Paper II — Q7
(a) Discuss the future of SAARC in the light of India's increased focus on other regional groupings like ASEAN and BIMSTEC. (20…
(a) Discuss the future of SAARC in the light of India's increased focus on other regional groupings like ASEAN and BIMSTEC. (20 marks) (b) Critically examine India's persistent refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) despite being recognized as a de facto nuclear power. (15 marks) (c) "India and USA have become such strong strategic partners that they need not become formal allies." Comment. (15 marks)
हिंदी में प्रश्न पढ़ें
(a) आसियान और बिम्सटेक जैसे अन्य क्षेत्रीय समूहों पर भारत के बढ़ते फोकस/संकेन्द्रण के आलोक में सार्क के भविष्य पर चर्चा कीजिए। (20 अंक) (b) वास्तविक परमाणु शक्ति के रूप में मान्यता प्राप्त होने के बावजूद परमाणु अप्रसार संधि (एन.पी.टी.) पर हस्ताक्षर करने से भारत के लगातार इनकार का आलोचनात्मक परीक्षण कीजिए। (15 अंक) (c) "भारत और यू.एस.ए. इतने सशक्त रणनीतिक साझेदार बन गए हैं कि उन्हें औपचारिक सहयोगी बनने की आवश्यकता नहीं है।" टिप्पणी कीजिए। (15 अंक)
Directive word: Discuss
This question asks you to discuss. The directive word signals the depth of analysis expected, the structure of your answer, and the weight of evidence you must bring.
See our UPSC directive words guide for a full breakdown of how to respond to each command word.
How this answer will be evaluated
Approach
The question demands a multi-directive response: 'discuss' for (a), 'critically examine' for (b), and 'comment' for (c). Allocate approximately 40% of time/words to part (a) given its 20 marks, and roughly 30% each to (b) and (c). Structure with a brief composite introduction, three distinct sections with clear sub-headings, and a synthesized conclusion that ties India's strategic autonomy theme across all three parts.
Key points expected
- For (a): SAARC's institutional paralysis due to India-Pakistan rivalry, India's strategic pivot to ASEAN (Act East Policy) and BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative) as functional alternatives, and assessment of whether SAARC can be revived or is structurally obsolete.
- For (b): India's principled objection to NPT as discriminatory (January 1968 statement), the distinction between NWS and NNWS as perpetuating nuclear apartheid, post-1998 de facto recognition through Indo-US nuclear deal and NSG waiver, and the credibility-costs of non-membership.
- For (c): The transformation from estranged democracies (1947-1991) to strategic partners through LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA agreements, the logic of 'alignment without alliance' preserving strategic autonomy, and limits evidenced by CAATSA sanctions, trade disputes, and divergent Russia/Iran policies.
- Synthesis across parts: India's consistent pursuit of strategic autonomy—rejecting NPT's hierarchical order, maintaining SAARC at arm's length while building alternative architectures, and partnering with US without formal alliance commitments.
- Contemporary developments: SAARC's virtual summit during COVID-19 vs. BIMSTEC's institutional deepening; India's nuclear doctrine evolution; Quad and I2U2 as new partnership formats.
Evaluation rubric
| Dimension | Weight | Max marks | Excellent | Average | Poor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Demand-directive understanding | 20% | 10 | Correctly identifies and operationalizes all three directives: 'discuss' for (a) presenting multiple perspectives on SAARC's viability; 'critically examine' for (b) evaluating both merits and flaws of India's NPT position with balanced judgment; 'comment' for (c) offering reasoned opinion on the alliance question with nuanced qualification. | Recognizes the three directives but treats them similarly—either over-critiquing (a) or under-analyzing (b)—missing the distinct evaluative demands of each sub-part. | Confuses directives (e.g., treats 'comment' as description) or ignores directive-specific requirements entirely, producing generic responses that fail to address what each sub-part demands. |
| Content depth & accuracy | 20% | 10 | Demonstrates command of institutional specifics: SAARC charter provisions (Article X on bilateral disputes), NPT's Article IX.3 and 1995 indefinite extension, foundational agreements (LEMOA 2016, COMCASA 2018, BECA 2020); accurate on India's 1974 and 1998 tests, NSG waiver 2008, and membership applications. | Covers main themes but with factual gaps—vague on BIMSTEC's 1997 founding or specific agreements, conflates NPT with CTBT, or mischaracterizes the India-US relationship as 'alliance' without qualification. | Substantive errors: claims India signed NPT, misidentifies SAARC's headquarters, or confuses strategic partnership with NATO-style alliance; superficial treatment with significant omissions on all three parts. |
| Structure & flow | 20% | 10 | Clear tripartite structure with explicit sub-headings for (a), (b), (c); logical internal progression in each (context → analysis → assessment); smooth transitions between parts via thematic connectors on strategic autonomy; proportional length reflecting mark distribution. | Basic three-part structure present but uneven—overdeveloped (a) at expense of (b) and (c), or merged parts causing confusion; some logical flow within sections but weak inter-part linkages. | Disorganized narrative without clear part demarcation; rambling or repetitive; severe imbalance (e.g., 60% on (a), perfunctory (b) and (c)) violating the 20:15:15 mark weight. |
| Examples / case-law / data | 20% | 10 | Rich empirical grounding: for (a)—2014 SAARC summit cancellation, 2016 Uri attack aftermath, BIMSTEC's 2018 charter adoption; for (b)—Shyam Saran's 2005 statement, Indo-US 123 Agreement, India's 2016 NSG application; for (c)—Quad ministerials 2020-2023, I2U2 2022, CAATSA waiver 2022 debate, specific trade figures or defense deals. | Some relevant examples but limited specificity—mentions 'SAARC problems' without 2016 reference, 'nuclear deal' without 123 Agreement detail, 'defense cooperation' without foundational agreements named. | Virtually example-free or inaccurate examples; generic references like 'India has good relations with US' without any institutional, temporal, or quantitative specificity across all three parts. |
| Conclusion & analytical edge | 20% | 10 | Synthesizes across parts to articulate India's distinctive strategic culture: rejecting hierarchical institutionalism (NPT, SAARC's Pakistan veto) while embracing flexible, issue-specific partnerships (US, ASEAN, BIMSTEC); projects future scenarios (SAARC's conditional revival, NPT adaptation pressures, partnership institutionalization limits); demonstrates original insight on strategic autonomy's evolution. | Separate conclusions for each part without synthesis; or generic summary restating points; limited forward projection or analytical integration across the three themes. | Absent or abrupt conclusion; mere summary of points made; no attempt at cross-cutting analysis or future-oriented assessment; fails to address the strategic autonomy theme connecting all three parts. |
Practice this exact question
Write your answer, then get a detailed evaluation from our AI trained on UPSC's answer-writing standards. Free first evaluation — no signup needed to start.
Evaluate my answer →More from Political Science & IR 2024 Paper II
- Q4 (a) "The Gramscian theory of hegemony provides many valuable insights into the nature of…
- Q5 Answer the following questions in about 150 words each: (a) "India must strive to become…
- Q6 (a) Would you concur with the view that of late, India's foreign policy has been in a tra…
- Q7 (a) Discuss the future of SAARC in the light of India's increased focus on other regional…
- Q8 (a) Critically examine the continuity and change in India's Palestine policy in the wake…