(a) Keeping in view the growth of International Law in the contemporary era, do you think the classical definition of…

(a) Is the classical definition of international law redundant?

Oppenheim (1905) defined international law as the customary and conventional rules "considered legally binding by civilised States in their intercourse with each other". States were the only subjects, the idea of "civilised" nations was Eurocentric, consent was the basis, and the scope was inter-State relations.

Contemporary law departs from this:

• New subjects: international organisations have personality (Reparation for Injuries, ICJ 1949). Individuals hold rights under human rights treaties and bear criminal responsibility (Nuremberg, Rome Statute).
• Universality: decolonisation ended the "civilised nations" test. The UN has 193 members.
• Non-consensual norms: jus cogens (VCLT Art 53) and obligations erga omnes (Barcelona Traction 1970).
• Subject-matter: human rights, environment, trade, health and cyberspace reach matters within States.

Starke and the US Restatement (Third) (1987) therefore include international organisations and some relations with individuals. The classical definition is incomplete rather than redundant: States remain the primary subjects and consent the main basis of obligation, but its exclusive State focus and "civilised" qualifier are outdated.

(b) De facto and de jure recognition

Recognition acknowledges a new State or government. The two forms differ as follows.

• Meaning: de facto is provisional acknowledgement of effective control while doubts about permanence remain. De jure is full acknowledgement of lawful status.
• Revocability: de facto can be withdrawn if control is lost. De jure is generally final, though relations may be severed.
• Diplomatic relations: limited or informal under de facto, full under de jure.
• State property and representation abroad: usually only with de jure. In Haile Selassie v Cable and Wireless (No 2) (1939), the Emperor lost his claim once the UK recognised Italy de jure over Ethiopia.
• Effect in courts: acts of a de facto authority within its territory are given effect (Luther v Sagor 1921) and it enjoys immunity (Arantzazu Mendi 1939).

The UK recognised the Soviet Government de facto in 1921 and de jure in 1924, and many States recognised Israel de facto in 1948. The distinction reflects confidence in the permanence of a regime. Under the Estrada doctrine many States now avoid recognising governments altogether.

(c) Territorial and extraterritorial asylum

Asylum is protection given to a person fleeing prosecution or persecution by another State. Art 14 UDHR gives a right "to seek and to enjoy" asylum, not a right to receive it.

Territorial asylum is granted within the territory of the asylum State and flows from territorial sovereignty. It is recognised in the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum (1967), the Caracas Convention on Territorial Asylum (1954) and the 1951 Refugee Convention, whose Art 33 bars refoulement. Limits include extradition treaties and the exclusion of serious non-political criminals (Art 1F). India, not a party to the 1951 Convention, has sheltered Tibetans and Sri Lankan Tamils, and NHRC v State of Arunachal Pradesh (1996) applied Art 21 to the Chakmas.

Extraterritorial (diplomatic) asylum is granted in embassies, legations or warships abroad and derogates from host sovereignty. In the Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) (ICJ 1950) the Court found no general custom supporting it. It rests on Latin American treaties (Havana 1928, Montevideo 1933, Caracas 1954). Mission premises are inviolable (VCDR Art 22) but must not be misused (Art 41(3)), so the host cannot enter but need not grant safe conduct. Examples are Cardinal Mindszenty in Budapest (1956-71) and Julian Assange in London (2012-19).

(d) Rights of States over territorial waters

Under UNCLOS 1982 (Arts 2-3) coastal sovereignty extends 12 nautical miles from the baselines, covering the water, airspace, seabed and subsoil. India adopts this in s.3 of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976.

1. Sovereignty and resources: exclusive fishing, minerals and energy, and cabotage.
2. Regulating innocent passage: passage must not prejudice peace, good order or security (Arts 17-19). The State may legislate on navigation, pollution, customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary matters and fix sea lanes (Arts 21-22).
3. Protection: preventing non-innocent passage and temporarily suspending passage for security (Art 25).
4. Criminal jurisdiction (Art 27): where the crime affects the coastal State or its good order, on request, or for drug trafficking.
5. Civil jurisdiction (Art 28): limited to liabilities incurred during the voyage.
6. Warships: may be required to leave immediately (Art 30). India requires prior notice for foreign warships, which some States dispute.
7. Hot pursuit (Art 111) from the territorial sea onto the high seas if uninterrupted.

The coastal State must not hamper innocent passage, must warn of known dangers (Corfu Channel 1949) and cannot charge for mere passage (Art 26).

(e) Arbitration and judicial settlement

Both are binding, law-based methods under Art 33 of the UN Charter.

• Tribunal: arbitrators are chosen by the parties ad hoc, with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (1899) giving only a panel and registry. Judicial settlement uses a standing court such as the ICJ (Charter Art 92) or ITLOS.
• Jurisdiction: arbitration needs a compromis or arbitration clause. The ICJ also has the Optional Clause (Statute Art 36(2)) and forum prorogatum.
• Law and procedure: parties may fix the law, including ex aequo et bono, and keep proceedings confidential. The ICJ applies Art 38 sources in public.
• Finality: an award binds the parties (Hague Convention 1907, Art 81) but may be challenged for excess of power. An ICJ judgment is final (Art 60), with revision only on new facts (Art 61).
• Enforcement: arbitration depends on good faith. Non-compliance with an ICJ judgment may go to the Security Council (Charter Art 94(2)).
• Precedent: both bind only the parties (Art 59), but the ICJ builds a persuasive jurisprudence.

Arbitrations include Alabama Claims (1872), Rann of Kutch (1968), Kishenganga (2013), Bay of Bengal (2014) and Enrica Lexie (2020). Judicial cases include Corfu Channel (1949) and Kulbhushan Jadhav (2019).