(a) "Preamble of the Indian Constitution is indicative of basic values that the political system is expected to pursue." How far…

(a) I largely agree. The Preamble states the source of authority ("We, the People of India"), the nature of the State (sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic, republic) and the objectives it must pursue:

• Justice, social, economic and political: reflected in Articles 14–17, 38, 39 and 46;
• Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship: reflected in Articles 19 and 25–28;
• Equality of status and of opportunity: reflected in Articles 14–16;
• Fraternity, assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation: reflected in Articles 17, 51A and 21.

The words "socialist", "secular" and "integrity" were added by the 42nd Amendment (1976).

Judicial treatment

• ***In re Berubari Union* (1960):** the Preamble was called the "key to open the minds of the makers", but was said not to be part of the Constitution.
• ***Kesavananda Bharati* (1973):** the Preamble is part of the Constitution. It can be amended, but not so as to destroy the basic features it embodies.
• ***LIC v. Consumer Education & Research Centre* (1995):** the Preamble is an integral part of the Constitution.
• ***S.R. Bommai v. Union of India* (1994):** secularism was held to be part of the basic structure.
• ***Dr. Balram Singh v. Union of India* (2024):** the Supreme Court dismissed a challenge to the insertion of "socialist" and "secular", treating them as reflecting the Constitution's existing ethos.

Qualification: the Preamble is not a source of power, nor a limit on power, and it is not enforceable by itself. It guides interpretation where the text is ambiguous. The values it lists are aspirations that are realised through the Fundamental Rights, the Directive Principles and legislation.

(b) The Constitution adopts a parliamentary system. Executive power is vested in the President (Article 53), but the President must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers (Article 74(1)).

• The 42nd Amendment made that advice binding.
• The 44th Amendment allows the President to return advice once for reconsideration.
• Courts cannot inquire into what advice was tendered (Article 74(2)).

Cases

• ***Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab* (1955):** the President is a formal or constitutional head, and real executive power lies with the Council of Ministers.
• ***U.N.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi* (1971):** a Council of Ministers must exist at all times, even after the Lok Sabha is dissolved.
• ***Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab* (1974), seven judges:** the "satisfaction" of the President or Governor is the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers, except in a few situations where personal judgment is required.
• ***Maru Ram v. Union of India* (1980) and Kehar Singh v. Union of India (1989):** the pardoning power under Article 72 is exercised on ministerial advice and is subject to limited judicial review.

Limited areas where the President uses personal judgment

• appointing a Prime Minister after a hung verdict;
• dismissing a ministry that has lost its majority;
• returning advice once (proviso to Article 74(1));
• the "pocket veto" under Article 111;
• seeking information under Article 78;
• seeking the Supreme Court's advisory opinion under Article 143.

Conclusion: the President is largely a "figurehead" in the sense of a constitutional head, but not a cipher. The office acts as a guardian of constitutional continuity.

(c) Yes, but with qualifications. The Constitution is federal with a strong unitary bias, described as "quasi-federal" (K.C. Wheare). The Supreme Court said in State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1962) that it is not a traditional federation.

The slant towards the Centre

• Legislative:
• the Union List is larger and more important (about 100 entries, against 61 in the State List);
• Parliament prevails on the Concurrent List (Article 254);
• residuary power lies with Parliament (Article 248, Entry 97);
• Parliament may legislate on State subjects under Articles 249, 250, 252, 253 and 357;
• Bills may be reserved for the President (Articles 200–201).
• Executive:
• binding directions to States (Articles 256–257), backed by Article 365;
• Governors are appointed by the Centre (Article 155);
• the All-India Services (Article 312).
• Financial: the more elastic taxes are with the Union; States depend on devolution and grants (Articles 270, 275, 280 and 282) and on Union consent to borrow (Article 293).
• Emergency: Articles 352, 356 and 360 can convert the structure into a unitary one.
• Territorial: Parliament can reorganise States under Article 3 without their consent. The "indestructible Union of destructible States" is a phrase often used for this.

Counter-balances

• ***S.R. Bommai* (1994):** federalism is part of the basic structure, and the use of Article 356 is subject to judicial review.
• Fiscal: the GST Council requires pooled decisions; Finance Commission devolution is 41%.
• Cooperative and contestatory federalism (Mohit Minerals (2022)); States can sue the Centre under Article 131.

Conclusion: the Centre's slant was a deliberate choice, made for unity after Partition. Constitutional practice and the courts have tempered it into cooperative federalism.

(d) Natural justice has two main rules: audi alteram partem (the right to be heard) and nemo judex in causa sua (the rule against bias). A reasoned decision is often added as a third. These are flexible standards, and their content depends on the statute, the subject-matter and the consequences (A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969)). They aim to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The courts accept deviations in several situations:

• Statutory exclusion: express, or by necessary implication, where constitutionally valid. For example, the second proviso to Article 311(2) (Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985)).
• Urgency and public interest: a prior hearing may give way to a post-decisional hearing (Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), impounding of a passport; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981), takeover of a company).
• Doctrine of necessity: a biased authority may decide if no other authority is competent (Election Commission v. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy (1996)).
• Useless formality and the prejudice test:
• Where the facts are admitted, or only one conclusion is possible, a failure to give a hearing may not vitiate the decision (Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan (2000)).
• In disciplinary matters, the delinquent must show prejudice caused by a procedural lapse (State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (1996); ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993)).
• Confidentiality and security: the extent of disclosure may be limited, for example to sealed covers, though the Court has recently insisted that the essence be disclosed (Madhyamam Broadcasting v. Union of India (2023)).
• Legislative and policy action: natural justice ordinarily does not apply to legislative acts.

Conclusion: the statement is correct. Natural justice is adapted to context to achieve fairness in substance. There is, however, a core that cannot be removed where civil consequences follow.

(e) Judicial review of administrative action rests on Articles 32, 226 and 227 and is part of the basic structure (L. Chandra Kumar (1997)). Lord Diplock set out the grounds in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (the GCHQ case, 1985). Indian courts have adopted and extended them.

1. Illegality:

• acting without jurisdiction or beyond the statute (ultra vires);
• errors of law;
• irrelevant considerations and improper purpose (Rohtas Industries v. S.D. Agarwal (1969); Barium Chemicals v. Company Law Board (1966));
• fettering discretion or acting under dictation;
• mala fides (S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab (1964)).

2. Irrationality: Wednesbury unreasonableness (Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948)), meaning a decision so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have taken it. It also covers arbitrariness under Article 14 (E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. (1974); Shayara Bano (2017), on "manifest arbitrariness").
3. Procedural impropriety: breach of statutory procedure or of natural justice (A.K. Kraipak (1969); Maneka Gandhi (1978)).
4. Proportionality, the possible fourth ground:

• Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987), on punishment;
• Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001), which applies proportionality to fundamental rights and Wednesbury to other cases;
• Modern Dental College (2016) and K.S. Puttaswamy (2017), on the structured four-part test.

5. Legitimate expectation: Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries (1993).

Limits on review: courts review the decision-making process, not the merits. They show restraint in contractual, tender and economic policy matters (Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994); BALCO Employees Union v. Union of India (2002)).