(a) Examine the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in regard to criminal matters. (10…

(a) The Supreme Court's criminal appellate jurisdiction over the High Courts comes from four constitutional routes and one statutory route.

• Article 134(1)(a) and (b), appeal as of right: where the High Court, on appeal, has reversed an order of acquittal and sentenced the accused to death; or has withdrawn a case from a subordinate court, tried it itself, convicted the accused and sentenced them to death.
• Article 134(1)(c), appeal on certificate: where the High Court certifies that the case is fit for appeal. The certificate must rest on a substantial question of law or principle, not on mere appreciation of facts (Haripada Dey v. State of W.B. (1956)). Under Article 134A, the High Court may grant it on its own motion, or on an oral application made immediately after the judgment.
• Article 134(2): Parliament may enlarge the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 gives an appeal as of right where the High Court reverses an acquittal and sentences the accused to imprisonment for life or for ten years or more. Section 420 of the BNSS (formerly Section 379 of the CrPC) mirrors this.
• Article 132: an appeal lies in any criminal proceeding if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
• Article 136, special leave: this is a residuary discretionary power. It is exercised sparingly in criminal cases, only where there is grave or substantial injustice, a disregard of legal procedure, or a perverse finding (Pritam Singh v. State (1950)).

Conclusion: the scheme is deliberately narrow. The Supreme Court is not a regular court of criminal appeal; Article 136 is its main gateway.

(b) Article 246, read with the Seventh Schedule, divides legislative power: the Union List for Parliament exclusively, the State List for the States, and the Concurrent List for both, with Union law prevailing under Article 254. Residuary power lies with Parliament (Article 248; Entry 97, List I). Each legislature must therefore stay within its field.

Doctrines that enforce the boundary

• Colourable legislation: a legislature cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly (K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa (1953)).
• Repugnancy: under Article 254, a State law yields to a Union law on a Concurrent subject, unless it has Presidential assent under Article 254(2).

Why the rule is not absolute

• Pith and substance: a law is judged by its true nature and character. Incidental trenching on another list does not invalidate it (Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce (1947, PC); State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (1951), where prohibition was upheld as a State subject despite its effect on imports).
• Parliament's power over State subjects: Parliament may legislate on the State List in the national interest on a Rajya Sabha resolution (Article 249), during an Emergency (Article 250), at the request of two or more States (Article 252), to implement treaties (Article 253), and under President's Rule (Article 357).

Assessment: the principle is sound because it protects federalism. However, the Constitution's strong centralising tilt, and the flexible pith-and-substance test, mean the boundary is policed on substance rather than form. Courts read entries widely and harmoniously to avoid conflict.

(c) Article 310(1) embodies the "pleasure doctrine": members of the defence services and the civil services of the Union hold office during the pleasure of the President. The rule applies "except as expressly provided by this Constitution", so it has important exceptions.

• Constitutional functionaries with protected tenure are removable only in the manner the Constitution prescribes, not at pleasure:
• Supreme Court and High Court judges (Articles 124(4) and 217–218);
• the Comptroller and Auditor General (Article 148);
• the Chief Election Commissioner (Article 324(5));
• members of the UPSC and State PSCs (Article 317).
• Contractual compensation (Article 310(2)): a person with special qualifications appointed under a contract may be compensated if the post is abolished, or if they are required to vacate it, before the contract period ends.

Article 311 safeguards:

• no dismissal or removal by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority (Article 311(1));
• no dismissal, removal or reduction in rank without an inquiry giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard (Article 311(2)). These protections apply only to penal action (Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (1958)).
• Exceptions to the exceptions (second proviso to Article 311(2)): the inquiry may be dispensed with:
• on conviction on a criminal charge;
• where it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, for reasons recorded in writing;
• in the interest of the security of the State.

Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) upheld these, subject to judicial review for mala fides or irrelevant grounds.

Conclusion: the pleasure is not absolute. It is subject to Article 311, fundamental rights and tenure protections.

(d) Delegated legislation is permitted because modern legislatures cannot provide for every detail. The Constitution does not expressly forbid delegation. The courts, however, impose limits drawn from the separation of powers and from Articles 245–246.

Limits on delegation

• Essential legislative functions cannot be delegated. The legislature must lay down the policy and standards (In re Delhi Laws Act (1951); Harishankar Bagla v. State of M.P. (1954)).
• Excessive delegation is void. Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India (1960) struck down a provision that let the executive add diseases without any guiding policy. By contrast, Gwalior Rayon v. Assistant Commissioner (1974) upheld the fixing of the rate of tax because the policy was discernible.
• Removal-of-difficulty ("Henry VIII") clauses cannot authorise the executive to amend the parent Act (Jalan Trading Co. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha (1967)).
• Substantive ultra vires: rules must stay within the parent Act and cannot override it or other statutes (Kerala Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union v. State of Kerala (2006)). The grounds of challenge are summarised in State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy (2006): lack of power, violation of fundamental rights, conflict with the parent Act or other statutes, and manifest arbitrariness (Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985)).
• Procedural ultra vires: mandatory consultation or publication must be followed.

Parliamentary control Rules are laid before the Houses, and the Committees on Subordinate Legislation scrutinise them.

Conclusion: delegation is a necessity, but it is controlled by the parent Act and by judicial review, so that the executive fills in details and does not make policy.

(e) Article 13(1) makes pre-Constitution laws void "to the extent of" inconsistency with Part III. Article 13(2) bars the State from making laws that take away or abridge fundamental rights, and makes any such law void "to the extent of the contravention". Three judicial doctrines explain this phrase.

Severability:

• Only the offending part is struck down if it is separable and the remainder can stand on its own as the legislature would have intended (A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950), where only Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act was invalidated; R.M.D.C. v. Union of India (1957)).
• If the valid and invalid parts are inextricably mixed, the whole law falls.
• A provision that could apply in both valid and invalid ways may be read down.
• Eclipse: a pre-Constitution law inconsistent with a fundamental right is not dead but eclipsed. It remains valid for past transactions and revives if the right is amended (Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of M.P. (1955)). Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay (1951) held that proceedings for offences committed before 26 January 1950 continue.

Post-Constitution laws:

• Such a law is void from inception, and eclipse does not apply (Deep Chand v. State of U.P. (1959)).
• However, a law that violates only rights available to citizens, such as Article 19, is void only as against citizens and remains operative against non-citizens (State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills (1974)).
• Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P. (1963) confirmed that such laws are "still-born" and cannot be revived by a later constitutional amendment.

Conclusion: invalidity is measured by the extent of the conflict, so constitutional supremacy is preserved while the legislature's intent is disturbed no more than necessary.