(a) China's growing footprint and a tangible shift in power dynamics in Bangladesh has weakened India's leverage in Dhaka…

(a) China's footprint in Bangladesh

China's growing footprint in Bangladesh reflects a tangible shift in power dynamics, but it has not erased India's leverage. Beijing's Belt and Road-linked rail connectivity, including the Padma Bridge rail link, and defence supplies such as submarines and missiles give Dhaka alternative strategic options and reduce its dependence on New Delhi. This constrains India's traditional influence, especially where China pairs infrastructure with financing, long-term investment and security cooperation. The political rupture of August 2024 sharpened the shift: after Sheikh Hasina's ouster and her refuge in India, the interim government of Muhammad Yunus courted Beijing and Islamabad, and Yunus's March 2025 visit to China, with his remark describing India's north-east as landlocked, prompted India to withdraw the transshipment facility for Bangladeshi exports in April 2025. The BNP government of Tarique Rahman, elected in February 2026, has sought to reset relations while keeping its options open. India's counter-efforts remain important: Lines of Credit, trade and connectivity projects, and political engagement sustain a large economic and cultural presence. Yet the Teesta water-sharing delay, into which China has stepped with a proposed Teesta river management project, and slower project execution have allowed China to fill gaps. The shift is real but partial; Bangladesh still needs India for water, energy, security and trade. India's leverage is weakened where it is perceived as coercive or inconsistent, but it can be restored through faster implementation, consistent project delivery, credible water diplomacy and a non-bullying neighbourhood policy.

(b) Post-Pahalgam hyper-realism

The Pahalgam strike has given momentum to a more aggressive realist posture, but it is better read as tactical escalation within India's existing strategic culture than a structural break. The decision of 23 April 2025 to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, the downgrading of diplomatic ties with Pakistan, the Operation Sindoor strikes of 7 May 2025 on terrorist infrastructure and then Pakistani airbases, and the stated doctrine that future terrorist attacks would be treated as acts of war show a willingness to use military, legal and diplomatic instruments together. This reflects hyper-realism in the sense that India is less willing to absorb terrorism and more prepared to impose costs. This also makes deterrence more explicit in public strategic communication. However, India has not crossed into unrestrained confrontation: it agreed to a cessation of hostilities on 10 May 2025, and nuclear restraint, limited targeting, and continued engagement with the UN and other forums remain. The shift is therefore real but bounded. It signals that India will treat cross-border terrorism as a core security issue, yet its strategic culture still favours calibrated escalation, international legitimacy and long-term deterrence over maximalist war-fighting.

(c) Multipolar world and multipolar Asia

A multipolar world order does not automatically produce a multipolar Asia, which is why External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has repeatedly argued that India's goal of a multipolar world is incomplete without a multipolar Asia rather than a China-centred one. India's G20 leadership and multilateral aspirations assume a world of several centres, but Asia's security architecture remains dominated by the US-China rivalry. In this region, great-power competition is sharper because of territorial disputes, maritime chokepoints and alliance systems. India's position is therefore ambiguous: it seeks strategic autonomy, yet it also depends on the US for technology and security, while maintaining economic ties with China. Asian multipolarity is possible only if middle powers such as Japan, ASEAN and Australia build credible institutions, connectivity and crisis-management mechanisms that reduce dependence on either great power. India can help by strengthening ASEAN centrality, minilateral security forums and inclusive economic networks. The verdict is that a multipolar world may make Asia more complex, but multipolar Asia requires deliberate institutional work, not merely the arithmetic of global power and the depth of economic interdependence.

(d) Future of NAM

The Non-Aligned Movement's future is limited by institutional atrophy and India's growing indifference. Prime Minister Modi has not attended a NAM summit since 2016, sending the Vice-President instead, though he joined the virtual NAM Contact Group meeting on COVID-19 in May 2020. This retreat from active NAM leadership reflects India's evolution towards strategic autonomy, where it chooses partnerships based on interest rather than ideological non-alignment. NAM still has residual value for Global South solidarity, especially on development finance, climate justice and reform of global institutions. However, its consensus-driven format makes it weak in security crises. India's more active platforms, such as the Voice of Global South and participation in the Quad, show a preference for issue-based, results-oriented engagement. Unlike full multilateral regional organisations such as the SCO, these platforms allow India to project influence without being bound by rigid bloc logic. NAM may survive as a symbolic forum, but its relevance will depend on whether it can adapt to a world where non-alignment is less about neutrality and more about selective cooperation, and whether it can offer tangible benefits to member states.

(e) India-Japan partnership

India-Japan ties have evolved from historical and cultural foundations into a special strategic and global partnership. Diplomatic relations began in 1952, and the relationship deepened through development cooperation, shared democratic values and Buddhist heritage. The 2006 Strategic and Global Partnership marked a strategic turn, while the 2014 upgrade to a special strategic and global partnership reflected converging interests in a free and open Indo-Pacific. The pillars are now concrete: a 2+2 ministerial dialogue (from 2019) and a logistics agreement (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, signed 2020); civilian nuclear cooperation, formalised by the agreement signed in 2016 and entered into force in 2017; the bullet train project; QUAD engagement; India's Act East policy; and semiconductor supply-chain cooperation. Japan provides technology and investment, including a target of 10 trillion yen of private investment over a decade announced during Prime Minister Modi's August 2025 visit, while India offers market size, strategic location and democratic legitimacy. This minilateral and bilateral architecture has made Japan one of India's most reliable partners, especially as both seek to balance great-power competition without forming a rigid bloc.