(a) "Indian Prime Minister is more empowered than his British counterpart in the Westminster model of democracy." Elucidate…

Part (a) The Indian Prime Minister is more empowered than the British Prime Minister because Westminster convention is reinforced in India by constitutional and statutory levers. Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, while Article 75 enables the President to appoint ministers on the PM’s aid and advice; the PM can recommend appointment, dismissal and portfolio changes, making the cabinet his creation. The PM can also recommend dissolution of the Lok Sabha, and the Tenth Schedule anti-defection law penalises defection, making it harder for a government to fall by party switching, though it does not immunise the PM from backbench rebellion or a no-confidence motion. Single-party majorities, ordinance power when Parliament is not in session, emergency provisions under Articles 352, 356 and 360, and the PM’s central role in appointments (through the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet and selection panels for bodies such as the CBI and, since the 2023 Act, the Election Commission) add quasi-presidential strength. In Britain, the PM’s power is convention-based and checked by parliamentary sovereignty; Brexit showed how Parliament and the courts can constrain the PM (the Miller cases of 2017 and 2019, the latter voiding Boris Johnson’s prorogation). Above all, a British PM can be removed by his own party without an election, as Thatcher (1990), May (2019), Johnson (2022) and Truss (2022) found, whereas Indian parties rarely unseat a sitting PM. Coalition compulsions also matter: even under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, which briefly made early dissolution difficult absent a two-thirds motion or no-confidence vote, a PM had to manage partners and backbenchers; after its repeal by the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022, the formal constraint is gone, but confidence remains decisive. Thus the Indian PM has clearer constitutional levers and stronger cabinet control, though federalism, a Rajya Sabha the government may not control, judicial review and, since 2024, dependence on coalition allies still limit that power.

Part (b) Post-73rd Amendment Panchayats have become a platform of competitive politics, but their performance as planning and service-delivery agencies remains uneven. The 73rd Amendment gave constitutional status to panchayats, listed 29 subjects in the 11th Schedule and provided for State Finance Commissions to recommend devolution of funds. Read with the 74th Amendment, District Planning Committees under Article 243-ZD were meant to integrate rural and urban planning, but their activation has often been weak. Party-based elections, criminalization and caste factionalism have turned many gram sabhas and panchayat meetings into arenas of local power contests rather than deliberative planning. The core problem is the absence of genuine devolution of the 3Fs—functions, functionaries and funds. Many states assign functions nominally but do not transfer staff, technical capacity or adequate resources; bureaucratic resistance limits panchayat control over implementation. Consequently, panchayats often become election machines rather than development agencies. Since 2015, Gram Panchayat Development Plans, prepared through campaigns such as ‘Sabki Yojana Sabka Vikas’ (from 2018), have created a planning routine, and panchayats now manage water committees under the Jal Jeevan Mission, so the record is not wholly negative. The contrast between Kerala’s People’s Plan Campaign (1996), where gram sabhas were involved in participatory planning and fund allocation, and Bihar’s weaker implementation, where panchayats often lack funds, staff and planning capacity, shows that constitutional status alone is insufficient. Unless states transfer real resources, activate District Planning Committees and reduce criminal-political capture, panchayats will remain competitive political platforms rather than effective agencies of planning and service delivery.

Part (c) Justice Dipak Misra’s observation links judicial efficiency to national greatness. An efficient judiciary is essential for rule of law, economic growth and social cohesion, because delayed justice undermines confidence in contracts, property rights and public administration. India’s challenge is stark: pendency has crossed 5 crore cases, the judge-population ratio is only about 20 judges per million compared with the 50 recommended by the Law Commission’s 120th Report (1987), vacancies are high, and infrastructure deficits persist. Reforms such as e-Courts (Phase III approved in 2023), the National Judicial Data Grid, Lok Adalats, the Mediation Act, 2023, commercial courts, case management, the debate on an All India Judicial Service under Article 312 and the NJAC controversy show that efficiency can be improved without compromising independence. The NJAC debate, for example, highlighted the tension between judicial accountability and separation of powers. A great nation needs not only a large judiciary but a fast, accessible and credible one; therefore, efficiency must be pursued through structural reform, adequate resources and institutional independence. Together, these issues show that democratic governance depends on accountable executive power, effective local institutions and a credible judiciary.