(a) "'Standard-contracts' contain a large number of terms and conditions in 'fine print' which restrict or often exclude…

(a) Standard-form contracts (contracts of adhesion) are printed terms drafted by suppliers such as railways, airlines, insurers, banks, builders and platforms, and offered on a "take it or leave it" basis. They save transaction costs but often hide exclusion or limitation clauses in fine print, so consent is nominal. Courts in England and India have developed several layers of protection.

1. Incorporation: was the term part of the contract?

• Reasonable notice: the proferens must give reasonable notice of the terms at or before the contract (Parker v South Eastern Railway (1877), the ticket cases).
• Timing: terms communicated after the contract is made are not incorporated. In Olley v Marlborough Court Hotel (1949), a notice in the hotel room came after the contract made at reception.
• Nature of the document: a document that a reasonable person would not regard as contractual does not bind (Chapelton v Barry UDC (1940), a deckchair ticket treated as a receipt).
• Onerous terms: unusual or onerous terms need greater notice, Denning LJ's "red hand" (Spurling v Bradshaw (1956); Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking (1971); Interfoto v Stiletto (1989)).
• Signed documents: a signed document binds (L'Estrange v Graucob (1934)), but not where its effect was misrepresented (Curtis v Chemical Cleaning (1951)).
• Indian application: in Bharathi Knitting Co v DHL Worldwide Express (1996), the Supreme Court held that a consignor who signed a consignment note was bound by its limitation clause. This shows that notice and signature matter, while the consumer forum could still examine deficiency in service.

2. Construction: interpreting the term strictly

• Contra proferentem: ambiguities are construed against the party relying on the exclusion.
• Main purpose rule: a clause is not read to defeat the main object of the contract.
• Negligence: clear words are needed to exclude liability for negligence (Canada Steamship Lines v R (1952)).
• Fundamental breach: this doctrine (Karsales v Wallis (1956)) was reduced to a rule of construction in Photo Production v Securicor (1980).

3. Invalidity under the Indian Contract Act

• Unconscionable terms (s.23): in ***Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v Brojo Nath Ganguly* (1986)**, a service rule allowing the employer to terminate permanent employees on three months' notice was held void under s.23. Unconscionable terms in contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power are opposed to public policy.
• Minimum duty of care (ss.151–152): the minimum statutory duty of a bailee cannot be contracted out of. Lily White v R. Munuswami (Madras HC, 1966) struck down a dry cleaner's clause limiting liability to 50% of the market value of lost goods.
• Undue influence (s.16(3)): a presumption of undue influence arises where a dominant party makes an unconscionable bargain.
• Other grounds: restraint of trade (s.27) and ouster of courts (s.28).

4. Constitutional scrutiny of State and public-sector contracts

• ***LIC v Consumer Education and Research Centre* (1995):** standard-form terms of a State insurer must satisfy Art 14 and be just and fair.

5. Consumer law

• Unfair contracts: the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines an "unfair contract" (s.2(46)), for example excessive security deposits, disproportionate penalties, and unilateral termination or assignment. State and National Commissions can declare such terms null and void (ss.49(2), 59(2)).
• ***Pioneer Urban Land v Govindan Raghavan* (2019):** one-sided terms in a builder–buyer agreement were held to be an unfair trade practice that does not bind the buyer.
• Reform proposals: the Law Commission's 199th Report (2006) recommended a law on unfair procedural and substantive terms, modelled on the UK's Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (now the Consumer Rights Act 2015). It has not been enacted.

Courts thus protect the weaker party at three points: incorporation, interpretation and validity. However, comprehensive statutory control in India still remains largely limited to consumer law.

(b) The Constitution does not mention a "right to information". The Supreme Court has derived it from the democratic structure of the Constitution and from fundamental rights.

Constitutional roots

1. Democracy and accountability (Preamble): in a "democratic republic", sovereignty rests with the people, who must know how they are governed. In ***State of UP v Raj Narain* (1975)**, the Court held that the people have a right to know every public act done by public functionaries, and that responsibility of officials requires openness. It refused privilege over the Blue Book on the Prime Minister's security arrangements without proper claim.
2. Article 19(1)(a), free speech and expression:

• speech presupposes information. Bennett Coleman v Union of India (1973) recognised the right of the public to receive information through the press;
• ***S.P. Gupta v Union of India* (1981, Judges Transfer)**: openness in government is the rule and secrecy the exception, and disclosure of information about government functioning emerges from Art 19(1)(a);
• ***Secretary, Ministry of I&B v Cricket Association of Bengal* (1995)**: the right to impart and receive information is part of Art 19(1)(a);
• ***Union of India v ADR* (2002) and *PUCL v Union of India* (2003)**: voters have a right to know candidates' criminal antecedents, assets and education, and s.33B of the Representation of the People Act, which diluted this, was struck down;
• ***ADR v Union of India* (2024, Electoral Bonds)**: anonymous political funding violated voters' right to information under Art 19(1)(a).

