(a) Discuss the law relating to 'Assault or Criminal force' to woman with intent to 'Outrage her Modesty' and 'Sexual Harassment'…

(a) The IPC protects a woman's sexual dignity through a graded set of offences. Section 354 (outraging modesty) is the original offence, and s.354A (sexual harassment) was added by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 following the Justice Verma Committee. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, these are BNS s.74 and s.75 respectively.

Section 354 IPC (BNS s.74): assault or criminal force with intent to outrage modesty

• **Ingredients (Raju Pandurang Mahale v State of Maharashtra (2004)):**
• the victim is a woman (of any age);
• the accused used assault or criminal force on her (ss.350–351; BNS ss.129–130);
• he did so intending to outrage her modesty, or knowing it likely that he would do so.
• Modesty: the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex. The test is whether the act is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman. State of Punjab v Major Singh (1967) held that even a seven-and-a-half-month-old infant has modesty that can be outraged.
• Intention, not reaction: the culpable intention of the accused is the crux, not the victim's reaction. In Rupan Deol Bajaj v K.P.S. Gill (1995), a slap on the posterior of a senior IAS officer at a party amounted to an offence under s.354.
• Punishment: since 2013, imprisonment of not less than one year, up to five years, and fine. The offence is cognizable and non-bailable.
• Gender: the offender may be any person ("whoever").

Section 354A IPC (BNS s.75): sexual harassment

• Acts covered: a man commits sexual harassment by:
• physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures;
• a demand or request for sexual favours;
• showing pornography against a woman's will;
• making sexually coloured remarks.
• Punishment: rigorous imprisonment up to three years, or fine, or both, for the first three kinds. For sexually coloured remarks, up to one year, or fine, or both. The offence is bailable.
• Allied offences:
• assault with intent to disrobe (s.354B / BNS s.76);
• voyeurism (s.354C / BNS s.77);
• stalking (s.354D / BNS s.78);
• words, gestures or acts intended to insult modesty (s.509 / BNS s.79).
• Workplace: in the workplace, civil redress lies under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, which grew out of Vishaka v State of Rajasthan (1997).

Differences between the two offences

• Actus reus:
• s.354: requires assault or criminal force, meaning a physical act or gesture causing apprehension of force.
• s.354A: covers both physical and non-physical conduct: demands, showing pornography, remarks.
• Mens rea:
• s.354: specific intent or knowledge of outraging modesty.
• s.354A: the conduct must be unwelcome or against her will, and sexual in nature. The focus is on the unwelcome sexual character of the conduct.
• Offender:
• s.354: "whoever", which is gender-neutral.
• s.354A: "a man".
• Gravity:
• s.354: more serious, with a mandatory minimum of one year and a maximum of five years. Non-bailable.
• s.354A: lighter, with a maximum of three years or one year. Bailable.
• Protected interest:
• s.354: bodily integrity and modesty.
• s.354A: sexual autonomy and freedom from a hostile, sexualised environment.

Overlap: Unwelcome physical sexual advances may fall under both sections. Where the accused intends to outrage modesty through force, the graver s.354 applies. Section 354A fills the gap for non-contact harassment that earlier fell only under the minor offence in s.509.

(b) Reasons for including e-commerce

• Old law did not reach online sales: the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was designed for face-to-face transactions. It did not address online marketplaces, cross-border sellers, digital products or platform intermediaries.
• Growth and new risks: e-commerce grew rapidly and brought new risks:
• consumers cannot inspect goods;
• there is information asymmetry about seller identity and country of origin;
• fake reviews, drip pricing and "dark patterns" mislead consumers;
• cancellation and refund are difficult;
• data misuse and platform-favoured sellers distort the market.
• Jurisdiction: consumers needed to be able to sue from home.

How the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 addresses these problems

• Definitions:
• "consumer" includes a person buying goods or services offline or online through electronic means, teleshopping, direct selling or multi-level marketing (s.2(7), Explanation);
• "e-commerce" means buying or selling goods or services, including digital products, over a digital or electronic network (s.2(16));
• "electronic service provider" is defined in s.2(17);
• a "product seller" can include a platform that exercises control over the product.
• Complaints: a complaint may be filed where the complainant resides or works (s.34(2)(d)) and may be filed electronically (s.35; the e-Daakhil portal).
• Rules: the Central Government must take measures to prevent unfair trade practices in e-commerce (s.94). It has notified the Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020 (s.101(2)(zg)). These rules:
• distinguish marketplace entities from inventory entities;
• require a grievance officer who acknowledges complaints within 48 hours and redresses them within one month;
• require disclosure of seller details, price breakdown, return, refund and warranty terms, and country of origin;
• prohibit price manipulation, fake reviews, discrimination between sellers, and pre-ticked consent boxes;
• bar cancellation charges unless the entity bears similar charges when it cancels;
• make inventory entities liable like sellers.
• Dark patterns: the Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns, 2023 (issued by the CCPA) specify 13 deceptive design practices, such as false urgency, basket sneaking and subscription traps.
• Regulator: the Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA, s.10) protects consumers' collective rights.

