(a) Discuss the powers of the Security Council for the maintenance of world peace and security. Has the 'Veto Power' proved a…

(a) Powers of the Security Council

• Primary responsibility (Art 24): the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members agree that it acts on their behalf, and they are bound to accept and carry out its decisions (Art 25).
• Pacific settlement (Chapter VI, Arts 33–38):
• it may call on parties to settle disputes by negotiation, mediation, arbitration or judicial settlement (Art 33);
• it may investigate any situation likely to endanger peace (Art 34);
• it may recommend procedures or terms of settlement (Arts 36–37).
• These measures are recommendatory.
• Enforcement (Chapter VII):
• Art 39: it determines the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression;
• Art 40: provisional measures, such as ceasefires;
• Art 41: measures not involving armed force, such as economic sanctions, arms embargoes and severance of communications. Examples are Southern Rhodesia (1966), Iraq (1990) and the 1267 sanctions regime. The Council also created the ICTY (1993) and ICTR (1994) under this power, upheld in Tadić (1995);
• Art 42: military action, in practice by authorising member States: Korea (1950), Iraq–Kuwait (Resolution 678, 1990) and Libya (Resolution 1973, 2011). The standing forces envisaged by Art 43 were never created.
• Other powers:
• regional arrangements (Chapter VIII);
• peacekeeping, described as "Chapter VI½";
• referrals to the ICC (Art 13(b), Rome Statute), for Darfur (2005) and Libya (2011);
• enforcement of ICJ judgments (Art 94(2));
• recommendations on the admission of members and the appointment of the Secretary-General.

The veto

• Art 27(3): decisions on non-procedural matters need nine votes, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members. A party to a dispute must abstain under Chapter VI.
• Abstention is not a veto: by practice, abstention does not count as a veto (Namibia advisory opinion (1971)).
• Purpose: to secure the participation of the great powers and to avoid enforcement action against them.

Has the veto been a hindrance?

• Yes, in many crises:
• Cold War paralysis: the Council was largely inactive, and collective security operated only when the USSR was absent (Korea, 1950);
• Syria (2011 onwards): repeated Russian and Chinese vetoes blocked sanctions, ICC referral and accountability for the use of chemical weapons;
• Ukraine (2022): Russia vetoed a draft condemning its own invasion, since the Charter's rule on abstention by a party applies only under Chapter VI;
• Israel–Palestine and Gaza (2023–24): vetoes, several of them by the USA, blocked ceasefire drafts for months;
• Selectivity: a permanent member and its allies are effectively above enforcement, which undermines the Council's legitimacy.
• But not wholly:
• the veto keeps great powers within the system; the League of Nations failed partly because they left it;
• many resolutions pass by consensus, including sanctions on North Korea until recent years, the counter-terrorism resolutions, and peacekeeping mandates.
• Workarounds:
• the Uniting for Peace resolution 377(V) (1950) lets the General Assembly recommend collective measures, as in the emergency special session on Ukraine in 2022;
• under General Assembly resolution 76/262 (2022), the Assembly must debate each use of the veto;
• the France–Mexico initiative and the ACT Code of Conduct ask States to refrain from vetoes in cases of mass atrocities.
• Reform: expansion of permanent and non-permanent membership, with India and the G4 seeking permanent seats, and restraint in the use of the veto. Reform itself needs P5 consent (Art 108).
• Conclusion: the veto has frequently prevented the Council from discharging its duties, especially where P5 interests are involved. Its abolition is unrealistic, but restraint and accountability are essential.

(b) Background

• The push for a new order: newly independent States of the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement argued that the post-war economic order (Bretton Woods and the GATT) perpetuated colonial dependence. This led to:
• the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), GA Resolution 3201 (S-VI), with its Programme of Action, Resolution 3202 (S-VI), adopted on 1 May 1974 at the Sixth Special Session;
• the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS), GA Resolution 3281 (XXIX), adopted on 12 December 1974 by 120 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions. The major Western States opposed or abstained.

The NIEO Declaration: principles

• sovereign equality, and the full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and economic activities, including the right to nationalise;
• regulation and supervision of transnational corporations;
• just and equitable prices for raw materials and commodities, and improved terms of trade;
• preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries;
• transfer of technology and financial resources;
• reform of the international monetary system, with a greater voice for developing States;
• restitution for peoples under colonial or foreign occupation.

