(a) India's reluctance to perceive any 'existential threat' inevitably made the multilateral path to nuclear security a 'default…

(a) Reasons for India's 1998 nuclear shift

India's pre-1998 nuclear posture rested on a deliberate refusal to treat any state as an existential threat. That restraint made multilateralism a default: India championed disarmament at the UNGA, led NAM on nuclear issues, and maintained nuclear ambiguity while opposing the NPT as discriminatory. India's earlier multilateralism was also a shield: by presenting itself as a responsible nuclear-capable state, it could criticize the NPT while retaining the option of a nuclear deterrent. The 1998 shift was not a rejection of multilateralism but a recalibration in which threat perception, technology, regime politics and domestic politics interacted.

Structurally, China's 1964 test had already pushed India towards nuclear capability, demonstrated in the 1974 Pokhran "peaceful nuclear explosion", but India retained a non-weaponised posture and made a last multilateral bid through Rajiv Gandhi's Action Plan for a nuclear-weapon-free world at the UN in 1988; its rejection coincided with India's quiet decision to weaponise around 1989. Indigenous nuclear technology had matured, making weaponisation feasible. By the 1990s, Pakistan's covert nuclear programme, after repeated crises, made the threat more immediate. The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and the CTBT of 1996, whose entry-into-force clause required India's ratification, were seen as permanently freezing the nuclear hierarchy and closing India's option while denying it security guarantees, while the end of Cold War bipolarity removed the balancing logic that had made restraint easier. Domestically, the BJP's electoral success and its party platform made a public nuclear declaration politically feasible. These factors acted together: Pakistan's programme made NPT/CTBT discrimination more salient, unipolarity reduced external constraints, and the BJP converted strategic ambiguity into a political decision. Tellingly, Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter to President Clinton after the tests named China - an overt nuclear power on India's border that had helped Pakistan's programme - as the main concern. India then converted ambiguity into overt weaponisation within a restrained doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and no first use (draft 1999, adopted 2003), and declared a voluntary moratorium on further testing.

(b) Drivers of India's new interests in Africa

India's newer Africa engagement is driven by resource and market needs. Energy security has pushed oil and gas investments in Sudan and Nigeria, while critical minerals such as lithium and cobalt are important for batteries, electronics and the green transition. Africa also offers market access for Indian pharmaceuticals, IT services and digital products, and the AfCFTA can reduce tariffs and improve supply-chain linkages. India's comparative advantage over China lies less in raw capital than in institutions and people. The India-Africa Forum Summit (2008, 2011, 2015), EXIM Bank financing and lines of credit, the Pan-African e-Network (now e-VidyaBharati and e-ArogyaBharati), eighteen new diplomatic missions announced in 2018, and India's role in securing the African Union's G20 membership in 2023 provide soft-power and capacity-building channels. A diaspora of over three million Indians in Africa can facilitate trade, education and health services; it also reduces transaction costs by providing language, networks and trust. China's model is more state-led and infrastructure-heavy. If India pairs these with transparent contracts, local capacity and people-to-people ties, it can build longer-term trust and a comparative advantage that is harder for China to replicate.

(c) India's role in India–China–Nepal economic engagement

Nepal's position between India and China makes it a node for trilateral economic engagement. India can initiate this by promoting cross-border infrastructure, such as the proposed Raxaul-Kathmandu rail link and the Hulaki road corridor, which reduce transit costs and connect Nepal to Indian markets. Hydropower is promising: under a 2024 understanding India plans to import 10,000 MW from Nepal within a decade, and the first trilateral power flow from Nepal to Bangladesh through the Indian grid began in November 2024. Here India's own rules are a limit, since it does not buy power from projects with Chinese involvement, so a genuine trilateral energy market would need a political decision in New Delhi. India can offer Nepal market access for its agricultural exports and a stable demand for hydropower, making the trilateral idea less dependent on China. Tourism circuits linking Lumbini, Kathmandu and Himalayan destinations can generate service-sector linkages. Trade complementarities in agricultural produce, labour mobility and services can deepen the economic base. The main constraint is asymmetry: Nepal may fear becoming a bargaining chip between two large neighbours. The August 2025 India-China agreement to reopen border trade through Lipulekh, which Nepal protested as its territory, shows how easily bilateral deals can bypass Kathmandu. China had floated a "China-India plus one" format after the 2018 Wuhan summit; India has been cautious, fearing that trilateralism would legitimise Chinese projects on the Indo-Nepal frontier. India should therefore use BBIN and BIMSTEC experience to build rules-based projects, ensure Nepal's ownership, and create mutual interdependence. Such a phase would not resolve India-China tensions, but it can make cooperation in the Himalayan region more resilient.