(a) Why is oil important for energy security? What is the role of oil in clean energy transition? (20 marks) (b) Critically…

(a) Oil and energy security

Oil remains central to energy security because it is the dominant fuel for transport, with a global share above 90%, and because heavy freight, aviation and marine shipping still lack immediate low-carbon substitutes. Its energy density and established supply chains make it difficult to replace quickly. About a fifth of world oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, so chokepoints turn regional conflict into global price shocks. For import-dependent economies such as India, which imports roughly 85–88% of its crude, imports create exposure to price volatility, exchange-rate shocks and geopolitical supply risk; the import bill affects inflation, the current account and fiscal transfers, so strategic petroleum reserves, diversified sourcing and fiscal buffers are treated as security instruments rather than mere commercial policy; India's 5.33 million tonne strategic reserves at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur and its E20 ethanol blending (reached in 2025) are examples. Oil’s role as a bridge fuel is narrow: oil-fired generation may have served as a stop-gap in some power transitions, but it does not balance renewable variability; gas, hydro and storage do that. Oil can still act as a stop-gap in hard-to-electrify transport and industrial uses, and it supplies petrochemical feedstocks for wind turbine blades, solar panel components and EV plastics. Yet under IEA Net Zero 2050 scenarios, oil demand must fall sharply; continued dependence risks stranded assets and locks in emissions, so its transition role is limited and time-bound.

(b) Primate cities

A primate city is disproportionately larger than the second city, as in Mark Jefferson’s law, and examples include Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Bangkok and Lagos. Their dominance over national urban spheres of influence is produced by cumulative causation, agglomeration economies, political centralization and concentrated infrastructure—ministries, ports, universities and financial institutions—which draw firms, skilled labour and public investment into one urban core. In Indonesia, Jakarta’s financial, port and service-sector concentration illustrates how a primate city can dominate economic and cultural life, and the planned relocation of the capital to Nusantara is itself a policy response to that primacy. Critically, however, this dominance is not absolute. India, with a polycentric national system, has no primate city at the national level, though primacy appears within states (Kolkata in West Bengal, Chennai in Tamil Nadu). Secondary cities such as Pune, Hyderabad and Surabaya are growing and benefiting from decentralized industrial policies, better connectivity and digital economy opportunities that reduce some spatial concentration. Polycentric urban regions are emerging, but these counter-trends do not yet offset the primacy of Bangkok or Jakarta; they mainly soften it. On balance, primate dominance remains structurally strong in developing countries, but it is being moderated by policy and technology.

(c) Demographic divergence

The demographic landscape is splitting between rapid growth and rapid ageing. In Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia, populations are expanding quickly: Nigeria is projected (UN World Population Prospects) to reach roughly 360–375 million by 2050, while the DRC, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen still have high fertility, with Yemen around 3.7; Bangladesh adds large absolute numbers. Declining but still high mortality and a large youth cohort create a youth bulge, implying future labour supply but also pressure on education, jobs and migration. In East Asia and Europe, ageing is rapid: Japan’s median age is about 49 and South Korea’s about 45, with Korea’s total fertility rate near 0.75, the world’s lowest; China’s population has been falling since 2022 and its demographic dividend is ending, and Germany and Italy face similar low-fertility, high-longevity pressures. Low fertility and increased longevity raise old-age dependency ratios; in Japan the ratio is around or above 50%, while in Italy it is about 38%, Germany about 35%, South Korea about 28% and China about 21%. India sits between the two worlds: national fertility is at replacement (TFR about 2.0), but southern states such as Kerala and Tamil Nadu are already ageing while Bihar and Uttar Pradesh remain youthful. Where ratios approach or exceed 50%, pension and health-care burdens become acute. These divergences are interconnected: ageing economies face labour shortages and pension pressure, while youthful regions face job creation and migration pressure, shaping global labour flows, consumption patterns and resource demand.