3. Article 21, life and liberty:

• ***Reliance Petrochemicals v Indian Express* (1988)**: the right to know is a basic right under Art 21;
• ***Dinesh Trivedi v Union of India* (1997)**: the right to know is part of Art 21, subject to limits in the public interest;
• information about environmental hazards and health is linked to the right to life.

4. Limits (Art 19(2)): the right is subject to reasonable restrictions such as sovereignty, security, public order, defamation and contempt, and must be balanced against privacy, which is itself a fundamental right (K.S. Puttaswamy (2017)).

Statutory implementation: the Right to Information Act, 2005

• The right and exemptions: it confers the right on citizens (s.3). Exemptions are in s.8, and s.8(2) contains a public-interest override.
• Interpretation:
• CBSE v Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011): examinees may inspect their evaluated answer sheets;
• Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v CIC (2013): personal information such as service records is exempt;
• CPIO, Supreme Court v Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2019): the office of the Chief Justice of India is a "public authority", with independence of the judiciary balanced against transparency.
• Amendments:
• the RTI (Amendment) Act, 2019 gave the Centre control over the tenure and salaries of Information Commissioners;
• the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (s.44(3)) amended s.8(1)(j) to exempt all personal information and removed the public-interest proviso, which critics argue dilutes the right.

RTI is therefore a constitutionally rooted right under Arts 19(1)(a) and 21, given operational form by the 2005 Act. Its effectiveness depends on independent Information Commissions and a narrow reading of exemptions.

(c) An undisclosed principal situation arises where the agent contracts with a third party (T) who neither knows nor has reason to suspect that the agent is acting as an agent. T believes the agent (A) is the principal. This differs from a disclosed but unnamed principal, where T knows A is an agent but does not know for whom.

Rights and liabilities under the Indian Contract Act, 1872

1. Principal (P)

• Right to intervene: P may require performance of the contract (s.231) and sue T, provided that:
• A acted within actual authority. An undisclosed principal cannot ratify, because ratification requires that the agent purported to act for a principal (Keighley, Maxsted & Co v Durant (1901); ICA s.196);
• the contract is not of a personal nature. In Said v Butt (1920), a theatre that had banned P could refuse a ticket bought through an agent;
• the terms do not exclude agency. In Humble v Hunter (1848), the agent described himself as "owner", so P was excluded.
• Subject to equities: P takes the contract subject to the rights and obligations subsisting between A and T (s.232). For example, T may set off a debt owed by A (Greer v Downs Supply Co (1927)).
• Liability to T: P is liable to T once discovered (ss.231, 233).

2. Third party (T)

• Same rights against P: T has against P "the same rights as he would have had as against the agent if the agent had been principal" (s.231).
• Right to withdraw: if P discloses himself before the contract is completed, T may refuse to fulfil the contract if he can show that, had he known who the principal was, or that the agent was not the principal, he would not have entered into it (s.231, second para).
• Choice of defendant: T may hold A, or P, or both liable (s.233). In India the liability is joint and several, unlike the English "election" rule (Scarf v Jardine (1882)), under which choosing one discharges the other.
• Estoppel: if T induces A to act on the belief that only P will be held liable, or induces P to act on the belief that only A will be held liable, T cannot later sue the other (s.234).

3. Agent (A)

• Personal liability: A is personally liable on the contract, because an agent is presumed personally liable where he does not disclose his principal (s.230, second presumption). A may also sue T in his own name.
• Rights against P: A may claim indemnity from P for lawful acts (s.222) and exercise a lien for remuneration (s.221).
• Discharge: A is released if T has induced him to act on the belief that only P would be held liable (s.234).

Illustration: A buys cotton from T in his own name, secretly on P's instructions. P may sue T for delivery. If A owed T money, T may set that debt off against P (s.232). If P does not pay, T may sue A, P, or both (s.233).

Evaluation: The doctrine is anomalous in contract theory, since T is bound to someone he did not choose. It is justified by commercial convenience. The Indian Act protects T more fully than English law, through the right to withdraw before completion (s.231), the preservation of set-offs (s.232), and joint liability (s.233).