(a) What do you understand by breakdown of constitutional machinery in a State ? Critically examine the powers of the President…

(a) Article 356(1) allows the President to issue a Proclamation when, on a Governor's report or otherwise, the President is satisfied that "a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution". This is the breakdown of constitutional machinery, and it is a constitutional breakdown, not ordinary maladministration or political instability. Article 365 adds a deeming rule: if a State fails to comply with valid Union directions (Arts 256, 257), the President may treat that as such a breakdown.

Situations recognised as breakdown (Sarkaria Commission; S.R. Bommai)

• Hung Assembly where no stable government can be formed after all alternatives are exhausted.
• A ministry that has lost its majority and refuses to resign or face the floor.
• Physical breakdown, such as internal subversion or the government wilfully refusing to act against grave disorder.
• A government acting against the basic features of the Constitution, such as secularism.
• Persistent defiance of valid Union directions (Art 365).

Maladministration, corruption allegations, or the ruling party losing Lok Sabha elections are not grounds.

Powers and procedure

• Effects of the Proclamation: the President may assume all or any executive functions of the State and the Governor's powers. The Legislature's powers become exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament (Art 357). The Assembly may be suspended or dissolved. The High Court's powers cannot be touched.
• Approval: approval by both Houses is required within two months (Art 356(3)). Once approved, the Proclamation runs for six months from issue and may be extended by six months at a time, up to three years.
• 44th Amendment (1978) limits: continuance beyond one year requires a National Emergency to be in force and the Election Commission to certify that elections cannot be held (Art 356(5)). It replaced the 38th Amendment's clause (5), which had made the President's satisfaction "final and conclusive", reopening judicial review.

Judicial control

• ***State of Rajasthan v Union of India* (1977):** the Court treated the satisfaction as largely political and declined to interfere with the dissolution of nine Assemblies. It still left room for review where the power is exercised mala fide or on wholly extraneous grounds.
• ***S.R. Bommai v Union of India* (1994, nine judges)** is the leading case:
• the Proclamation is judicially reviewable, and the Court may examine whether relevant material existed and whether it reasonably supports the satisfaction, though not its sufficiency;
• majority must be tested on the floor of the House, not in the Governor's chamber;
• the Assembly may only be suspended until both Houses approve the Proclamation, and dissolution before approval is invalid;
• if the Proclamation is struck down, the Court can restore the dismissed ministry and Assembly;
• secularism is a basic feature, so a government acting against it can be dismissed.
• ***Rameshwar Prasad v Union of India* (2006):** the dissolution of the Bihar Assembly before it first met, on the Governor's report of possible horse-trading, was held unconstitutional and the report mala fide. Because fresh elections were already under way, the Court did not restore the Assembly.
• ***Nabam Rebia v Deputy Speaker* (2016, Arunachal Pradesh) and *Union of India v Harish Chandra Singh Rawat* (2016, Uttarakhand):**
• the Court curbed the Governor's discretion and insisted on floor tests;
• in the Uttarakhand case, the Uttarakhand High Court quashed President's Rule and the Supreme Court supervised a floor test that restored the ministry.
• ***In re Article 370* (2023):** the Court held that challenges to actions taken during President's Rule must show prima facie mala fides or extraneous considerations. Not every action of Parliament or the President during the Proclamation must be limited to day-to-day administration.

Critical examination

• Misuse: Article 356 has been used over 100 times. Many uses were partisan, especially before 1994, for example the 1977 and 1980 mass dismissals. Ambedkar hoped it would remain a "dead letter".
• Effect of Bommai: since Bommai, use has fallen sharply and courts have struck down improper proclamations.
• Remaining weaknesses:
• the Governor's report remains the usual trigger and the Governor's impartiality is often questioned;
• judicial relief can come too late, as in Bihar in 2006;
• Parliament's approval is controlled by the ruling majority.
• Commission recommendations: the Sarkaria Commission (1988) and Punchhi Commission (2010) recommended using Article 356 only as a last resort, after a warning to the State, and with the grounds of the Governor's report disclosed. The Punchhi Commission also suggested "localised emergencies" as a less drastic alternative.

The power remains a necessary federal safeguard. Bommai has converted it from a political weapon into a justiciable, last-resort power.

(b) Objectives: The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 followed the Administrative Reforms Commission's 1966 recommendation, the 2nd ARC and the 2011 anti-corruption movement. Its aims are:

• an independent ombudsman to inquire into corruption allegations against public functionaries, including the Prime Minister, Ministers and MPs;
• time-bound inquiry, investigation and prosecution;
• insulation of anti-corruption work from executive control;
• a mandate on States to create Lokayuktas;
• implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption, which India ratified in 2011.

Lokpal: composition and appointment

• Composition: a Chairperson and up to eight Members. Half must be judicial members, and at least half must be from SC, ST, OBC, minority communities or women (s.3).
• Selection Committee (s.4):
• the Prime Minister;
• the Lok Sabha Speaker;
• the Leader of the Opposition, or the leader of the single largest opposition party;
• the Chief Justice of India or a nominated judge;
• an eminent jurist.
• Tenure: five years or until age 70.
• The first Lokpal, Justice P.C. Ghose, was appointed only in March 2019, after the Supreme Court in Common Cause v Union of India (2017) held that the Act was workable without the proposed amendment on the Leader of the Opposition.

Lokpal: jurisdiction (s.14)

• Prime Minister: covered, except for allegations relating to international relations, security, public order, atomic energy and space. An inquiry against the Prime Minister requires approval of a two-thirds full bench and is held in camera.
• Ministers and MPs: covered, except for anything said or any vote given in Parliament (Art 105).
• Officials: Group A, B, C and D officials of the Union.
• Bodies: boards, corporations and societies financed or controlled by the Union, and bodies receiving foreign contributions above ₹10 lakh.

