(a) A twenty year old girl 'G' was coming back to home after attending college. A man 'M' held her, shut her mouth and dragged…

(a) The facts disclose a sequence of acts: seizure and gagging, dragging G to a bush, slitting her throat, and then a sexual act on her dead body. Each stage must be analysed separately. The IPC sections below are given with the corresponding sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which governs offences committed after 1 July 2024.

1. Murder: IPC s.302 read with s.300 (BNS ss.101, 103)

• Culpable homicide: slitting the throat is an act done with the intention of causing death (s.299; BNS s.100).
• Murder: it falls under the first clause of s.300 (BNS s.101(a)). The nature of the weapon, the vital part chosen and the force used show intention. The Virsa Singh v State of Punjab (1958) test for the third clause is also satisfied.
• No exception: none of the exceptions (provocation, private defence, sudden fight and so on) is available.
• Punishment: death or imprisonment for life, and fine. Whether the case is "rarest of rare" is judged under Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980) and Machhi Singh v State of Punjab (1983). A brutal killing of a young woman followed by desecration of her body is an aggravating factor, weighed against mitigating circumstances and the possibility of reform.

2. Abduction and restraint

• Abduction: dragging G by force to the bush is abduction (s.362; BNS s.138), because she was compelled by force to go from one place to another.
• Abduction in order to murder (s.364; BNS s.140(1)): attracted if the prosecution shows the abduction was in order to murder her. Punishable with imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment up to 10 years, and fine.
• Abduction to compel illicit intercourse (s.366; BNS s.87): attracted if the intention at the time of abduction was that she be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, which may be inferred from the later sexual act.
• Wrongful restraint and confinement: holding her and shutting her mouth is also wrongful restraint and confinement (ss.341–342; BNS ss.126–127).
• Outraging modesty: these acts are also assault or criminal force with intent to outrage modesty (s.354; BNS s.74).

3. The sexual act after death: is it rape?

• Why it is not rape:
• rape under s.375 (BNS s.63) is sexual intercourse with a woman "against her will" or "without her consent";
• these concepts presuppose a living person, and a dead body cannot be the victim of rape;
• rape causing death (s.376A; BNS s.66) is also not made out, because the death preceded the sexual act.
• ***Rangaraju @ Vajapeyi v State of Karnataka* (Karnataka HC, 2023):**
• the accused killed a woman and then had intercourse with her body;
• the High Court acquitted him of rape (ss.375/376) and held that s.377 also did not apply;
• it upheld the murder conviction and recommended that Parliament create an offence of necrophilia.
• The lacuna under the BNS: the gap continues under the BNS, which has no equivalent of s.377 for adults.
• Indignity to a corpse (s.297; BNS s.301): the act may fall under s.297, which punishes a person who, with the intention or knowledge of wounding anyone's feelings or insulting any religion, "offers any indignity to any human corpse" in a place of worship, place of sepulture, place set apart for funeral rites, or depository for remains. The punishment is up to one year, or fine, or both. Its place-based wording makes it an imperfect fit for an act in a bush.
• Attempt to rape: if the evidence shows that M dragged G away with intent to rape her and went beyond preparation before killing her, an attempt to rape (s.376 read with s.511; BNS s.64 read with s.62) may be considered. This is a question of evidence.
• Evidence: medical evidence of the time of death relative to the sexual act (expert opinion under BSA s.39) is crucial.

4. Other offences

• If M concealed the body or weapon, causing disappearance of evidence (s.201; BNS s.238) is attracted.

Conclusion: M is liable for murder (s.302 / BNS s.103) and abduction (s.364 or s.366 / BNS s.140(1) or s.87), along with wrongful confinement and outraging modesty. For the post-mortem act, he cannot be convicted of rape as the law stands. At most s.297 (BNS s.301) applies, which exposes a legislative gap that the courts have asked Parliament to fill.

(b) Negligence, as a tort, is "the omission to do something which a reasonable man ... would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do" (Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co (1856)). The plaintiff must prove four essentials.

1. Duty of care

• ***Donoghue v Stevenson* (1932):** Lord Atkin's "neighbour principle" requires care towards persons so closely and directly affected that they ought reasonably to be in contemplation. The manufacturer of ginger beer was held to owe a duty to the ultimate consumer.
• ***Caparo Industries v Dickman* (1990):** duty requires foreseeability of harm, proximity, and that imposing a duty is fair, just and reasonable.
• ***Municipal Corporation of Delhi v Subhagwanti* (1966):** the MCD was liable for the collapse of the Chandni Chowk clock tower, as the owner of a structure on a highway owes a duty to passers-by.

2. Breach of duty

• Standard: the standard is the reasonable person, judged by the probability and gravity of harm, the cost of precautions, and the social value of the act. In Bolton v Stone (1951), a cricket ball hit out of the ground was so improbable that there was no breach.
• Professionals: professionals are judged by the Bolam test, the practice accepted by a responsible body of professionals (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (1957)). This was adopted in India in Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab (2005) and Kusum Sharma v Batra Hospital (2010).
• ***Res ipsa loquitur*:** where the thing is under the defendant's control and the accident would not ordinarily happen without negligence, breach may be inferred (Scott v London and St Katherine Docks (1865)).

