(a) Discuss the future of SAARC in the light of India's increased focus on other regional groupings like ASEAN and BIMSTEC. (20…

(a) The Future of SAARC Amid India's Pivot to BIMSTEC and ASEAN

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has suffered structural paralysis, primarily driven by persistent India-Pakistan rivalry and the weaponisation of cross-border terrorism, which stalled summits after the 2016 Islamabad summit was cancelled following the Uri attack; the last summit was held at Kathmandu in 2014, and after the Pahalgam attack of April 2025 India cancelled SAARC visa exemptions for Pakistani nationals. Consequently, New Delhi has strategically shifted focus toward functional alternatives: the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) under its Act East Policy. BIMSTEC offers seamless sub-regional connectivity free of Pakistan’s obstructionism, reinforced by its Charter (signed in 2022, in force from 2024) and the Bangkok Vision 2030 adopted at its 2025 summit, while ASEAN anchors India’s broader Indo-Pacific architecture.

However, SAARC is not entirely obsolete. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated its residual utility when India convened a virtual SAARC emergency summit and established the SAARC COVID-19 Emergency Fund. While BIMSTEC bridges South and Southeast Asia, it lacks SAARC’s comprehensive civilisational geography and integrated trade mechanisms like SAFTA. Thus, while SAARC remains in a state of diplomatic hibernation, it retains latent relevance should political realignments permit genuine regional integration.

(b) India’s Position on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

India’s persistent refusal to sign the NPT stems from a principled critique first articulated in its 1968 multilateral statements, which denounced the treaty's discriminatory architecture. By arbitrarily creating a permanent hierarchy between five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) recognized prior to 1967 and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), the treaty institutionalised what Jaswant Singh later called "nuclear apartheid" (Foreign Affairs, 1998), since Article VI contains only a vague undertaking to pursue disarmament negotiations in good faith.

Following the 1998 Pokhran-II tests, India formulated a responsible nuclear doctrine based on Credible Minimum Deterrence and a No-First-Use (NFU) pledge. India’s de facto nuclear status gained international legitimacy through the 2008 Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement (123 Agreement) and an unprecedented clean waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008, followed by membership of the MTCR (2016), the Wassenaar Arrangement (2017) and the Australia Group (2018). However, staying outside the NPT imposes structural costs, including persistent Chinese obstruction to formal NSG membership and lingering frictions within the global non-proliferation regime. Despite these costs, signing the NPT as a non-nuclear state remains an existential non-starter given India's two-front security environment involving China and Pakistan.

(c) India-US Relations: Strategic Partnership Without Formal Alliance

The trajectory of India-US relations has transformed from the Cold War "estranged democracies" of Dennis Kux's phrase into a comprehensive global strategic partnership. This convergence is institutionalised through the foundational defense agreements—LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA—as well as dynamic minilateral platforms such as the Quad and I2U2, alongside cooperation in critical technologies (iCET, 2023, relaunched as TRUST in 2025) and a ten-year framework for the major defence partnership signed in October 2025.

This relationship thrives precisely because it avoids a treaty-based mutual defense pact. A formal alliance would impose rigid entrapment risks, constraining India’s foundational commitment to strategic autonomy. The framework of "alignment without alliance" allows both nations to balance an assertive China in the Indo-Pacific while accommodating divergent vital interests. These friction points—manifested in US sanctions threats under CAATSA, bilateral trade disputes culminating in the steep US tariffs of 2025 over India's Russian oil purchases (cut to 18 per cent under the February 2026 interim trade deal), and India’s independent strategic ties with Russia and Iran—highlight the boundaries of this partnership, and show why an alliance would bind India to disputes that are not its own.