(a) Describe the various powers and functions of the General Assembly. (20 marks) (b) Explain the maxim "Pacta Tertiis Nec…

(a) Powers and functions of the General Assembly

The General Assembly (GA) is the principal deliberative organ of the UN (Art 7), with all 193 members having one vote each (Art 18(1)). Important questions, such as peace and security recommendations, elections, admission, suspension, expulsion and the budget, need a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. Other questions need a simple majority (Art 18(2)-(3)).

1. Deliberative: it may discuss any matter within the Charter and recommend action (Art 10), consider principles of peace, security and disarmament (Art 11) and recommend peaceful adjustment of situations (Art 14). It may not recommend on a dispute the Security Council is handling unless asked (Art 12(1)), a limit read narrowly in the Wall opinion (2004).
2. Law-making and norm-setting: it promotes the progressive development and codification of international law (Art 13(1)(a)) through the International Law Commission (1947), whose work produced the VCLT and VCDR. Its declarations shape custom: the UDHR (1948), Res 1514 (1960), Res 2625 (1970) and Res 3314 (1974). Resolutions can evidence opinio juris (Nicaragua 1986, Nuclear Weapons 1996).
3. Supervisory: it considers reports of other organs (Art 15), handles trusteeship (Arts 16, 85) and oversees ECOSOC (Arts 55-60) and the Human Rights Council, from which it suspended Russia in April 2022.
4. Financial (Art 17): it approves the budget and apportions expenses, and these decisions are binding (Certain Expenses, ICJ 1962). A member two years in arrears loses its vote (Art 19).
5. Elective and constitutional: it admits members on Security Council recommendation (Art 4(2), Competence of the General Assembly, ICJ 1950), elects the ten non-permanent Council members (Art 23), ECOSOC members (Art 61) and, with the Council, ICJ judges, appoints the Secretary-General (Art 97), adopts Charter amendments (Art 108), sets up subsidiary organs such as UNICEF and UNHCR (Art 22) and seeks advisory opinions (Art 96), such as Chagos (2019) and Climate Change (2025).
6. Residual peace role: under Uniting for Peace, Res 377(V) (1950), it may meet in emergency special session when a veto blocks the Council, as in Korea, Suez and Ukraine (ES-11/1, 2022). Res 76/262 (2022) requires a GA debate within ten working days of any veto.

Most GA resolutions are recommendations, but its budgetary, elective and internal decisions bind, and its norm-setting gives it wide indirect influence.

(b) Pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt

The maxim means that treaties neither harm nor benefit third parties. It reflects consent and sovereign equality and is codified in VCLT Arts 34-38.

• Art 34: no rights or obligations for a third State without its consent.
• Art 35: an obligation needs express written acceptance by the third State.
• Art 36: a right arises if intended, with assent presumed unless the contrary is shown (stipulation pour autrui).
• Art 37: obligations change only with the consent of all, and rights intended to be irrevocable cannot be revoked.
• Art 38: a treaty rule may bind third States as custom.

Case law:

• ***Island of Palmas* (1928):** the 1898 Treaty of Paris could not affect the title of the Netherlands, a third State.
• ***Free Zones of Upper Savoy and Gex* (PCIJ 1932):** Art 435 of the Treaty of Versailles could not abolish zones created for Switzerland, a non-party, though treaties may confer rights on third States if intended.
• ***Polish Upper Silesia* (PCIJ 1926):** a treaty is law only between its parties.
• ***North Sea Continental Shelf* (ICJ 1969):** the equidistance rule of the 1958 Convention did not bind West Germany, a non-party, and was not custom.
• ***Nicaragua* (1986):** customary rules applied alongside treaty rules excluded by a reservation.

Apparent exceptions are objective regimes such as the demilitarised Aaland Islands and international canals, the objective personality of the UN (Reparation for Injuries 1949), Art 2(6) of the Charter and jus cogens. Third States are bound only through consent, custom or objective status, never by a treaty as such.

(c) Self-defence and pre-emptive action

Art 51 preserves the "inherent right" of self-defence "if an armed attack occurs", while Art 2(4) bars force otherwise. Pre-emptive (anticipatory) action meets an imminent attack. Preventive action targets a non-imminent, speculative threat.

For a pre-emptive right: the inherent customary right included the Caroline formula (1837), a necessity "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation", with proportionality. Modern weapons make waiting dangerous. The High-Level Panel (2004) and In Larger Freedom (2005) accepted imminent threats within Art 51 but not non-imminent ones. The 1967 war is often cited as anticipatory.

Against: Art 51 speaks of an attack that "occurs". The ICJ has avoided endorsing anticipatory self-defence (Nicaragua 1986, Armed Activities 2005) and requires an armed attack of sufficient gravity, necessity and proportionality (Oil Platforms 2003). Preventive force has been rejected: the Security Council unanimously condemned the 1981 Osirak strike (Res 487), and the 2002 Bush Doctrine and the 2003 Iraq war were widely viewed as unlawful. Strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in June 2025, presented as pre-emptive, were criticised by many States and scholars for lacking evidence of imminence.

India has invoked self-defence against cross-border terrorism, calling Balakot (2019) a "non-military pre-emptive" strike and presenting Operation Sindoor (2025) as a measured response to the Pahalgam attack. These raise the contested issue of force against non-State actors.

A narrow right of pre-emptive self-defence against a clearly imminent attack is arguably accepted, subject to necessity, proportionality and reporting to the Security Council. Preventive force against distant threats is not lawful without Chapter VII authorisation.