(a) Would you concur with the view that of late, India's foreign policy has been in a transition mode from Nehruvianism to…

(a) From Nehruvianism to Neoliberal Strategic Pragmatism

Nehruvian foreign policy was anchored in non-alignment, moralpolitik, anti-imperialist solidarity, and a domestic framework of state-led economic nationalism with import substitution. In contrast, the post-1991 era prompted a shift toward neoliberal imperatives: outward-oriented economic liberalization, integration into global capital flows, military modernization, and a transition from non-alignment to multi-alignment based on strategic autonomy.

Tangible manifestations of this transition include the landmark 2008 Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement, active engagement in minilaterals such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), foundational defence pacts (LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA), free trade agreements with the UAE, Australia, EFTA and the UK, the India-EU FTA concluded in January 2026, and production-linked incentive schemes under Atmanirbhar Bharat (2020) designed to make India a manufacturing hub within global value chains. The evidence is mixed, however: India walked out of RCEP in 2019 and raised many tariffs, so its economic diplomacy is selectively rather than wholly neoliberal. However, this is a recalibration rather than an absolute rupture. India maintains vital continuities with its foundational ethos through developmental cooperation in its immediate periphery under the Neighbourhood First policy, a residual presence in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and south-south cooperation platforms like BRICS and IBSA.

(b) Feasibility of the Asian Century Amid Sino-Indian Friction

Deng Xiaoping told Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 that there could be no genuine Asian century unless China and India developed together. The idea of the 21st century as an 'Asian Century' is premised on the global redistribution of economic weight, technological innovation, and institutional leadership toward Asia. However, structural friction between India and China presents a fundamental impediment to this vision.

The 2020 Galwan Valley standoff, persistent Line of Actual Control (LAC) disputes, geo-economic decoupling measures, and clashing regional architectures—China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) versus India’s vision of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific—risk producing a fragmented, contested Asia rather than a cooperative economic bloc.

Nevertheless, the Asian century remains viable through alternative dynamics. High volumes of Sino-Indian bilateral trade - well over $100 billion a year, though with an Indian deficit approaching $100 billion - highlight sustained economic interdependence despite political tensions. Diplomacy has also thawed: the October 2024 agreement on patrolling at Depsang and Demchok, the Modi-Xi meeting at Kazan, and Prime Minister Modi's visit to Tianjin for the SCO summit in 2025 were followed by the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra and direct flights. Furthermore, ASEAN centrality offers an institutional buffer, while regional platforms (such as the AIIB and SCO) sustain functional engagement. India’s Indo-Pacific strategy serves as a constructive hedge, promoting a multipolar Asia where regional stability rests on a balance of power and collective security rather than unilateral hegemony.

(c) India’s Role in Establishing a New International Economic Order

India possesses substantial normative and institutional credentials to lead the Global South in restructuring the global economic architecture. Rooted in its historical stewardship of the NAM and G-77, which secured the UN General Assembly's 1974 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, India reinforced this role through its Vaccine Maitri pharmaceutical diplomacy during COVID-19, its advocacy for climate justice grounded in Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), new institutions such as the International Solar Alliance (2015) and the Global Biofuels Alliance (2023), and the institutionalization of the Voice of Global South Summit. A key milestone was India’s steering of the African Union’s permanent induction into the G20 during its 2023 Presidency.

To establish a 21st-century New International Economic Order (NIEO), India can pursue concrete multilateral pathways:

• Advocating comprehensive reforms in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to protect food security, public stockholding, and special and differential treatment for developing states.
• Pushing for governance and quota revisions in the IMF and World Bank to align voting power with contemporary economic weight.
• Facilitating sovereign debt relief and restructuring mechanisms for vulnerable low-income countries under distress.
• Exporting low-cost, open-source Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI)—such as the India Stack—to bridge the global digital divide.
• Building resilient, diversified supply chain architectures through initiatives like the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) to reduce unilateral external dependencies.

To realize these goals, India must continue balancing its external partnerships with strategic autonomy, translating its domestic economic momentum into collective bargaining power for the Global South, thereby ensuring an equitable, multipolar, and resilient international economic order.