(a) Strengthening social audit through appropriate ways will promote inclusive government. Comment. (20 marks) (b) The…

(a) Strengthening Social Audit for Inclusive Governance

Social audit transforms traditional financial auditing into a participatory, bottom-up accountability process where the community examines public schemes to verify whether outcomes match official expenditures. It promotes inclusive government by institutionalizing the voice of marginalized beneficiaries, dismantling asymmetric information, and fostering deliberative democracy. Its roots lie in the jan sunwais (public hearings) of the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan in 1990s Rajasthan. Section 17 of MGNREGA (now succeeded by the VB-G RAM G Act, 2025) mandated Gram Sabha social audits and the Audit of Scheme Rules, 2011 required independent state Social Audit Units (SAUs); Section 28 of the National Food Security Act, 2013 extends social audit to the PDS; and Meghalaya’s Community Participation and Public Services Social Audit Act, 2017 became the first state law to make social audit a statutory requirement across schemes. Andhra Pradesh’s independent social audit society (SSAAT) showed how systematic audits can expose leakages, recover misappropriated funds and give voice to vulnerable groups.

Yet social audit has clear limits: SAUs are often understaffed and financially dependent on the very department they audit, auditors face local hostility, Gram Sabha hearings can be captured by local elites, and follow-up action on findings (recoveries, disciplinary proceedings) remains weak, so audits risk becoming a ritual.

Strengthening this tool through appropriate ways therefore requires statutory backing on the lines of Meghalaya’s Act, insulating SAUs from administrative interference through independent directorates, and building the capacity of citizen-auditors via dedicated civil society partnerships. Furthermore, embedding social audits within the Right to Information (RTI) framework and deploying digital tools such as geo-tagged asset photographs and public expenditure dashboards will ensure that social audit evolves from an ad-hoc exercise into an enforceable instrument of inclusive governance, as the Second ARC (Second Report, 2006) urged for NREGA. On balance, social audit deepens inclusion only when its findings carry consequences; without mandatory action-taken reports and protection for auditors, it remains a ritual of disclosure rather than an instrument of accountability.

(b) Administrative Tribunals in the Welfare State

The expansion of the state from a minimalist, night-watchman model to a proactive Welfare State led to an unprecedented increase in delegated legislation and administrative discretion. Albert Venn Dicey’s classical formulation of the Rule of Law, which strictly opposed specialized administrative tribunals in favor of ordinary courts, proved inadequate for complex socio-economic regulations. Ordinary civil courts, burdened by procedural rigidity, formal delays, and high litigation costs, lacked the technical expertise required for modern regulatory adjudication. Administrative tribunals thus emerged as a functional necessity to deliver speedy, specialized, inexpensive, and flexible justice.

Recognizing this imperative, the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act (1976) inserted Articles 323A and 323B; the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 created the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) and State Administrative Tribunals (SATs) for service matters under Article 323A, while other specialized bodies such as the National Green Tribunal (NGT, 2010) and the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT, 2016) were created by ordinary statutes. In S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987), the Supreme Court affirmed that tribunals serve as effective institutional substitutes for High Courts, provided they maintain functional efficacy. Subsequently, in R.K. Jain v. Union of India (1993), the apex court emphasized the urgent need for institutional autonomy, proper infrastructure, and transparent appointments, ensuring tribunals do not become executive dependencies while discharging quasi-judicial functions. Decisively, L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) overruled Sampath Kumar on this point, holding that judicial review by the High Courts under Articles 226/227 is part of the basic structure, so tribunals are supplementary rather than substitute bodies. The necessity of tribunals is thus settled, but their independence remains contested: the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 abolished several appellate tribunals, and the Supreme Court, through the Madras Bar Association line of cases, has repeatedly struck down executive-controlled tenure and appointment conditions and pressed for a National Tribunals Commission. Heavy pendency and vacancies show that speed and expertise are not automatic.

(c) Comprehensive Reforms for Effective Legislative Control

Legislative oversight of the executive—the bedrock of parliamentary democracy—has faced significant structural erosion. The anti-defection law under the Tenth Schedule has suppressed intra-party debate, reducing parliamentary proceedings to majoritarian voting. Executive dominance over legislative agendas, inadequate research support for legislators, fragmented committee attention, and persistent executive non-compliance with Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) findings have rendered legislative control predominantly ex-post and formalistic. According to PRS Legislative Research, the share of bills referred to committees fell from 60% in the 14th Lok Sabha and 71% in the 15th to 27% in the 16th and about 16% in the 17th, while bills passed with little debate and the use of money-bill certification (examined by the Supreme Court in the Aadhaar case, 2018) have further narrowed scrutiny.

To restore parliamentary efficacy, a comprehensive approach is necessary. First, Department-Related Standing Committees (DRSCs) must be revitalized by making pre-legislative scrutiny mandatory for all major bills and holding committee hearings publicly. Second, strengthening the Committees on Subordinate Legislation and introducing statutory sunset clauses will ensure periodic legislative review of executive programs and delegated rules. Third, parliamentary monitoring must shift from procedural inputs to outcome-based performance budgeting. Finally, institutionalizing a feedback loop that tables social audit reports directly before legislative committees will effectively bridge grassroots citizen oversight with parliamentary scrutiny. Judicial review of delegated legislation and executive action supplements this, but cannot substitute for a vigilant legislature; a parliamentary budget office, a fixed minimum number of sitting days and a stronger opposition role in committees would complete the comprehensive approach.