3. Causation: the chain must remain intact

• Causation in fact (the "but for" test): in Barnett v Chelsea & Kensington Hospital (1969), a doctor negligently failed to examine a patient, but the patient would have died of arsenic poisoning anyway, so there was no liability.
• Causation in law and remoteness:
• Re Polemis (1921) applied a test of direct consequences;
• The Wagon Mound (No 1) (1961) replaced it with reasonable foreseeability of the kind of damage;
• the "thin skull" rule still makes the defendant take the victim as found (Smith v Leech Brain (1962)).
• Novus actus interveniens: an independent, unforeseeable act of a third party, the plaintiff or nature may break the chain.
• In Haynes v Harwood (1935), horses were left unattended and a boy frightened them. A policeman was injured stopping them, and the defendant was liable, because both the intervening act and the rescue were foreseeable.
• In Knightley v Johns (1982), a police inspector's negligent order to a constable was a novus actus that broke the chain.
• In Lamb v Camden LBC (1981), damage by squatters was too remote.
• Criminal negligence: in criminal law, s.304A IPC (BNS s.106) similarly requires that death be the direct result of a rash or negligent act, without the intervention of another's negligence (Kurban Hussein Mohammedali Rangwalla v State of Maharashtra (1965)).

4. Damage

• Negligence is not actionable per se. Legally recognised damage (physical, property, or in limited cases economic or psychiatric) must be proved.

Defences: contributory negligence (apportionment), volenti non fit injuria, and inevitable accident.

(c) Definition: Under s.2(1)(a) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, "atrocity" means an offence punishable under section 3. The Act uses the word for crimes committed by persons who are not members of SC/ST against SC/ST members, where the victim's caste or tribal identity is the context of humiliation, exclusion or violence. It gives effect to Arts 15, 17 and 46.

Acts amounting to atrocity: s.3(1), as substituted by the 2015 Amendment Punishment is imprisonment of not less than six months, extending to five years, and fine.

• Degrading and humiliating acts:
• forcing an SC/ST member to eat or drink inedible or obnoxious substances (cl. (a));
• dumping excreta, sewage or carcasses at the member's premises or in the neighbourhood (cls. (b)–(c));
• garlanding with footwear or parading naked or semi-naked (cl. (d));
• forcible tonsuring, removing clothes or painting the face (cl. (e)).
• Land and livelihood:
• wrongful occupation or cultivation of land owned by or allotted to the member (cl. (f));
• wrongful dispossession or interference with rights, including forest rights (cl. (g));
• begar, forced or bonded labour (cl. (h));
• compelling the member to dispose of carcasses or dig graves (cl. (i));
• manual scavenging (cl. (j));
• dedicating a woman as a devadasi (cl. (k)).
• Political rights:
• preventing the member from voting or contesting (cl. (l));
• obstructing SC/ST Panchayat or municipal office-holders (cl. (m));
• post-poll hurt or boycott (cls. (n)–(o)).
• Abuse of legal process: false, malicious or vexatious suits or criminal proceedings, and false information to a public servant (cls. (p)–(q)).
• Insult and hate:
• intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate "in any place within public view" (cl. (r));
• abusing the member by caste name in public view (cl. (s));
• defiling objects held sacred (cl. (t));
• promoting enmity against SC/STs (cl. (u));
• disrespecting any late person held in high esteem (cl. (v)).
• Sexual acts: intentional sexual touching without consent, and sexual words or gestures, against an SC/ST woman (cl. (w)).
• Social exclusion:
• fouling water sources (cl. (x));
• denying passage to places of public resort (cl. (y));
• forcing the member to leave home or village (cl. (z));
• obstructing use of common property, cremation grounds, public transport, wedding processions, places of worship, and so on (cl. (za));
• "witch" branding (cl. (zb));
• social or economic boycott (cl. (zc)).

Aggravated atrocities: s.3(2)

• False evidence: giving or fabricating false evidence to secure conviction of an SC/ST member for a capital offence is punishable with life imprisonment, and death if an innocent member is executed as a result (cl. (i)). False evidence in other serious cases is also covered (cl. (ii)).
• Mischief by fire or explosive: against SC/ST property, or against a place of worship or dwelling (cls. (iii)–(iv)).
• Serious IPC offences: committing any IPC offence punishable with ten years or more against an SC/ST person or property, knowing the victim to be SC/ST, is punishable with life imprisonment (cl. (v)). Offences listed in the Schedule attract the IPC punishment (cl. (va)).
• Evidence and public servants: causing disappearance of evidence (cl. (vi)), and offences by public servants, which carry enhanced punishment (cl. (vii)).
• Neglect of duty: wilful neglect of duties by public servants is punishable under s.4.

Procedural safeguards

• Special courts: Special Courts and Exclusive Special Courts try these offences (s.14).
• Victims' rights: victims and witnesses have rights under s.15A.
• Anticipatory bail and arrest: anticipatory bail is barred (s.18). Under s.18A (2018), no preliminary enquiry and no prior approval is needed before arrest. This reversed Subhash Kashinath Mahajan (2018) and was upheld in Prathvi Raj Chauhan v Union of India (2020). Courts may still grant anticipatory bail where no prima facie case is made out.

Judicial interpretation

• ***Swaran Singh v State* (2008):** "public view" means a place open to public view, not necessarily a public place.
• ***Hitesh Verma v State of Uttarakhand* (2020): an insult inside a building with no member of the public present is not in public view. The insult must be because** the victim belongs to SC/ST.
• ***Shajan Skaria v State of Kerala* (2024):** not every insult of an SC/ST person is an offence under s.3(1)(r). There must be intent to humiliate on the basis of caste identity.