Answer the following questions in about 150 words each: (a) 'Absolute equality may itself be a cause of inequality.' In the…

(a) Absolute Equality and Substantive Equality

The Aristotelian principle that justice requires treating equals equally and unequals unequally illustrates why absolute, formal equality often perpetuates structural injustice. Formal equality under Article 14 ensures equality before the law, yet applying identical standards to persons in disparate socio-economic conditions deepens existing inequalities.

To remedy this, Indian jurisprudence evolved towards substantive equality, which mandates affirmative state action to achieve real, de facto equality. The Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu dynamicized Article 14 as an antithesis to arbitrariness. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, equality was linked with natural justice and fairness. Further, in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, the Court embraced transformative constitutionalism, affirming that equality entails dismantling systemic hierarchies and recognizing differential vulnerabilities rather than enforcing formal sameness. Substantive equality thus legitimizes reasonable classification and protective discrimination under Articles 15 and 16, enabling the realization of egalitarian constitutional goals.

(b) Constitutionalism and the Preservation of Freedoms

A mere written Constitution does not guarantee freedom; it must be animated by 'Constitutionalism', which signifies limited government, rule of law, and checks and balances. While a Constitution establishes the legal organs of the State, Constitutionalism constitutes the normative philosophy that restrains those organs from exercising arbitrary authority, thereby safeguarding individual liberty and dignity.

Without constitutionalism, a State risks descending into majoritarian authoritarianism under the facade of constitutional legality. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, formulating the Basic Structure doctrine to prevent Parliament from destroying core constitutional principles. In I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Court reiterated that laws violating fundamental rights cannot be insulated via the Ninth Schedule, establishing that judicial review and the protection of basic freedoms form the essence of constitutionalism. Thus, constitutionalism ensures that state power serves individual dignity rather than eclipsing it.

(c) Repugnancy between Union and State Laws (Article 254)

Repugnancy arises under Article 254 when a State law and a Union law governing a subject in the Concurrent List (List III) present a direct, irreconcilable conflict. Under Article 254(1), the Union law prevails, and the State law is void to the extent of the repugnancy, unless the State law, having been reserved for the President's consideration, receives Presidential assent under Article 254(2).

In Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court laid down that repugnancy arises where there is direct conflict, where Parliament intended to occupy the entire field, or where compliance with one law results in breach of the other. In M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, the Court held that repugnancy exists only where both provisions are fully inconsistent and cannot stand together. In T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, it was affirmed that when Parliament amends or occupies a field previously occupied by a State law, the Central enactment supersedes the State enactment to that extent.

(d) Triple Test for OBC Quota in Local Bodies

The Supreme Court, in Vikas Kishanrao Gawali v. State of Maharashtra (reaffirming K. Krishna Murthy v. Union of India), held that political reservation under Articles 243D(6) and 243T(6) cannot be provided automatically on the same basis as reservations in education and public employment under Articles 15(4) and 16(4).

The Court mandated the rigorous 'triple test' before provisioning Other Backward Classes (OBC) quotas in local self-government: First, the State must set up a dedicated Commission to conduct a contemporaneous, empirical inquiry into the nature and implications of political backwardness in local bodies. Second, the State must specify the proportion of reservation required to be provisioned local body-wise in light of the Commission’s recommendations. Third, in no case shall such reservation exceed the aggregate ceiling of 50 percent of the total seats reserved in favor of SCs, STs, and OBCs combined. Absence of this empirical exercise invalidates local body OBC reservations.

(e) Wednesbury Principles and Merits Review

The principle of unreasonableness was established in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948). Lord Greene held that an administrative decision is subject to judicial review if the authority took into account irrelevant matters, failed to consider relevant factors, or made a decision so absurd that no sensible person could ever have dreamed that it lay within the powers of the authority. Lord Diplock in the CCSU case termed this standard 'irrationality'.

Wednesbury principles do not permit a 'merits review'. Judicial review examines the legality and fairness of the decision-making process, not the correctness of the decision itself; the court cannot substitute its view for that of the administrative authority. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, the Supreme Court affirmed that judicial review under Wednesbury limits the court to correcting errors of law, procedural impropriety, and blatant arbitrariness, preserving administrative autonomy while restraining administrative abuse.