(a) Minor's contract is 'void ab initio'. Comment. 10 (b) Discuss the constitutionality of Right to Information Act, 2019 in the…

(a)

• The rule: under s.11 of the Indian Contract Act, a person is competent to contract only if he has attained majority (18 years, under the Indian Majority Act, 1875). Section 10 requires competent parties for a valid contract.
• ***Mohori Bibee v Dharmodas Ghose* (1903, PC):**
• a minor mortgaged his property to a moneylender, whose agent knew of the minority;
• the Privy Council held that a minor's agreement is void ab initio, not voidable;
• the moneylender could not recover the money advanced, since s.64 (restitution on rescission of voidable contracts) and s.65 did not apply to an agreement that was void from the start.
• Consequences:
• no ratification on attaining majority is possible. A fresh contract with fresh consideration is needed;
• no estoppel against a minor who misrepresented his age. The law of estoppel cannot override the statutory incapacity (Sadiq Ali Khan v Jai Kishore (PC, 1928));
• no personal liability, even for fraud; but the court may require restoration of benefits the minor obtained by fraud (Specific Relief Act, 1963, s.33; Khan Gul v Lakha Singh (Lahore HC FB, 1928)).
• Qualifications:
• necessaries supplied to a minor are recoverable from the minor's property, not from him personally (s.68);
• a minor may be a promisee or beneficiary. A mortgage in favour of a minor who has paid the consideration is enforceable (Raghava Chariar v Srinivasa (Madras HC FB, 1917));
• a minor can be an agent (s.184) and can be admitted to the benefits of a partnership (Partnership Act, s.30);
• contracts entered into by a guardian for the minor's benefit, within the guardian's powers, may bind the minor's estate.
• Conclusion: the statement is correct as the general rule, which exists to protect minors. The exceptions protect the minor's interests and prevent injustice to others.

(b)

• Background: the RTI Act, 2005 gives statutory form to the right to know, which is part of Art 19(1)(a):
• State of UP v Raj Narain (1975);
• S.P. Gupta v Union of India (1981);
• Union of India v ADR (2002).
• The RTI (Amendment) Act, 2019:
• amended ss.13 and 16 so that the term, salary and service conditions of the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners, at the Centre and in the States, are prescribed by the Central Government. Earlier, the Act fixed a five-year term and parity with Election Commissioners;
• critics argue that this undermines the independence of the Commissions;
• the challenge (Jairam Ramesh v Union of India) is pending before the Supreme Court.
• Recent Supreme Court judgments:
• ***CPIO, Supreme Court of India v Subhash Chandra Agarwal* (2019, Constitution Bench): the office of the CJI is a "public authority". Judicial independence is not undermined by transparency, but disclosure must be balanced against privacy and confidentiality under s.8(1)(j) and s.11, by applying a proportionality and public-interest** test;
• ***Anjali Bhardwaj v Union of India* (2019): the Court directed timely and transparent appointments** to the Information Commissions, since vacancies render the right illusory. It has since repeatedly monitored compliance.
• Later concern: the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (s.44(3)) amended s.8(1)(j) to exempt all personal information, removing the public-interest override. This has been challenged as diluting the RTI.
• Assessment:
• the RTI Act and its amendments have not been struck down;
• however, the Court has treated the right to information as a constitutional value and insisted on functioning, independent commissions;
• the constitutional validity of the 2019 and 2023 changes remains to be decided.

(c)

• Meaning of the statement: agency is a special legal relationship, not every service rendered for another person.
• Definition (s.182): an agent is employed "to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with third persons".
• The essence of agency: the power to affect the principal's legal position, by making contracts or disposing of property, so as to bring the principal into privity with third parties.
• Persons who act for another but are not agents:
• Servant or employee:
• works under the master's control as to the manner of work, and does not ordinarily contract on his behalf;
• Lakshminarayan Ram Gopal & Son v Government of Hyderabad (1954): an agent represents the principal in dealings with third parties, while a servant acts under direction.
• Independent contractor: undertakes to produce a result, uses his own methods, and cannot bind the employer.
• "Agent" in name only:
• labels are not decisive. In Bhopal Sugar Industries v Sales Tax Officer (1977), a "sole selling agent" who bought goods and resold them on his own account was a buyer, dealing principal to principal;
• similarly, a distributor or dealer who buys and resells is not an agent.
• Trustee, bailee, broker or messenger: these hold property or convey information but have no authority to contract for another unless it is specifically conferred.
• A volunteer or friend who does an act without authority is not an agent, unless the act is later ratified (ss.196–200).
• Conclusion: the test is the authority to represent and to create legal relations for the principal, with the principal bearing the consequences (s.226). Merely doing work for another is not enough.

