(a) "There shall be Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of…

Part (a) The Governor–CM controversy turns on a simple constitutional distinction. Article 163(1) requires a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor, except where the Constitution requires him to act in his discretion. Article 163(2) does not itself create discretion; it only makes the Governor’s decision on whether a matter falls within his discretion final. The discretion arises from the 163(1) exception and specific constitutional provisions. Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) held that the Governor generally acts on ministerial advice, and Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) reinforced that he cannot summon or advance an Assembly session without ministerial advice, his discretion being confined to narrow cases. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025) the Supreme Court held that the Governor cannot sit indefinitely on bills and set timelines, though its November 2025 advisory opinion on the Presidential reference held that courts cannot prescribe fixed timelines or deemed assent, while reaffirming that Governors must act within constitutional limits.

The debate is intense because the Governor is a constitutional head, yet often perceived as a political appointee. The Sarkaria Commission (1988) recommended that the Governor be an eminent person from outside the state, not recently active in politics, appointed after consulting the Chief Minister, and acting on ministerial advice except in clearly defined discretionary situations. The Punchhi Commission (2010) reinforced this, urging a fixed five-year tenure, removal only through a resolution of the state legislature rather than at the Centre’s pleasure, and a time limit (six months) for decisions on bills. Recent controversies in Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Kerala, Punjab and Maharashtra over bills, Assembly summoning and advice to the Chief Minister show whether the Governor acts as a constitutional head or political agent. Thus, under Article 163, the elected government is the real executive unless the Constitution expressly gives the Governor discretion.

Part (b) The Deputy Commissioner/District Collector has evolved from a revenue collector into a development administrator. Historically a revenue officer and magistrate, he now coordinates development, disaster response, public order and scheme implementation. This creates a conflict between magisterial and developmental roles, as the same officer must regulate, enforce and promote growth. The Second ARC’s fifteenth report, on State and District Administration (2009), saw the Collector as the principal coordinator of district administration and recommended rationalising his many committee and regulatory burdens. Several changes have already reshaped the role: the police commissionerate system in many large cities has removed magisterial control over policing there; the Collector chairs the District Disaster Management Authority under Section 25 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005; the DRDAs were merged into zila parishads from April 2022; and the Aspirational Districts Programme (2018) casts the Collector as a data-driven ‘champion’ of outcomes, while elected panchayats and DISHA committees chaired by MPs now share oversight of schemes.

The Collector should remain the head of district administration and the District Disaster Management Authority, but routine regulatory work should be separated from developmental coordination. This would allow the Collector to focus on disaster management, SDG localization, district planning, and monitoring of schemes, while other officers handle revenue, law and order, and regulatory functions. A redefined Collector can act as a development coordinator, ensuring state policies reach the district without administrative overload. This realignment would improve accountability and speed of scheme delivery, provided Collectors get stable tenures and panchayats receive the functions that the Collector now performs on their behalf.

Part (c) Launched in October 2017, with Phase I targeting about 34,800 km at an initial cost of ₹5.35 lakh crore, Project Bharatmala is a road-centric programme to improve connectivity, reduce logistics costs and support growth. Unlike NHDP, which focused mainly on expanding the national highway network, Bharatmala has six components: economic corridors, inter-corridor and feeder routes, national corridor efficiency improvement, border/strategic roads, coastal/port connectivity roads, and green-field expressways. It is funded through NHAI bonds, EPC contracts, which are government-funded, and HAM models, which involve private participation.

Bharatmala has improved connectivity, especially in the North-East and Himalayan regions, by promoting all-weather roads and strategic links. However, execution has faced delays due to land acquisition, clearances, funding, and implementation bottlenecks; the original 2022 target has been extended by several years. The CAG’s 2023 performance audit found that only about 13,500 km had been completed by March 2023, that per-km costs had roughly doubled against the approved estimate, and that some projects deviated from approved appraisal processes. The PM Gati Shakti National Master Plan is now used to plan new highway alignments with other ministries’ networks, reducing overlaps and improving coordination.

These parts are linked: Governor-CM friction can delay state policy and land acquisition, weakening district execution. Bharatmala needs smooth state-district coordination, clear regulatory-promotional separation and cooperative federalism. The way forward is to treat the Governor as a non-partisan constitutional head, redefine the Collector as a development coordinator with separated regulatory functions, and execute Bharatmala through Gati Shakti coordination.