(a) 'Absolute equality may itself be a cause of inequality.' In the light of this statement, discuss substantive equality. (10…

(a) Absolute equality and substantive equality

Formal equality treats everyone alike. Where people start unequal, identical treatment reproduces disadvantage, so "equal treatment of unequals" is itself inequality. Substantive equality looks at outcomes and context and requires the State to remove disadvantage, if necessary by differential treatment.

• Constitutional basis: Art 14 permits reasonable classification (intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the object). Arts 15(3)-(6), 16(4), 16(4A), 38(2) and 46 authorise special measures.
• ***State of Kerala v N.M. Thomas* (1976):** Art 16(4) is a facet of Art 16(1), not an exception to it.
• ***Indra Sawhney v Union of India* (1992):** OBC reservation upheld with the creamy-layer exclusion and the 50% rule.
• ***Lt Col Nitisha v Union of India* (2021):** facially neutral criteria that disadvantage women officers are indirect discrimination.
• ***State of Punjab v Davinder Singh* (2024, seven judges):** sub-classification of Scheduled Castes permitted, since uniform treatment of a heterogeneous class defeats equality. Janhit Abhiyan (2022) extended the idea to economic disadvantage (EWS).
• ***Vikash Kumar v UPSC* (2021):** reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities is part of equality.

Limits remain: efficiency of administration (Art 335), the 50% ceiling and quantifiable data (M. Nagaraj 2006, Jarnail Singh 2018). The Constitution aims at equality in fact, not merely in form.

(b) Constitution and constitutionalism

A Constitution creates and empowers government. Constitutionalism requires that this power be limited, accountable and exercised according to law. A state may have a Constitution without constitutionalism, as nominal constitutions in authoritarian regimes show.

• Supremacy of the Constitution and rule of law: every organ is bound by it (Arts 13, 245).
• Enforceable rights: Part III with Art 32, which Ambedkar called the "heart and soul" of the Constitution.
• Separation of powers: judicial review, executive accountability to Parliament, and federalism.
• Limits on amendment: basic structure (Kesavananda Bharati 1973). Minerva Mills (1980) held limited amending power itself a basic feature.
• Independent institutions: Election Commission, CAG, Public Service Commissions.

Dignity and freedoms depend on this. ADM Jabalpur (1976) let rights be suspended during the Emergency. It was overruled in K.S. Puttaswamy (2017), which placed dignity and privacy at the core of Part III, and the 44th Amendment made Arts 20 and 21 non-suspendable. Maneka Gandhi (1978) requires any procedure to be just, fair and reasonable. I.R. Coelho (2007) and the NJAC case (2015) extended basic-structure review. As Ambedkar warned, without constitutional morality the text can be subverted from within.

(c) Repugnancy between Union and State laws

• Art 254(1): on a Concurrent List matter, a Union law (or existing law) prevails over a repugnant State law, whether passed before or after it. The State law is void to the extent of repugnancy.
• Art 254(2): a State law repugnant to an earlier Union law prevails in that State if reserved for and given Presidential assent. Under the proviso, Parliament may later amend or repeal it.

Tests and cases:

• ***Deep Chand v State of UP* (1959):** repugnancy arises from direct conflict, from Parliament intending an exhaustive code (occupied field), or from both laws operating in the same field.
• ***M. Karunanidhi v Union of India* (1979):** there is a presumption against repugnancy. The conflict must be irreconcilable.
• ***Zaverbhai Amaidas* (1954) and *T. Barai v Henry Ah Hoe* (1983):** a later Central law on the same matter overrides even an assented State law.
• ***State of Kerala v Mar Appraem Kuri* (2012):** repugnancy arises when the Central law is made, even if not yet in force.
• ***Forum for People's Collective Efforts* (2021):** West Bengal's housing law, duplicating RERA 2016, was struck down.

Conflicts between List I and List II are settled by pith and substance and federal supremacy under Art 246 (Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee 1947), not by Art 254.

Which law prevails: ordinarily the Union law. The State law prevails only under Art 254(2), within that State, until Parliament legislates again.

(d) Triple test for OBC quota in local bodies

Arts 243D(6) and 243T(6) allow reservation for backward classes in panchayats and municipalities. K. Krishna Murthy v Union of India (2010) held that political backwardness differs from social and educational backwardness, so OBC lists for jobs cannot simply be carried over.

In ***Vikas Kishanrao Gawali v State of Maharashtra* (4 March 2021) the Court set aside OBC reservation that breached the 50% limit and laid down a triple test**:

1. Dedicated commission: a contemporaneous, rigorous empirical inquiry into the nature and implications of backwardness in local bodies.
2. Local body-wise proportion: the quantum of reservation must be specified local body-wise on the commission's recommendations.
3. Fifty per cent ceiling: SC, ST and OBC reservation taken together must not exceed 50% of the seats.

Until the test is met, the seats are treated as general seats. Suresh Mahajan v State of Madhya Pradesh (May 2022) first directed polls without OBC quota and then allowed Madhya Pradesh's quota once its commission reported. In Rahul Ramesh Wagh (July 2022) the Banthia Commission report was accepted for Maharashtra. The ruling ties political reservation to local evidence, echoing the quantifiable-data rule of M. Nagaraj.

(e) Wednesbury unreasonableness and merits review

Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation (1948) upheld a condition barring children under 15 from Sunday cinemas. Lord Greene MR held that a decision can be quashed if the authority considered irrelevant matters, ignored relevant ones, or reached a decision "so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it". In CCSU (1985) Lord Diplock restated this as irrationality, beside illegality and procedural impropriety.

In India, Tata Cellular (1994) held that courts review the decision-making process, not the decision. Om Kumar (2001) applied Wednesbury to ordinary administrative action and proportionality where fundamental freedoms are restricted. Modern Dental College (2016) adopted structured proportionality.

Scope for merits review:

• In principle, no. The court asks whether the decision lies within the range of reasonable responses, not whether it is the best one. The weight given to factors is for the authority.
• In practice, a limited check at the extremes. "Anxious scrutiny" applies where rights are at stake (ex p Smith 1996), and proportionality (Daly 2001) comes closer to the merits. Indian courts still refuse to re-weigh evidence or policy (Gaurav Ashwin Jain 2007).