CERDS: rights and duties

• Art 1: the right of every State to choose its economic, political, social and cultural system.
• Art 2:
• permanent sovereignty over wealth and natural resources;
• regulation of foreign investment and transnational corporations;
• the right to nationalise, with "appropriate compensation" determined under the domestic law of the nationalising State (Art 2(2)(c)).
• Duties:
• international cooperation for development (Arts 9, 17);
• the right to form producers' associations (Art 5);
• protection of the environment (Art 30);
• the common heritage of mankind for the seabed beyond national jurisdiction (Art 29);
• the duty to eliminate colonialism and apartheid (Art 16).

Evaluation

• Legal status: these are General Assembly resolutions, not binding treaties.
• In ***Texaco v Libya* (1977), the arbitrator held that Resolution 1803 (1962)** on permanent sovereignty, which requires "appropriate compensation in accordance with international law", reflected custom. The CERDS formula did not, because it lacked the support of capital-exporting States.
• Influence:
• GSP preferences;
• special and differential treatment in the WTO;
• the Lomé Conventions;
• the common heritage principle in UNCLOS;
• the Declaration on the Right to Development (1986);
• later, the SDGs and common but differentiated responsibilities in environmental law.
• Decline: the debt crisis of the 1980s, structural adjustment, and post-1990 liberalisation through the WTO and bilateral investment treaties weakened the NIEO agenda.
• Continuing relevance: its themes resurface in demands for reform of the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, in debt relief, climate finance, and the G20's Global South agenda.

(c) The threat

• What terrorism attacks: the right to life, liberty and security, democracy and development. It targets civilians indiscriminately, as in the attacks of 9/11 (2001), 26/11 in Mumbai (2008) and Pahalgam (2025).
• The opposite danger: counter-terrorism itself can erode human rights through arbitrary detention, torture, profiling and restrictions on speech.

Ways to protect humanity

• 1. A comprehensive international legal framework:
• the sectoral conventions, including the Hague Convention (1970), the Terrorist Bombings Convention (1997), the Financing Convention (1999) and the Nuclear Terrorism Convention (2005);
• finalising the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, proposed by India in 1996, with an agreed definition;
• applying aut dedere aut judicare and closing safe havens.
• 2. Security Council measures:
• Resolution 1373 (2001) requires States to criminalise financing, freeze assets and deny safe haven;
• the 1267 sanctions regime targets Al-Qaida and ISIL;
• Resolution 2178 (2014) deals with foreign terrorist fighters;
• Resolution 1566 (2004) states that terrorist acts are never justifiable.
• 3. Cutting financing and networks: FATF standards, intelligence sharing, cyber and border cooperation, and action against online radicalisation.
• 4. Human rights as the foundation (UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2006, Pillar IV):
• non-derogable rights (ICCPR Art 4), such as the rights not to be arbitrarily deprived of life or tortured, must be protected;
• measures must be lawful, necessary and proportionate;
• fair trial must be guaranteed (Art 14);
• there must be no discrimination or profiling;
• due process in sanctions listing is required, through the UN Ombudsperson (Resolution 1904, 2009), following Kadi (ECJ, 2008).
• 5. Addressing conditions conducive to terrorism: tackling poverty, exclusion, unresolved conflicts and radicalisation through education, deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes, and community engagement.
• 6. Support for victims: compensation and rehabilitation for victims, with the UN recognising the rights of victims of terrorism.

Indian perspective

• Laws: the UAPA, 1967, which since 2019 allows individuals to be designated as terrorists, and the NIA Act, 2008.
• Court safeguards:
• ***Kartar Singh v State of Punjab* (1994):** TADA was upheld with safeguards;
• ***Arup Bhuyan v State of Assam* (2023):** membership of a banned organisation is punishable under UAPA s.10;
• ***Thwaha Fasal v Union of India* (2021):** mere association or possession of literature is not enough without intent;
• ***Union of India v K.A. Najeeb* (2021):** long incarceration can justify bail despite s.43D(5);
• ***Prabir Purkayastha v State (NCT of Delhi)* (2024): the grounds of arrest must be given in writing**.
• Conclusion: effective counter-terrorism and human rights are complementary. Security gained by sacrificing rights ultimately fuels radicalisation.