(a) "India's Nuclear policy is deeply influenced by its cultural beliefs and the pragmatic approach of its foreign policy."…

India’s nuclear posture, Afghan engagement and Iran ties all reflect a state trying to reconcile normative identity with hard-power realities.

Cultural and pragmatic roots of nuclear policy India’s nuclear policy is not merely a military doctrine; it is shaped by civilisational ideas and strategic calculation. The declared No First Use (NFU) policy is often linked to Gandhian and Jain ideas of ahimsa, presenting nuclear weapons as instruments of deterrence rather than war-fighting. This restraint is also traced to Arthashastra’s emphasis on calculated statecraft and avoidance of unnecessary escalation. After the 1998 tests, India framed itself as a “responsible nuclear power,” seeking legitimacy while retaining a deterrent. At the same time, the policy is pragmatic. India follows Credible Minimum Deterrence, maintaining enough nuclear capability to deter major attack without entering an arms race. NFU is cost-effective because it reduces the need for large arsenals and complex command-and-control systems. The development of a nuclear triad—land-based missiles, sea-based platforms and air-delivered weapons, completed when INS Arihant finished its first deterrence patrol in 2018—strengthens second-strike credibility. The 2003 doctrine also shows pragmatism: NFU is qualified by "massive" retaliation and by the option of a nuclear response to a major biological or chemical attack, under civilian control through the Nuclear Command Authority. This allows India to balance China and Pakistan, especially given Pakistan's first-use posture and "full-spectrum deterrence", including tactical nuclear weapons, and China's rapid nuclear build-up, while avoiding an unaffordable escalation. Thus culture supplies moral language, while pragmatism shapes survivability and deterrence.

Afghanistan after 2021 After the Taliban takeover in August 2021, India adopted a cautious but persistent strategy to protect its investments and humanitarian interests. It provided some 50,000 tonnes of wheat (first overland through Pakistan in 2022, later via Chabahar), medicines, COVID-19 vaccines and earthquake relief, signalling concern for Afghan civilians rather than recognition of the Taliban government. India reopened its Kabul mission with a technical team in June 2022; contacts then rose step by step - a Foreign Secretary-level meeting with Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai (January 2025), a ministerial telephone call after the Pahalgam attack, and Muttaqi's visit to New Delhi in October 2025, when India announced that its mission would be upgraded to an embassy. Indian-built assets such as the Salma Dam and the Parliament building remain reminders of India's long-term presence and goodwill. At the regional level, India pursued coordination through NSA-level talks such as the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue (November 2021) and backed UN Security Council Resolution 2593 (2021) on keeping Afghan soil free of terrorism, seeking to keep Afghanistan stable and prevent the country from becoming a source of regional insecurity. This reflects a pragmatic attempt to remain relevant without legitimising the Taliban’s governance.

Challenges and limitations in India-Iran relations India-Iran relations are strategically important but constrained by external pressure and internal limitations. US sanctions have complicated Chabahar port, limiting Indian investment and operational use despite India’s interest in a gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia; even after the ten-year terminal agreement of May 2024, Washington announced in September 2025 that it would revoke the sanctions exemption the port had enjoyed since 2018. The Farzad-B gas field project has been delayed, and India was excluded from its upstream development, weakening India’s energy and economic stake in Iran. Pakistan’s role in regional connectivity, especially through CPEC and its influence in Afghanistan, creates a competing axis that India must counter. Sectarian tensions in the Gulf, particularly between Iran and Saudi Arabia, add a layer of caution for India, which seeks stable energy supplies and broader Gulf cooperation. Iran’s tilt towards China, formalised in a 25-year strategic partnership, raises concerns that India’s connectivity and economic interests may be marginalised.

Structural limitations also persist. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) remains underutilised due to logistics, financing and transit bottlenecks. Banking channel restrictions have made trade settlement difficult, discouraging private participation. India’s oil imports from Iran have been at zero since the US ended sanctions waivers in May 2019, removing a major economic link. The Israel-Iran war of June 2025, including US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, showed how India must balance ties with Iran against its partnerships with Israel, the Gulf states and the United States, and Iranian criticism on Kashmir and Indian Muslims has periodically irritated New Delhi. Afghanistan also presents a competing priority: while India and Iran share interests in stability and connectivity, India’s immediate security concerns in Afghanistan can pull resources away from deeper Iran engagement.

Way forward The way forward is to deepen strategic autonomy through calibrated engagement. India should sustain humanitarian and technical ties with Afghanistan while linking them to security assurances. With Iran, it should pursue sanctions-resilient mechanisms, revive INSTC and Farzad-B participation, and use Chabahar as a multi-modal hub. Nuclear restraint, Afghan pragmatism and Iran-focused connectivity together show India’s effort to balance values, security and economic interests in a volatile neighbourhood.