(a) In the Parliamentary system, though there is no separation between the legislature and the executive in terms of personnel…

(a) Separation of functions in a parliamentary system

Ministers must be or become members of Parliament within six months (Art 75(5)), and the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha (Arts 75(3), 164(2)). Bagehot called the Cabinet the "hyphen" joining the two. Personnel are therefore fused, but the Constitution allocates functions and bars one organ from usurping the essential functions of another.

• Text: executive power in the President and Governors (Arts 53, 154), legislative power in Parliament and the State legislatures (Arts 79, 168, 245), and an independent judiciary (Arts 50, 124, 214). The legislature cannot discuss the conduct of judges (Arts 121, 211), courts cannot question legislative procedure (Arts 122, 212), and Art 361 gives official immunity.
• Controlled overlaps: ordinances (Arts 123, 213), delegated legislation, tribunals, legislative contempt powers and court rules (Art 145).

Judicial decisions:

• ***Ram Jawaya Kapur* (1955):** separation is not recognised "in its absolute rigidity", but functions are "sufficiently differentiated", and one organ cannot assume the essential functions of another. Executive power is the residue after legislative and judicial functions.
• ***In re Delhi Laws Act* (1951):** essential legislative functions cannot be delegated.
• ***Kesavananda Bharati* (1973) and *Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain* (1975):** separation of powers is a basic feature. Parliament cannot decide an election dispute by legislation.
• ***Asif Hameed* (1989) and *Aravali Golf Club* (2008):** courts must not direct legislation or create posts.
• ***D.C. Wadhwa* (1987) and *Krishna Kumar Singh* (2017):** repeated re-promulgation of ordinances is a fraud on the Constitution.
• ***Indian Aluminium* (1996) and *Madras Bar Association* (2021):** the legislature may remove the basis of a judgment but cannot simply overrule it or re-enact what was struck down.
• ***GNCTD v Union of India* (2018, 2023):** the "triple chain of accountability" from civil servants to ministers, ministers to the legislature, and the legislature to the people.
• ***Kalpana Mehta* (2018):** courts may refer to committee reports but not treat them as adjudicative findings.

India therefore follows functional separation with checks and balances, not the rigid American model.

(b) Tribunals and the validity of primary legislation

Arts 323A and 323B (42nd Amendment) allowed tribunals and the exclusion of courts other than the Supreme Court. S.P. Sampath Kumar (1987) upheld the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 on the footing that tribunals were an effective substitute for High Courts.

***L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India* (1997, seven judges):**

• judicial review under Arts 32 and 226-227 is basic structure, so the exclusion clauses and s.28 of the 1985 Act were struck down.
• tribunals may act as courts of first instance and examine the constitutional validity of statutes and rules, except their own parent statute, which must be challenged in the High Court.
• their decisions go to a Division Bench of the High Court and then to the Supreme Court. They are supplementary, not substitutes.

Later cases protected tribunal independence: R. Gandhi (2010), Madras Bar Association (2014) striking down the National Tax Tribunal, Rojer Mathew (2019), and Madras Bar Association (19 November 2025), which struck down key parts of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 and directed a National Tribunals Commission. Parliament responded with the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026 (assent 13 August 2026), which repeals the 2021 Act and sets up a National Tribunals Commission to oversee tribunals.

Tribunals are competent to test primary legislation other than their parent Act, but only as courts of first instance and never as final arbiters.

(c) Audi alteram partem and its exclusion

Audi alteram partem ("hear the other side") means no one should be condemned unheard. With the rule against bias it forms the core of natural justice. It requires notice, disclosure of adverse material, a reasonable opportunity to answer and a reasoned decision (S.N. Mukherjee 1990). Through Maneka Gandhi (1978) it is part of Arts 14 and 21. It applies to administrative action with civil consequences (Ridge v Baldwin 1964, A.K. Kraipak 1969, Mohinder Singh Gill 1978), and its content is flexible (Union of India v P.K. Roy 1968).

It may be excluded or modified in these situations:

1. Statutory or constitutional exclusion: the second proviso to Art 311(2) (Tulsiram Patel 1985), provided the exclusion itself is constitutional.
2. Urgency: a post-decisional hearing may replace a prior one (Maneka Gandhi, Swadeshi Cotton Mills 1981).
3. Legislative or policy action, such as price fixing (Union of India v Cynamide 1987).
4. National security and confidentiality (ex p Hosenball 1977).
5. Impracticability, such as mass copying in an examination (Bihar School Examination Board v Subhas Chandra Sinha 1970).
6. Interim or preliminary action, such as suspension pending inquiry.
7. Useless formality, where admitted facts allow only one conclusion (AMU v Mansoor Ali Khan 2000), and the need to show prejudice (S.K. Sharma 1996, Dharampal Satyapal 2015), though S.L. Kapoor (1981) holds that prejudice need not ordinarily be shown.

Exceptions are construed narrowly, and courts still insist on the minimum fairness the situation allows.