(a) "The Constitutional courts through their judicial activism have made substantial contribution in protecting women against…

(a) PIL as a tool. From S.P. Gupta v Union of India (1981) and PUDR v Union of India (1982), the Supreme Court relaxed locus standi, accepted letters as petitions ("epistolary jurisdiction"), and used Arts 32 and 226 to devise continuing mandamus, commissions and guidelines. For women, whose grievances were often invisible, unreported or trapped by poverty and custom, PIL became a primary route to enforce Arts 14, 15(3), 21, 23 and 39A.

Leading contributions

1. Custody, trafficking and exploitation

• ***Sheela Barse v State of Maharashtra* (1983):** on a journalist's letter, the Court directed separate lock-ups for women suspects, female officers for interrogation, and informing arrestees of their right to legal aid.
• ***Vishal Jeet v Union of India* (1990) and *Gaurav Jain v Union of India* (1997):** directions to rescue and rehabilitate trafficked women and children of sex workers.
• ***Budhadev Karmaskar v State of WB* (2011, suo motu continuation):** sex workers' right to dignity under Art 21, and a panel on their rehabilitation.

2. Sexual harassment and violence

• ***Vishaka v State of Rajasthan* (1997):** filed by women's groups after the gang-rape of a saathin. With no statute in place, the Court read CEDAW into Arts 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 and laid down binding guidelines, which became the POSH Act, 2013. Apparel Export Promotion Council v A.K. Chopra (1999) applied them.
• ***Chairman, Railway Board v Chandrima Das* (2000):** a lawyer's PIL secured compensation for a Bangladeshi woman gang-raped by railway staff. Art 21 protects non-citizens too.
• ***Laxmi v Union of India* (2014):** regulation of acid sales, compensation of at least ₹3 lakh, and free treatment for acid-attack survivors.
• ***Nipun Saxena v Union of India* (2018):** protected the identity of rape victims.
• ***In re: RG Kar Medical College* (2024, suo motu):** after the rape and murder of a resident doctor in Kolkata, the Court constituted a National Task Force on the safety of medical professionals.

3. Marriage, family and personal law

• ***Independent Thought v Union of India* (2017):** read down Exception 2 to s.375 IPC so that intercourse with a wife aged 15–18 is rape.
• ***Shakti Vahini v Union of India* (2018):** guidelines against honour killings and khap diktats. Lata Singh v State of UP (2006) had earlier protected inter-caste marriages.
• ***Joseph Shine v Union of India* (2018, a PIL):** struck down adultery (s.497) as treating the wife as the husband's chattel.
• ***Shayara Bano v Union of India* (2017):** talaq-e-biddat was held unconstitutional (manifest arbitrariness under Art 14, per the plurality).

4. Equality in public life and religion

• ***Indian Young Lawyers Association v State of Kerala* (2018):** exclusion of women aged 10–50 from Sabarimala was struck down under Arts 14, 15, 17, 21 and 25. The review is pending before a larger bench.
• ***Secretary, Ministry of Defence v Babita Puniya* (2020):** permanent commission for women officers.

5. Health

• ***Jaya Thakur v Government of India* (PIL, from 2023):** directions for menstrual hygiene policy and sanitary facilities for girls in schools.

Critical appraisal

• Achievements: PIL created rights where legislatures were slow, and its guidelines often became statutes (POSH Act 2013; the 2013 criminal law amendments after the Verma Committee).
• Limits:
• guidelines are unevenly enforced, and many internal committees, one-stop centres and helplines remain weak;
• continuing mandamus strains judicial capacity;
• there have been occasional reversals, such as Rajesh Sharma v State of UP (2017), which diluted s.498A safeguards before being modified in Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar (2018);
• critics argue that judicial legislation raises separation-of-powers concerns.

PIL has been a powerful catalyst, but lasting protection depends on legislation, implementation and social change.

(b) Minor's agreement void ab initio

• Competence: under s.11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a person who has not attained majority (18 years; 21 if under a court-appointed guardian, Majority Act, 1875) is not competent to contract.
• ***Mohori Bibee v Dharmodas Ghose* (1903, PC):**
• a minor mortgaged his property to a moneylender for ₹20,000, of which about ₹8,000 was advanced;
• the Privy Council held the mortgage absolutely void, not merely voidable;
• the minor was not bound to repay the money advanced, because ss.64–65 presuppose a contract between competent parties.
• No estoppel: estoppel (IEA s.115; BSA s.121) cannot be used to enforce the agreement even if the minor misrepresented his age, because there can be no estoppel against a statute.
• No ratification: a minor cannot ratify the agreement on attaining majority, since void means incapable of ratification. A fresh contract with fresh consideration is needed (Suraj Narain Dube v Sukhu Aheer (1928)).
• No specific performance: a minor's contract cannot be specifically enforced by or against him, for lack of mutuality. However, a contract made by a competent guardian for the minor's benefit may be enforced (Subrahmanyam v Subba Rao (1948, PC)).

