(a) Critically examine the continuity and change in India's Palestine policy in the wake of the ongoing Israel-Hamas War. (20…

(a) Palestine: continuity and change

India’s Palestine policy has a long continuity. Indira Gandhi’s government recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in 1974, India recognised the State of Palestine in 1988, and it has consistently supported Palestinian self-determination and a negotiated two-state solution with a sovereign, viable Palestinian state. The 1992 establishment of full diplomatic relations with Israel did not abandon this; it de-hyphenated Palestine from Israel, allowing engagement with both, as Prime Minister Modi's separate visits to Israel (2017) and Ramallah (2018) showed. After 7 October 2023, India condemned Hamas terrorism, supported Israel’s right to self-defence, but also called for a ceasefire, protection of civilians, humanitarian access and a negotiated two-state outcome. It sent humanitarian relief and medical supplies for Gaza and continued its contributions to UNRWA. Yet the change is visible in tactical calibration: India abstained on the Jordan-sponsored UNGA humanitarian truce resolution of 27 October 2023 because it did not name Hamas, but voted for the ceasefire resolution of 12 December 2023, for enhanced rights for Palestine at the UN in May 2024, and for the New York Declaration on the two-state solution in September 2025, and it welcomed the ceasefire and hostage-release deal of October 2025. The tension is between a deepening security and technology partnership with Israel, including defence imports and counter-terrorism cooperation, and India's stakes in the Arab world - about nine million citizens in the Gulf, energy supplies, and projects such as I2U2 and IMEC that need Arab-Israeli stability. Critically, India has not reversed its pro-Palestinian principle; it has subordinated rhetorical leadership to strategic autonomy, making its policy more transactional but still anchored in two-state advocacy.

(b) Myanmar FMR and the north-east

The Free Movement Regime (FMR) reflects the older reality of kin communities divided by a colonial boundary; formalised in 1968 and later restricted to 16 km, it allowed residents near the 1,643 km India-Myanmar border to cross without a visa, and was reframed in 2018 under the Act East policy. The Union Home Ministry announced in February 2024 that the FMR would be scrapped and the entire border fenced, and later replaced it with a stricter pass-based regime for residents close to the border. The move has immediate border-management consequences in the Manipur-Mizoram sector: visa/permit checks, tighter checkpoints, reduced cross-border trade and livelihood, and greater state control. Its ethno-political implications are complex. The Mizoram and Nagaland assemblies passed resolutions against scrapping the FMR, while the then Manipur government supported it; Manipur itself came under President's Rule in February 2025. Mizo, Kuki-Zo and Naga communities in Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland and Myanmar maintain cross-border kinship, trade and cultural networks; formal barriers may fragment these networks and increase resentment, particularly in Manipur where Meitei-Kuki-Zo tensions are already acute, risking escalation of Manipur violence. The move may also affect the flow of people and goods that had eased some local grievances, but it can reduce cross-border trafficking and insurgent movement. At the same time, post-2021 Myanmar coup violence and refugee influx, including displaced communities, strain India’s border districts and can intensify competition over resources. Security-wise, scrapping FMR helps deny safe havens to insurgents and criminal networks, but if implemented without development and community engagement, it may harden ethnic boundaries and complicate peacebuilding. A way forward is to pair border control with development, community dialogue and refugee management.

(c) Non-alignment and multi-alignment

The claim that India has debunked non-alignment is partly right only if non-alignment is misread as isolation. NAM was a coalition of newly independent states that refused to join either Cold War bloc, tied to anti-colonial solidarity; India’s newer multi-alignment is issue-based partnership without permanent bloc commitment. India’s Quad membership, I2U2, and US foundational defence pacts (LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA) and closer defence ties with France show deeper alignment with the West on security and connectivity. Yet simultaneous engagement with Russia through S-400 and with Iran through Chabahar shows it is not choosing a side. Thus India has not discarded non-alignment’s core—strategic autonomy, not ideological neutrality—but has transformed it into multi-alignment. India also continues to value NAM and Global South platforms, as its Voice of the Global South Summits show, so the statement overstates the break: multi-alignment is non-alignment's strategic core adapted to a multipolar world.