(a) When is an aircraft considered to be 'in flight' for the purposes of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure…

In flight and State obligations. Under the Hague Convention 1970, Article 3 defines ‘in flight’ as from external doors closed after boarding until any door opened for disembarkation. Article 2 requires preventive measures. Article 4(1) requires jurisdiction where the offence is on board an aircraft registered in that State; where the aircraft lands there with the offender on board; or where it was leased without crew to a lessee whose principal place of business, or if none, permanent residence, is there. Article 5 requires the State where the offender is found to take custody and investigate if it has jurisdiction, or promptly decide whether to prosecute. Article 6(1) permits custody or other measures to ensure presence. If the State does not prosecute, Article 7 imposes aut dedere aut judicare: it must surrender the person for prosecution. Article 8 makes it extraditable; Article 10 requires mutual assistance; Article 11 requires ICAO reporting; Article 12 requires information. Article 9(1) obliges all Contracting States, not only the territorial State, to take appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander. Unlike the Tokyo Convention 1963, which addresses unlawful acts on board and the landing State’s powers, and the Montreal Convention 1971, which targets violent acts against aviation safety, the Hague Convention is centred on seizure. India implements it through the Aircraft (Prevention of Unlawful Seizure) Act, 1982, amended in 2016, which gives jurisdiction on registration, landing, lease, nationality or presence links, not pure universal jurisdiction.

WTO decision-making. The most favoured means is consensus under Article IX:1: a decision is valid if no Member formally objects. Formal voting is a fallback when consensus fails. Majority/supermajority apply in specified cases: waivers of obligations require three-fourths of Members (Article IX:2); accessions require two-thirds (Article XII); amendments to most provisions require two-thirds and bind only accepting Members (Article X), while amendments to basic/constitutional provisions such as MFN, national treatment, rules of origin, institutional provisions and dispute settlement require ratification by all Members. The problem is that consensus can become paralysis, as in the Doha Development Round, where any single objection blocked progress. Reforms proposed include critical-mass or plurilateral agreements among willing Members, and in some discussions weighted voting or qualified voting for narrow technical issues. India supports preserving consensus and special and differential treatment, opposes erosion of developing-country flexibility, and insists that any reform should not undermine food security, public health and S&D rights.

IHL principles. IHL regulates conduct of hostilities. Its core principles are distinction, proportionality, military necessity and humanity. Distinction requires parties to distinguish civilians/civilian objects from combatants/military objectives and direct attacks only at the latter. Proportionality prohibits attacks expected to cause civilian harm excessive in relation to concrete and direct military advantage. Military necessity permits only measures required to defeat the enemy, not unnecessary destruction. Humanity, reflected in the Martens Clause, imposes limits of public conscience, humanity and requirements of public morality even where rules are silent. These principles derive from the Geneva Conventions 1949 and Additional Protocols 1977, and customary IHL. In contemporary conflict, drones, cyber operations and non-state armed groups test them: remote strikes require real-time distinction and proportionality; cyber attacks may be use of force or hostilities; non-state groups must still respect IHL. India, a party to the Geneva Conventions, supports IHL and customary law but has not ratified Additional Protocol I; it emphasises compliance with IHL in counter-terrorism and internal security while protecting civilians. Together, these regimes show that international law depends on precise triggers, collective rules and limiting norms; their value now lies in aviation-security cooperation, WTO reform and IHL compliance in asymmetric warfare.