(a) "Aurangzeb's religious policy was a reflection of the changed political realities of the Mughal Empire." Elucidate. (15…

(a) Aurangzeb's religious policy and changed political realities

By Aurangzeb's reign (1658–1707) the empire faced a shortage of revenue-yielding jagirs (be-jagiri) as the mansabdar corps swelled with Deccani and Maratha entrants, zamindari and peasant revolts (Jats from 1669, Satnamis 1672, Afghans on the north-west frontier), and the cost of long campaigns. Several religious measures map onto these pressures. Early orders ending jharokha darshan, withdrawing court music and appointing muhtasibs sought the support of the orthodox ulema after a war of succession against Dara Shukoh that had been framed partly in religious terms. The re-imposition of jizya in 1679 coincided with the Rathor war that followed Jaswant Singh's death (1678) and the dispute over Ajit Singh's succession, and it gave posts and income to the ulema; its collection was suspended in the Deccan in 1704 under wartime pressure, showing that fiscal and military needs moderated it. Temple destructions were selective: Kashi Vishwanath (1669) and Keshava Deva at Mathura (1670) fell amid Jat unrest and political suspicion, while many temples kept their grants and some new grants were issued (Richard Eaton). The Rajput breach was political: Prince Akbar's revolt (1681), backed by Rathors and Sisodias, and his flight to Sambhaji drew the emperor to the Deccan for his last 26 years. Meanwhile Hindu mansabdars rose to about 31% of the higher nobility, roughly half of them Marathas (M. Athar Ali). Satish Chandra reads the policy as an effort to rally Muslim nobles and ulema around a state in fiscal and jagir crisis; others, such as Audrey Truschke, give more weight to personal piety. The evidence suggests an orthodoxy that was real but applied pragmatically, shaped by changed political realities rather than by a fixed programme.

(b) Provincial architectural styles

As imperial control loosened, especially after 1707, provincial courts developed distinct styles that combined the Mughal vocabulary of bulbous domes, cusped arches, chhatris and axial gardens with local materials and forms. Structural diversity: Bengal built in brick and terracotta; its curved cornice and the do-chala (bangla) hut roof entered the Mughal repertoire itself, appearing in Shah Jahan's pavilions at Agra and Delhi, while the Lalbagh Fort and Bibi Pari's tomb in Dhaka and Murshid Quli Khan's Katra mosque at Murshidabad (1723–24) show the provincial Mughal idiom. Awadh's nawabs built in brick and lime stucco rather than stone: Asaf-ud-Daula's Bara Imambara (1784), with its great vaulted hall without beams, and the Rumi Darwaza, with European motifs appearing later. In the Deccan, Bibi ka Maqbara at Aurangabad (1660s) adapted the Taj plan in stucco and plaster, and Asaf Jahi Hyderabad blended Qutb Shahi forms. Rajput courts adapted Mughal features into palaces at Amber, Jaipur (City Palace, Hawa Mahal) and Jodhpur, with jharokhas and bangaldar roofs. Cultural interaction: local artisans, climate and building traditions shaped the forms; Shia ceremonial needs in Awadh produced the imambara as a new public building type; Rajput palaces absorbed Mughal symmetry and inlay decoration. Provincial power dynamics: architecture stated legitimacy. Successor states such as Awadh, Bengal and Hyderabad kept Mughal forms to signal nominal loyalty while building on a scale that asserted their own authority, and the scale of patronage followed the revenue a provincial ruler controlled (Catherine Asher, Ebba Koch).

(c) Transformation of the Maratha polity in the 18th century

Political: Shivaji's kingdom (coronation 1674) rested on the king, the ashtapradhan and salaried officials. After Shahu's release (1707) and the civil war with Tarabai, Shahu relied on Balaji Vishwanath, appointed Peshwa in 1713. Under Baji Rao I (1720–40) the office became hereditary, and effective power shifted from Satara to Pune, confirmed after Shahu's death by the Sangola arrangement (1750). The Mughal sanads of 1719 for chauth and sardeshmukhi of the Deccan gave legal cover to expansion. Military: expansion was carried by great sardars with their own armies (Scindia, Holkar, Gaikwad, the Bhonsles of Nagpur) paid through saranjam assignments. Light cavalry and ganimi kava tactics stayed central (Palkhed, 1728), but from the 1750s artillery and trained infantry were added, under Ibrahim Khan Gardi at Panipat and later in Mahadji Scindia's battalions under de Boigne. Administrative: conquered areas were first subjected to chauth and sardeshmukhi and only gradually brought under regular revenue administration (Malwa, Gujarat); revenue farming spread, and a largely Chitpavan Brahmin bureaucracy ran the Pune daftar, which some older sardar families resented. Rise: this decentralised fiscal-military structure exploited the Mughal vacuum and carried Maratha power to Delhi and the Punjab; after Panipat (1761) the recovery under Madhavrao I and Mahadji Scindia's entry into Delhi (1771) showed its resilience. Decline: the same structure made the confederacy fragile. Sardars pursued their own interests; the succession crisis after Narayanrao's murder (1773) opened the way to the first Anglo-Maratha war (Treaty of Salbai, 1782); and rivalry among Scindia, Holkar and Baji Rao II led to the Treaty of Bassein (1802) and the final war of 1817–18. Stewart Gordon and André Wink describe a network of shared sovereignty rather than a centralised state, which suited expansion but lacked the cohesion to resist the East India Company.