(d) The Air Act framework

• The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 was enacted under Art 253 to implement the Stockholm decisions. It provides:
• the CPCB and SPCBs (ss.16–17);
• declaration of air pollution control areas (s.19);
• consent to establish and operate industries (s.21);
• emission standards;
• power to close units and cut off utilities (s.31A);
• penalties (s.37 onwards).

Why it "languishes"

• Weak enforcement:
• the Boards lack staff and technical capacity, and suffer political interference;
• penalties are low;
• the Jan Vishwas Act, 2023 replaced most imprisonment with civil penalties.
• A structural mismatch with the sources of pollution:
• the Act focuses on industries;
• Delhi–NCR's pollution comes from vehicles, construction dust, stubble burning, waste burning and weather conditions across several States. The Act was not designed for this airshed-level, inter-state problem.
• Fragmented authority: responsibilities are split among the Centre, several States, municipal bodies and police.

Judicial response

• **The M.C. Mehta v Union of India vehicular pollution case:**
• it led to CNG for public transport (1998–2002), phasing out old vehicles, BS-VI fuel by 2020, and restrictions on diesel generator sets;
• since 2019 the Court has issued repeated orders on stubble burning and on enforcing GRAP.
• ***Arjun Gopal v Union of India* (2017 onwards):** restrictions on firecrackers.
• The NGT: orders on the ban on old vehicles, dust control and environmental compensation.
• A right to clean air: the Supreme Court has treated clean air as part of Art 21, and in 2024 it criticised the non-enforcement by the Commission for Air Quality Management and the States.

Administrative mechanisms

• The Graded Response Action Plan (GRAP) (2017, revised), which imposes staged restrictions linked to the AQI.
• The Commission for Air Quality Management in NCR and Adjoining Areas Act, 2021:
• it replaced the EPCA;
• it is a statutory body with overriding powers and penalties.
• The National Clean Air Programme (2019): a target of a 40% reduction in PM10 by 2025–26 for non-attainment cities.
• Other measures:
• subsidies for crop-residue machinery;
• the Eastern and Western Peripheral Expressways;
• Delhi's electric vehicle policy.

Assessment

• Partly true: the statement is partly true. The Air Act alone has proved inadequate. Courts and new bodies have filled the gaps, but in an episodic, crisis-driven way.
• What is needed:
• airshed-based regional governance;
• strengthened Boards;
• enforceable targets under the NCAP;
• incentives for farmers;
• consistent year-round enforcement rather than seasonal emergency measures.

(e) Why trade marks matter in a global economy

• Their role: brands identify the source and quality of goods and services, embody goodwill built over years, and are often a firm's most valuable asset.
• Why protection is needed: globalisation, e-commerce and the internet enable cross-border counterfeiting, domain-name squatting and free-riding on foreign reputations. Effective protection promotes consumer protection, fair competition and investment.

The Indian legal framework: the Trade Marks Act, 1999

• Definition: a "trade mark" is a mark capable of graphical representation and of distinguishing goods or services, including shape, packaging and colour combinations (s.2(1)(zb)).
• Grounds for refusal:
• absolute grounds (s.9), such as lack of distinctiveness or descriptiveness;
• relative grounds (s.11), such as conflict with earlier marks.
• Well-known marks: marks such as TATA are protected across classes (ss.2(1)(zg), 11(6)–(10); Tata Sons v Manoj Dodia (Delhi HC, 2011)).
• Infringement (s.29): this includes use as a trade name. Remedies include injunctions, damages and accounts (s.135), and criminal penalties for falsification (ss.103–104).
• Passing off: the common-law action of passing off is preserved (s.27(2)).
• International registration: India acceded to the Madrid Protocol in 2013 (ss.36A–36G), enabling international registration. It complies with the Paris Convention (Art 6bis on well-known marks) and TRIPS (Arts 15–21).

Judicial contribution

• ***N.R. Dongre v Whirlpool Corporation* (1996): trans-border reputation** was protected, although Whirlpool's Indian registration had lapsed.
• ***Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v Prius Auto Industries* (2017): the territoriality principle. A foreign reputation must be shown to have spilled over into India**.
• ***Cadila Health Care v Cadila Pharmaceuticals* (2001): tests of deceptive similarity**, with stricter scrutiny for medicinal products.
• ***Satyam Infoway v Sifynet Solutions* (2004): domain names** are protected as trade marks.
• ***Daimler Benz v Hybo Hindustan* (Delhi HC, 1994):** "Benz" was protected against use on undergarments.

Institutional changes

• the Commercial Courts Act, 2015;
• the abolition of the IPAB in 2021 and the creation of IP Divisions in High Courts;
• e-filing and faster examination.

Remaining challenges

• Enforcement problems: counterfeiting, weak criminal enforcement, backlogs in oppositions, and marketplace liability online.
• Needed: effective trade mark law requires strong enforcement, speedy adjudication and platform accountability, alongside a sound statute.