Q2
(a) "Amending power does not extend to damaging or destroying the basic structure or framework of our Constitution." Discuss. (20 marks) (b) Discuss the application of fundamental rights to parliamentary privilege cases. (15 marks) (c) Do you think that all the 'Directive Principles of State Policy' are equally fundamental for the governance of the country? Describe with the help of decided case laws. (15 marks)
हिंदी में प्रश्न पढ़ें
(a) "संशोधनकारी शक्ति हमारे संविधान के आधारभूत स्वरूप या संरचना को नुकसान या नष्ट करने तक विस्तारित नहीं होती है।" चर्चा कीजिए। (20 अंक) (b) संसदीय विशेषाधिकार के मामलों में मूल अधिकारों को लागू करने पर चर्चा कीजिए। (15 अंक) (c) क्या आपको लगता है कि देश के शासन में सभी 'राज्य की नीति के निदेशक तत्त्व' समान रूप से महत्त्वपूर्ण हैं? निर्णयज वाद विधियों की सहायता से वर्णन कीजिए। (15 अंक)
Directive word: Discuss
This question asks you to discuss. The directive word signals the depth of analysis expected, the structure of your answer, and the weight of evidence you must bring.
See our UPSC directive words guide for a full breakdown of how to respond to each command word.
How this answer will be evaluated
Approach
The directive 'discuss' requires a balanced, analytical examination of all three sub-parts with arguments for and against. Allocate approximately 40% of word budget to part (a) given its 20 marks, and roughly 30% each to parts (b) and (c). Structure with a brief unified introduction, separate analytical sections for each sub-part with doctrinal evolution and case law, and a synthesized conclusion on constitutionalism.
Key points expected
- Part (a): Evolution of basic structure doctrine from Shankari Prasad to Kesavananda Bharati, Minerva Mills, and I.R. Coelho; Article 368's limited amending power; specific components of basic structure (judicial review, federalism, secularism, democracy)
- Part (b): Article 105(3) and Article 194(4) read with fundamental rights; conflict between parliamentary privilege and individual rights in cases like Gunupati Keshavram Reddy, P.V. Narasimha Rao, and Raja Ram Pal; balancing test applied by Supreme Court
- Part (c): Classification of DPSPs into socio-economic, Gandhian, and liberal-intellectual categories; judicial hierarchy between FRs and DPSPs post-Minerva Mills and I.R. Coelho; unequal enforceability and constitutional status
- Interconnection: How judicial review under basic structure ensures harmony between amending power, FRs, and DPSPs
- Contemporary relevance: 103rd Amendment (EWS quota) challenge and ongoing debates on constitutional silences
- Critical evaluation: Whether basic structure is too vague; whether parliamentary privileges require codification; whether DPSPs need enforceability reforms
Evaluation rubric
| Dimension | Weight | Max marks | Excellent | Average | Poor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Provision / section accuracy | 20% | 10 | Precisely cites Article 368 (original and amended), Articles 13(2), 105, 194, and Part IV provisions; accurately distinguishes between constituent power and legislative power; correctly notes 24th, 25th, 26th, 29th, and 42nd Amendments with their constitutional fate | Mentions Article 368 and basic structure generally; lists some DPSP articles but mixes categories; conflates parliamentary privileges with legislative privileges or state privileges | Incorrectly states that Parliament can amend any part of Constitution; confuses Article 368 with Article 356; omits key articles or cites wrong constitutional provisions |
| Case-law citation | 20% | 10 | For (a): Kesavananda Bharati (1973), Minerva Mills (1980), I.R. Coelho (2007), Waman Rao (1981); for (b): Gunupati Keshavram Reddy (1958), M.S.M. Sharma (1959), Keshav Singh (1965), P.V. Narasimha Rao (1998), Raja Ram Pal (2007); for (c): Champakam Dorairajan (1951), Minerva Mills, Unni Krishnan (1993), Mohan Chandra (2015); notes bench strength and ratio decidendi | Mentions Kesavananda and Minerva Mills for (a); cites some privilege cases for (b) but misses Narasimha Rao; knows Champakam for (c) but misses post-Coelho developments | Cites cases without relevance (e.g., Golak Nath for basic structure origin); confuses facts or outcomes; invents case names or misattributes judgments to wrong benches |
| Doctrinal analysis | 20% | 10 | Traces emergence of 'basic features' test from Waman Rao's prospective overruling to Coelho's detailed enumeration; explains 'prospective overruling' and 'severability' doctrines; analyzes 'harmonious construction' between FRs and DPSPs; evaluates 'absolute privilege' vs. 'qualified privilege' debate in parliamentary context | Describes basic structure as judicial innovation without doctrinal evolution; states FRs prevail over DPSPs without explaining Minerva Mills' balance; treats privileges as absolute without constitutional limitation analysis | Presents basic structure as explicit constitutional text; claims DPSPs are enforceable in courts; asserts parliamentary privileges override all fundamental rights absolutely |
| Comparative / constitutional angle | 20% | 10 | Compares Indian basic structure with German 'übermaßverbot' and 'Ewigkeitsklausel' (Article 79(3) GG); contrasts uncodified UK parliamentary privilege with India's constitutionalized version; references South African transformative constitutionalism for DPSP enforceability debate; situates 103rd Amendment within global affirmative action jurisprudence | Mentions that basic structure is unique to India without comparative depth; notes UK influence on privileges without constitutional distinction; makes passing reference to foreign constitutions without specific provisions | Compares with US 'due process' incorrectly as source of basic structure; conflates Indian parliamentary system with British sovereignty doctrine; makes irrelevant comparisons without constitutional relevance |
| Conclusion & application | 20% | 10 | Synthesizes three parts through 'constitutional morality' concept; applies analysis to pending 103rd Amendment challenge, proposed DPSP enforceability bills, and privilege codification debates; offers balanced view on whether basic structure doctrine needs codification; demonstrates awareness of contemporary constitutional tensions between majoritarianism and constitutionalism | Summarizes each part separately without integration; makes generic recommendation for constitutional review commission; concludes that judiciary should balance all interests without specific application | Contradicts own analysis in conclusion; advocates abolition of basic structure or absolute judicial supremacy without justification; offers no application to current constitutional developments; ends with mere repetition of introduction |
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