(a) Describe social cognitive theory and its applications to solve large scale societal problems. (20 marks) (b) 'Meditation…

(a) Social cognitive theory and societal problems

Bandura’s social cognitive theory describes learning and behaviour as products of reciprocal determinism among person, behaviour and environment. Its core constructs are observational learning, self-efficacy, outcome expectations and personal agency. Unlike behaviourism, which emphasises external reinforcement, SCT treats people as active agents who set goals, model others, anticipate consequences and regulate action. SCT also emphasises self-regulation: people observe, encode, store and retrieve models, then act on them when motivated. It also distinguishes self-efficacy from outcome expectations: people may expect a result but still doubt their capacity to perform. For large-scale societal problems, this matters because change can be scaled through media, peers and institutions. The best-known application is entertainment-education (the Sabido method): serial dramas such as India's Hum Log (1984) and radio soaps on family planning and HIV in Africa used positive, negative and transitional characters as models, and evaluations linked them to changes in attitudes and behaviour. In India’s polio eradication, media campaigns and community mobilisation used visible role models, success stories and collective efficacy to alter vaccination norms. In environmental conservation, Chipko’s tree-hugging provided powerful observational models of non-violent resistance, strengthening villagers’ efficacy and outcome expectations. In education, Diksha enables vicarious learning through teacher demonstrations, peer examples and digital resources. SCT’s agentic perspective and collective efficacy are especially useful for climate change and communal harmony, where individuals must believe that group action can produce meaningful outcomes. This makes SCT a practical framework for policy.

(b) Meditation and consciousness

Consciousness is usually defined as wakefulness plus awareness of self and world; it is not simply arousal. Meditation includes focused attention and open monitoring practices that train attention, reduce reactivity and alter subjective experience. Research shows meditation can change brain function and structure. Davidson’s EEG studies with Tibetan monks found sustained attention, emotional regulation and asymmetrical frontal activity associated with long-term practice. Lazar’s structural MRI study reported greater cortical thickness in experienced meditators; however, because it was cross-sectional, it cannot prove that meditation induces cortical thickening or counteracts age-related thinning. Meditation may produce altered states through de-automatization, where habitual perception is loosened, and in some traditions through transcendental consciousness, a non-dual awareness beyond ordinary object-focused thought. These altered states may be temporary during practice or become stable traits with sustained training. Indian research, including NIMHANS studies on Vipassana and Sudarshan Kriya, has documented effects on brain-wave patterns and physiological regulation, supporting the view that meditation changes consciousness rather than merely relaxing the body.

(c) The Whorfian hypothesis of linguistic relativity

The Whorfian hypothesis has a strong form, linguistic determinism, which claims language determines thought, and a weak form, linguistic relativity, which claims language influences habitual perception and cognition. Strong determinism is largely rejected because people can think in ways not fully captured by their language and can learn new categories. Weak relativity receives partial support. The weak version is especially plausible in domains tightly coupled to language, such as colour, space and time, while cross-linguistic transfer limits its scope. Berlin and Kay’s basic colour-term research challenged strong Whorfianism by showing a broadly universal sequence of colour terms, yet later work shows language can affect colour discrimination: Russian speakers, who have separate basic terms for light blue (goluboy) and dark blue (siniy), discriminate blues across that boundary faster (Winawer et al., 2007). Levinson’s spatial cognition studies, such as comparisons involving Maya (Tzeltal) and Dutch speakers, suggest that spatial language can shape how people encode and remember space. Indian evidence is more indirect: Gumperz’s Hindi-English code-switching work shows how language choice frames social meaning and identity, but it is sociolinguistic rather than direct cognitive Whorfian evidence. Pederson’s Tamil work on spatial frames, rather than temporal orientation, illustrates language-specific spatial cognition. Overall, empirical evidence supports a modest, domain-specific linguistic relativity, not strong determinism.