1974). It demanded permanent sovereignty over natural resources, stable and fair commodity prices, regulation of multinational corporations, technology transfer, preferential market access, and democratisation of the Bretton Woods institutions. In the contemporary era of globalization, this demand remains deeply relevant due to persistent structural paradoxes. While globalization expanded trade volumes, it deepened inequalities between the Global North and South.

This asymmetry is evident in the World Trade Organization (WTO), where developing nations face constraints on agricultural support such as public stockholding for food security, while the Appellate Body has been non-functional since December 2019 because the US has blocked appointments. Similarly, the long-missed USD 100 billion climate finance goal and the widely criticised USD 300 billion New Collective Quantified Goal agreed at COP29 (2024) and lagging Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) reflect historical structural neglect. Contemporary manifestations such as the digital divide and the vaccine nationalism witnessed during the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate that the core–periphery patterns described by Raúl Prebisch and dependency theorists endure. While institutions like BRICS, the New Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are hailed as NIEO 2.0, critics argue they risk being co-opted by existing neoliberal financial logics rather than replacing them. The NIEO agenda also survives in reform demands: IMF quota realignment, the Bridgetown Initiative on development finance, sovereign-debt restructuring under the G20 Common Framework, the African Union's G20 membership secured during India's 2023 presidency, and the Voice of the Global South summits India convenes. Critics add that the original NIEO faded in the 1980s debt crisis because the South lacked bargaining power once OPEC's leverage waned. Nonetheless, the demand for a fair economic architecture remains indispensable for the Global South.

(b) Turnaround in India’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy

India's post-Cold War diplomatic recalibration was triggered by systemic structural shocks. The collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated the bipolar cushion, ending the structural utility of classical non-alignment in a unipolar world led by the United States. Concurrently, India’s 1991 Balance of Payments crisis mandated Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation (LPG) reforms, requiring foreign capital, technology, and integration with Western markets.

This turnaround manifested in dynamic policy shifts: full diplomatic relations with Israel (1992), the Look East policy launched under Narasimha Rao (renamed Act East in 2014) to integrate with East Asian economies, the Gujral Doctrine of non-reciprocal generosity towards neighbours (1996), the 1998 Pokhran-II nuclear tests that transitioned India from moral disarmament advocacy to overt deterrence, and the 2008 Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement. India moved from non-alignment to pragmatic multi-alignment, engaging simultaneously across platforms like the QUAD, BRICS, and the SCO.

Critically examining this trajectory reveals that this turnaround was not an abandonment of principle, but an evolution from passive non-involvement to active, issue-based alignment. The fundamental objective remained constant: safeguarding strategic autonomy while maximizing developmental and security payoffs.

(c) India’s Refusal to Sign the NPT

India’s refusal to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) rests on its fundamentally discriminatory framework. The treaty instituted an arbitrary cut-off date of January 1, 1967, legitimizing a nuclear monopoly for the P-5 nations while obligating non-nuclear states to permanently forswear nuclear weapons, balanced only by a vague Article VI obligation on nuclear-weapon states to pursue disarmament negotiations in good faith, with no timeline. For the same reason India rejected the NPT's indefinite extension in 1995 and refused to sign the CTBT in 1996, having earlier offered the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (1988) for time-bound universal disarmament.

India's stance is also driven by acute regional security realities. The 1964 Chinese nuclear test and the subsequent China–Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation created an existential two-front security dilemma. Following the 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (Pokhran-I) and 1998 weaponization, nuclear capability became essential to preserve sovereign strategic deterrence, and India adopted a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and No First Use (2003) to reassure the world of its restraint.

India's principled refusal has proven tenable over time. Despite initial sanctions, India’s strong non-proliferation record earned it the 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver and the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, granting de facto recognition as a responsible nuclear power. While China continues to block India's formal NSG membership, India’s entry into the MTCR (2016), the Wassenaar Arrangement (2017) and the Australia Group (2018) affirms that its principled refusal has protected national sovereignty without isolating it from global technological regimes.