Lokpal: powers and functions

• Wings: an Inquiry Wing (s.11) and a Prosecution Wing (s.12).
• Inquiry and investigation: preliminary inquiry after hearing the public servant, then investigation through the CBI or any agency. Timelines are generally 90 days for a preliminary inquiry and six months for an investigation, extendable.
• Control over agencies: superintendence and direction over the CBI in cases it refers (s.25). CBI officers investigating Lokpal cases cannot be transferred without its approval.
• Court-like powers: civil court powers of summons and discovery (s.27), and search and seizure (s.28).
• Property: provisional attachment (s.29) and confiscation (s.31) of corruptly acquired property.
• Disciplinary powers: recommending transfer or suspension of the public servant (s.32).
• Courts and sanction: Special Courts to complete trials within a year (s.35), and the Lokpal itself grants sanction to prosecute.
• Complainants: protection of honest complainants and penalties for false complaints (s.46).

Lokayuktas: Section 63 required every State to set up a Lokayukta by its own law within a year. Their composition, jurisdiction and powers are left to the States, so they vary widely. Karnataka's Lokayukta, for example, was historically strong, while several States delayed setting one up.

Effectiveness

• Positives:
• the institution exists, the Prime Minister is within its reach, and it has powers over property;
• it has referred cases to the CBI;
• on 27 January 2025, its full bench claimed jurisdiction over High Court judges.
• Weaknesses:
• appointments were delayed for five years;
• posts have often been vacant;
• the Inquiry and Prosecution Wings were slow to be made operational;
• complaint numbers are low and a large share are dismissed for defects in form;
• there are very few prosecutions;
• it depends on the CBI and on executive-controlled budgets;
• the Selection Committee is dominated by the executive;
• jurisdiction over the judiciary is contested, and the Supreme Court stayed the January 2025 order on judges on 20 February 2025;
• the 2016 amendment diluted asset-declaration requirements;
• Lokayuktas are uneven, and some States have no functioning Lokayukta.
• Needed: full staffing, its own investigation cadre, financial autonomy, and a model Lokayukta law, so that the institution matches its design.

(c) Article 143(1) empowers the President, if a question of law or fact "has arisen, or is likely to arise" and is of such a nature and public importance that the Court's opinion is expedient, to refer it to the Supreme Court. The Court "may", after hearing, report its opinion. Under Art 143(2), disputes arising from pre-Constitution treaties excluded from Art 131 must be answered ("shall"). References are heard by at least five judges (Art 145(3)), and the opinion is delivered in open court (Art 145(4)).

Role of the Supreme Court

• Discretion to decline: the Court may decline a reference that is vague, political or unsuited to judicial answer. In M. Ismail Faruqui v Union of India (1994), it declined the Ayodhya reference on whether a temple pre-existed the mosque, because it would have favoured one community and replaced adjudication.
• No review through the back door: a reference cannot be used to review or overrule a decided judgment. The Court can only clarify the law (In re Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (1991); Special Reference No. 1 of 2012).
• Binding force: the opinion is advisory, not a judgment between parties. Whether it binds as law under Art 141 has been debated, but in practice it is followed as authoritative (St. Xavier's College v State of Gujarat (1974): entitled to great weight).
• Reframing questions: the Court may reframe questions and hear the States and interested parties.

Illustrative references

• ***In re Delhi Laws Act* (1951):** the limits of delegated legislation. Essential legislative functions cannot be delegated.
• ***In re Kerala Education Bill* (1958):** harmonised Art 30 minority rights with regulation in the interest of excellence, and used Directive Principles in interpretation.
• ***In re Berubari Union* (1960):** ceding Indian territory to Pakistan required a constitutional amendment under Art 368. This led to the 9th Amendment.
• ***In re Keshav Singh* (Special Reference No. 1 of 1964):** reconciled legislative privilege with the High Court's power under Art 226.
• ***In re Presidential Election* (1974):** the election can be held even if some Assemblies are dissolved.
• ***In re Special Courts Bill* (1978):** upheld special courts for Emergency-era offences with safeguards under Art 14.
• ***In re Cauvery* (1991):** Karnataka's ordinance nullifying the Tribunal's interim order was unconstitutional.
• ***Third Judges case* (Special Reference No. 1 of 1998):** the collegium of the CJI and four senior judges for Supreme Court appointments.
• ***Special Reference No. 1 of 2002* (Gujarat elections):** Art 174(1)'s six-month rule does not apply to a dissolved Assembly. The Election Commission decides the election schedule.
• ***Natural Resources Allocation* (Special Reference No. 1 of 2012):** auction is not a constitutional mandate for all natural resources. It clarified the 2G judgment without overruling it.
• ***In re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills* (Special Reference No. 1 of 2025, opinion of 20 November 2025):**
• courts cannot impose fixed timelines on Governors or the President under Arts 200 and 201, and "deemed assent" is impermissible;
• Governors cannot sit on Bills indefinitely, and prolonged unexplained inaction permits limited judicial direction;
• this effectively diluted the two-judge ruling in State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu (April 2025).

Assessment: Article 143 lets the Court act as a constitutional counsellor on major questions of federalism, separation of powers and rights, without a live dispute. The risk is that the executive may use references to seek a second opinion on inconvenient judgments, as critics argued about the 2025 reference. The Court's refusal to let Article 143 operate as an appeal preserves its adjudicatory integrity.