To this extent the statement is correct: there is no contractual obligation on either side.

Qualifications: where a minor's agreement still has effects

1. Necessaries (s.68):

• a person who supplies necessaries suited to the minor's condition in life may be reimbursed from the minor's property. There is no personal liability, and the obligation is quasi-contractual, not contractual;
• the supplier must prove the goods were suitable and actually needed (Nash v Inman (1908): eleven fancy waistcoats supplied to a student already well supplied were not necessaries).

2. Minor as beneficiary or promisee:

• a minor can enforce an agreement under which he has performed his part or which confers a benefit on him;
• for example, a mortgage in the minor's favour (Raghava Chariar v Srinivasa (1917, Madras FB)), or a promissory note executed in favour of a minor, which he can enforce.

3. Restitution where the minor obtained benefits by fraud:

• under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, ss.33(2)(b) and 30, when the minor seeks cancellation or rescission, the court may require him to restore any benefit he obtained;
• Khan Gul v Lakha Singh (1928, Lahore FB) ordered a minor who had misrepresented his age to refund the money received;
• Leslie v Sheill (1914) and Ajudhia Prasad v Chandan Lal (1937, Allahabad FB) limited restitution to property still traceable, not the money as a debt.

4. Other statutory exceptions:

• a minor may be admitted to the benefits of partnership (Partnership Act s.30);
• a minor may be an agent (ICA s.184);
• a minor may be a holder, payee or endorsee of a negotiable instrument, binding all parties except himself (NI Act s.26).

5. Tort: a minor is liable in tort, but not where the tort is merely a way of enforcing the void contract (R. Leslie v Sheill). A minor may be liable for a tort independent of the contract (Burnard v Haggis (1863)).

Conclusion: A minor's agreement creates no contractual obligation on either side. But the law does not treat it as wholly without effect. Equity, quasi-contract and statute give it limited consequences so that the protection of minors does not become an instrument of fraud.

(c) The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 classifies promissory notes, bills of exchange and cheques by how they are payable, and this determines how they are negotiated, that is, transferred so as to make the transferee the holder (s.14).

Bearer instruments: negotiated by delivery

• Definition (s.13, Explanation (ii)): an instrument is payable to bearer when it is expressed to be so payable, or when the only or last endorsement on it is an endorsement in blank.
• Negotiation (s.47): a bearer instrument is negotiable by delivery alone. The transferor need not sign and, as a "transferor by delivery", is generally not liable on the instrument to later holders, because only parties who sign it are liable on it.
• Conditional delivery: an instrument delivered on condition that it takes effect only on an event is not negotiable, except in the hands of a holder in due course, unless that event happens (s.47 proviso).
• Once a bearer cheque, always a bearer cheque: a cheque originally payable to bearer remains payable to bearer even if later endorsed in full, and the banker is discharged by payment to the bearer (s.85(2)).
• Restriction: under the RBI Act, 1934, s.31, only the RBI (and the Central Government, for notes it is authorised to issue) may issue promissory notes or bills payable to bearer on demand. Private parties cannot. Bearer cheques are therefore the common example.

Order instruments: negotiated by endorsement and delivery

• Definition (s.13, Explanation (i)): an instrument is payable to order when it is expressed to be so payable, or is payable to a particular person, without words prohibiting transfer.
• Negotiation (s.48): an order instrument is negotiated by the holder's endorsement and delivery. Endorsement means signing on the instrument or on an attached slip (an allonge) (s.15).
• Kinds of endorsement (ss.16, 50–52, 54–55):
• in blank: only a signature, which converts the instrument into a bearer instrument (s.54);
• in full or special: naming the endorsee;
• restrictive: for example "pay C only";
• conditional, or sans recours (without recourse to the endorser).
• Converting a blank endorsement: a holder may convert a blank endorsement into a full one by writing in the name of an endorsee (s.49).
• Delivery (s.46): delivery is essential. Endorsement without delivery does not negotiate the instrument.

Consequences of the distinction

• Forgery:
• a forged endorsement is a nullity, so no one, not even a holder in due course, acquires title to an order instrument through it. (Bankers who pay in due course are protected by s.85(1).)
• a bearer instrument needs no endorsement, so a holder in due course who takes it for value and in good faith, even from a thief, gets good title (ss.9, 58).
• Holder in due course: a holder in due course (s.9) takes free from defects in prior titles (s.53). There is a presumption that every holder is a holder in due course (s.118(g)).
• Liability: an endorser of an order instrument is liable to later parties (s.35). A transferor of a bearer instrument by mere delivery generally is not.
• Security and convenience: bearer instruments circulate easily, like money, but carry the risk of loss or theft. Order instruments are safer because of the endorsement chain.

Illustration: A draws a cheque "Pay B or order". B endorses it "Pay C" and delivers it to C, which is negotiation by endorsement and delivery. If B had merely signed on the back (a blank endorsement), C could pass it on to D by delivery alone.