Answer the following questions in about 150 words each : 10×5=50 (a) "The Fundamental Rights may be said to constitutionalise…

(a) Fundamental Rights as Constitutionalisation of Social Values

Part III of the Indian Constitution translates the historical aspirations, anti-feudal struggles, and egalitarian values of Indian society into legally enforceable norms. Rather than creating rights in a vacuum, the Constitution elevated foundational social demands into fundamental guarantees to dismantle entrenched social hierarchies.

Articles 14 to 18 institutionalise the social demand for egalitarianism. Specifically, Article 17 abolishes untouchability, constitutionalising decades of social reform against caste oppression. Article 19 secures individual autonomy, speech, and democratic participation, which were suppressed under colonial rule. Article 21 expands the social understanding of human dignity, protecting bodily integrity and personal liberty against arbitrary state action. Furthermore, Articles 25 to 28 constitutionalise India’s composite culture and secular ethos by balancing individual freedom of conscience with social reform. These provisions demonstrate that Fundamental Rights operate as an instrument of social engineering, converting dynamic societal values into durable constitutional protections.

(b) Judge-Led and Judge-Induced Public Interest Litigation

Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India emerged primarily through judicial innovation rather than statutory codification, specifically to address institutional inaction and expand access to justice for the marginalised. The Supreme Court dismantled traditional procedural barriers by relaxing the strict rule of locus standi, pioneering epistolary jurisdiction where letters and telegrams were treated as writ petitions.

In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981), Justice P.N. Bhagwati formally institutionalised PIL by holding that any public-spirited individual could move the court on behalf of those unable to access justice due to poverty or disability. In the M.C. Mehta cases, the Court took proactive, suo motu cognizance of environmental degradation, evolving concepts like the Precautionary Principle and deploying continuing mandamus to supervise executive compliance. Similarly, in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997), the judiciary actively intervened to formulate guidelines against workplace sexual harassment in the absence of enacted legislation, underscoring that Indian PIL has been largely judge-led in inception and judge-induced in execution.

(c) Right to Education as the Base for Fundamental and Human Rights

Education serves as the foundational enabler for all other civil, political, and socio-economic rights; without literacy, the exercise of freedom of speech under Article 19 or dignified existence under Article 21 becomes illusory. Recognizing this nexus, the Supreme Court in Unnikrishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) read the right to education directly into Article 21 up to the age of fourteen years.

To institutionalise this judicial mandate, Parliament enacted the Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2002, inserting Article 21A, which made free and compulsory education for children aged 6 to 14 years a Fundamental Right. Consequently, the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act, 2009 was passed, mandating a 25% reservation for economically weaker sections in private unaided schools and laying down infrastructural norms. Programmatic measures such as the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (now subsumed under Samagra Shiksha) and the PM POSHAN (Mid-Day Meal) Scheme further operationalised this right by enhancing enrollment, retention, and nutritional support for children across India.

(d) Relationship between President and Council of Ministers

The Indian Constitution establishes a parliamentary executive modeled on the Westminster system, where the President acts as the de jure constitutional head while real executive power resides with the de facto executive—the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. Under Article 53, executive power is vested in the President, but Article 74 mandates that there shall be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President in the exercise of these functions. Article 75 ensures democratic accountability by making the Council collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha.

The binding nature of this advice was historically affirmed in Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (1955) and Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974), wherein the Supreme Court held that the President must act only on ministerial advice. The 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976 made this advice explicitly mandatory. The 44th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1978 introduced a limited check via a proviso to Article 74(1), empowering the President to return advice once for reconsideration. However, if the Council of Ministers reiterates its advice, the President is constitutionally bound to accept it.

(e) Constitutionality of Delegated Legislation

The Constitution of India contains no express provision either permitting or prohibiting the delegation of legislative powers. However, given the complexities of the modern welfare state and technical subject matters, delegation has become an administrative necessity, balanced against the doctrine of separation of powers.

The constitutional validity of delegated legislation was established by the Supreme Court in the landmark reference In re Delhi Laws Act (1951). The Court ruled that delegation is permissible provided the legislature does not abdicate its essential functions. Under the "Essential Legislative Functions Doctrine," the legislature must determine the legislative policy and formulate a clear standard; it cannot delegate the power to repeal, amend, or modify the core policy of an Act. In Harishankar Bagla v. State of M.P. (1954), the Court held that a statute delegating power must provide an intelligible principle and guidance for the delegate. Furthermore, in Gwalior Rayon Mills v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax (1974), it was reiterated that delegated legislation remains constitutional only so long as the parent statute sets out the legislative objective, thereby preventing excessive delegation.