(a) When is an aircraft considered to be 'in flight' for the purposes of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure…

(a) Aircraft in flight and State obligations under the Hague Convention, 1970

The Hague Convention (1970), adopted under ICAO between the Tokyo (1963) and Montreal (1971) Conventions, makes it an offence for a person on board an aircraft in flight unlawfully, by force, threat or intimidation, to seize or control the aircraft, or to attempt or abet this (Art 1).

"In flight" (Art 3(1)): from the moment all external doors are closed after embarkation until any such door is opened for disembarkation. After a forced landing, the flight continues until the competent authorities take over responsibility for the aircraft, persons and property. Military, customs and police aircraft are excluded (Art 3(2)). The Convention applies only if take-off or actual landing is outside the State of registration (Art 3(3)), but Arts 6, 7, 8 and 10 apply wherever the offender is found in a State other than the State of registration (Art 3(5)). The Beijing Supplementary Protocol (2010) extends coverage to aircraft "in service", from pre-flight preparation to 24 hours after landing.

Obligations of State parties:

1. Criminalise with severe penalties (Art 2).
2. Jurisdiction (Art 4): as State of registration, as landing State with the offender on board, as State of the lessee of a dry-leased aircraft, and wherever the offender is present and not extradited (Art 4(2)).
3. Custody and inquiry (Art 6): detain the offender, conduct a preliminary inquiry, notify interested States and allow consular contact.
4. ***Aut dedere aut judicare* (Art 7):** if not extraditing, submit the case "without exception whatsoever" for prosecution.
5. Extradition (Art 8): the offence is deemed extraditable, and the Convention may serve as the legal basis.
6. Restore the aircraft (Art 9) to its lawful commander and let passengers and crew continue.
7. Mutual assistance (Art 10) and reporting to the ICAO Council (Art 11).
8. Disputes (Art 12): negotiation, arbitration, then the ICJ, with an opt-out.

India gives effect to the Convention and the Beijing Protocol through the Anti-Hijacking Act, 2016, which covers aircraft "in service" and allows the death penalty where a hostage or security personnel dies. The IC-814 hijacking (Kandahar, 1999) showed the importance of cooperation by the landing State.

(b) Decision-making at the WTO

Consensus is the favoured method (Art IX:1 of the WTO Agreement). It exists if no Member present formally objects, so silence does not block. Where consensus fails, decisions may be taken by a majority of votes cast, one Member one vote, but voting is almost never used. Even waivers and accessions go by consensus under a 1995 General Council decision.

Special majorities:

• Three-fourths of Members: authoritative interpretations (Art IX:2) and waivers (Art IX:3), such as the 2003 TRIPS public health waiver.
• Two-thirds: terms of accession (Art XII:2), and amendments under Art X:3 and X:4. TRIPS Art 31bis (2017), the Trade Facilitation Agreement (2017) and the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement (in force September 2025) came in this way.
• Unanimity: amendments to Arts IX and X, GATT Arts I and II, GATS Art II:1 and TRIPS Art 4 (Art X:2).
• Consensus: adding a plurilateral agreement to Annex 4 (Art X:9).

Dispute settlement uses reverse consensus, so panels are set up and reports adopted unless all Members object (DSU Arts 6.1, 16.4, 17.14).

Reform is debated. Consensus gives each Member a veto: the Doha Round stalled, the Appellate Body has not functioned since 2019, and the Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement remains blocked under Art X:9. "Green Room" talks lack transparency. Proposals include "responsible consensus", plurilaterals and limited majority voting. Defenders say consensus protects developing countries and legitimacy, and it delivered the TFA and MC12 outcomes (2022). India favours consensus and special and differential treatment and is wary of plurilaterals. Reform is best aimed at transparency, inclusive processes and restoring two-tier dispute settlement while keeping consensus for rule-making.

(c) Core principles of International Humanitarian Law

IHL (jus in bello) limits the effects of armed conflict. It protects those not or no longer fighting and restricts means and methods of war. Its sources are the Hague Conventions (1899, 1907), the four Geneva Conventions (1949), the Additional Protocols (1977, 2005) and customary IHL. It binds all parties regardless of the legality of the war.

1. Distinction (AP I Arts 48, 51-52): civilians and civilian objects must be distinguished from combatants and military objectives, and indiscriminate attacks are barred. The ICJ called it a "cardinal principle" (Nuclear Weapons, 1996).
2. Proportionality (AP I Art 51(5)(b)): an attack is barred if expected civilian harm is excessive relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
3. Precaution (AP I Arts 57-58): verify targets, choose means to minimise harm, give warning where possible and keep military objectives away from civilians.
4. Military necessity: only force needed to weaken the enemy is allowed (Lieber Code 1863, St Petersburg Declaration 1868), and necessity cannot override specific rules.
5. Humanity and no unnecessary suffering (Hague Regulations Art 23(e), AP I Art 35(2)): hence bans on poison, chemical and biological weapons and blinding lasers.
6. Humane treatment (Common Art 3, GC III and IV): no torture, hostage-taking or execution without fair trial for the wounded, prisoners and civilians.
7. Martens Clause: where no rule applies, "the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience" govern.
8. Limits on methods (AP I Art 35): including widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage.

Enforcement runs through the grave breaches regime with universal jurisdiction, the ICTY, ICTR and ICC (Rome Statute Art 8, Tadic 1995 for internal conflicts), and the ICRC as guardian. India ratified the Geneva Conventions in 1950 and passed the Geneva Conventions Act, 1960, but has not ratified Additional Protocols I and II.