Consequences of non-compliance

• CCPA action:
• inquiry and investigation (ss.18–19);
• orders to recall goods, refund consumers or discontinue unfair practices (s.20);
• directions against false or misleading advertisements, with penalties up to ₹10 lakh (₹50 lakh for repeat violations), and bans on endorsers (s.21).
• Consumer Commissions: orders for refund, replacement, compensation, punitive damages and corrective advertisement (ss.39, 49, 59). Product liability applies to product manufacturers, sellers and service providers (ss.82–87).
• Criminal penalties:
• failure to comply with a CCPA direction: up to six months' imprisonment or fine up to ₹20 lakh, or both (s.88);
• false or misleading advertisement: up to two years and ₹10 lakh, or up to five years and ₹50 lakh for a repeat offence (s.89);
• failure to comply with an order of a District, State or National Commission: imprisonment of one month to three years, or fine of ₹25,000 to ₹1 lakh, or both (s.72).
• Rules enforcement: violating the E-Commerce Rules attracts the penal provisions of the Act (Rule 8). Platforms may also lose intermediary safe harbour under the IT Act, s.79, if they fail due diligence.

The inclusion of e-commerce therefore extends consumer sovereignty to the digital marketplace, backed by regulatory, civil and criminal sanctions.

(c) Private nuisance is an unlawful and unreasonable interference with a person's use or enjoyment of land, or of some right over or in connection with it. Nuisance protects land, not the person as such.

Essentials

1. Unreasonable interference: the interference may be:

• physical injury to land or property (St Helen's Smelting Co v Tipping (1865), where fumes damaged trees);
• substantial interference with comfort and enjoyment, such as noise, smell, smoke or vibration;
• interference with servitudes, such as the right to light (Colls v Home and Colonial Stores (1904)) or the right of way.

2. Reasonableness: this is judged by several factors:

• Locality: "what would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey" (Sturges v Bridgman (1879)). In that case the doctor succeeded against a confectioner's noisy machinery, and it was held that "coming to the nuisance" is no defence.
• Duration and intensity: temporary building works are generally tolerated.
• Sensitivity of the plaintiff: there is no protection for abnormally sensitive uses (Robinson v Kilvert (1889), where sensitive paper was damaged by ordinary heat).
• Malice: malice can make an otherwise reasonable act a nuisance (Christie v Davey (1893); Hollywood Silver Fox Farm v Emmett (1936)).
• Public utility: public benefit is no defence (Adams v Ursell (1913), a fried-fish shop).

3. Damage: actual damage is required, except where the interference is with an easement, where damage is presumed.
4. Plaintiff's interest in land: the plaintiff must have an interest in the land, as owner, tenant or occupier (Hunter v Canary Wharf (1997)).
5. Defendant's responsibility: the defendant must be responsible as creator, occupier who adopts or continues the nuisance (Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan (1940)), or landlord who authorised it.

Indian illustrations

• ***Dhannalal v Thakur Chittarsingh* (MP HC, 1959) and Radhey Shyam v Gur Prasad Sharma (All HC, 1978):** noise from flour mills in residential areas was held to be a nuisance.
• ***Ram Raj Singh v Babulal* (All HC, 1982):** dust from a brick-grinding machine affecting a doctor's clinic was held to be a nuisance.
• ***Halsey v Esso Petroleum* (1961):** acid smuts, smell and night-time noise from a depot were held to be both private and public nuisance.

Remedies

• Damages: compensation for past loss, such as injury to property, loss of amenity and diminution in value. Courts may award damages in lieu of an injunction where an injunction would be oppressive (Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting (1895); Coventry v Lawrence (2014)).
• Injunction:
• a temporary injunction under CPC Order 39 Rules 1–2;
• a perpetual injunction, prohibitory or mandatory, under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, ss.37–39, for example to close a noisy machine or remove an obstruction;
• a quia timet injunction against a threatened nuisance, which requires proof of imminent and substantial harm (Kuldip Singh v Subhash Chander Jain (2000), where a proposed bakery oven was held not to be shown to be a nuisance).
• Abatement (self-help): the injured party may remove the nuisance, for example by cutting overhanging branches, using no more force than necessary and, where entry onto the other's land is needed, generally after notice (Lemmon v Webb (1895)).

Defences: prescription after 20 years' continuous enjoyment (Easements Act, 1882, s.15), statutory authority (Allen v Gulf Oil (1981)), and consent. Public nuisance, by contrast, is a crime (IPC s.268; BNS s.270) and a civil wrong actionable by an individual only on proof of special damage, or by a representative suit (CPC s.91). It may also be removed by a magistrate's conditional order (CrPC s.133; BNSS s.152).