(a) "Article 194, which is an exact reproduction of Article 105, deals with the State Legislatures and their members and…

(a) Article 105 (Parliament) and Article 194 (State Legislatures) are drafted in identical terms. Each has four clauses:

• Clause (1): freedom of speech in the House, subject to the Constitution and the rules of procedure.
• Clause (2): immunity from court proceedings for anything said or any vote given in the House or its committees, and for publications made under the House's authority.
• Clause (3): other powers, privileges and immunities as defined by law. Until defined, they are those the House had immediately before Section 15 of the 44th Amendment Act, 1978 came into force; before 1978 the reference was to the House of Commons.
• Clause (4): extends these privileges to persons entitled to speak in the House, such as the Attorney-General (Article 88) and the Advocate-General (Article 177).

Why the two Articles are complementary and must be read together

• Same text and purpose: both secure the independence and dignity of legislatures in a federal parliamentary democracy. A ruling on one therefore governs the other.
• Same limits: privileges are subject to other constitutional provisions and to fundamental rights.
• Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha (1959) held that Article 194(3) prevails over Article 19(1)(a) but is subject to Article 21.
• In Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 (the Keshav Singh case), the Court held that the High Court could entertain a habeas corpus petition against committal by a State Legislature, and that courts may decide whether a claimed privilege exists.

Parallel case law across both Articles:

• Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy (1970), on Article 105(2), gave absolute immunity for "anything" said in the House.
• Raja Ram Pal v. Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) upheld Parliament's power to expel members, subject to judicial review for illegality or unconstitutionality. Amarinder Singh v. Punjab Vidhan Sabha (2010) applied the same test to a State Legislature.
• Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024, seven judges) overruled P.V. Narasimha Rao (1998) and held that bribery is not protected by Article 105(2) or Article 194(2). The Court decided the question for both Articles together.
• Companion provisions: Articles 122 and 212 bar courts from questioning the validity of proceedings on the ground of irregular procedure. Articles 118 and 208 give each House power to frame its rules.
• Common gap: neither Parliament nor any State has codified privileges under clause (3), so the uncertainty is the same at both levels.

Comment: Article 194 mirrors Article 105 so that State Legislatures enjoy the same autonomy as Parliament. Reading them together gives uniform, constitutionally limited privileges. Codification would reconcile legislative privilege with the freedom of the press and with fundamental rights.

(b) The Constitution does not define "minority". Articles 29 and 30 refer to minorities based on religion or language. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002, eleven judges) held that, for State laws, minority status is decided with reference to the population of the State concerned. Under Section 2(c) of the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992, the Centre has notified six religious minorities: Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Parsis and Jains, the last added in 2014. Bal Patil v. Union of India (2005) cautioned against multiplying minority status.

The right under Article 30

• Article 30(1): all religious and linguistic minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
• Article 30(1A): compensation on compulsory acquisition of their property must not restrict or abrogate the right. This was added by the 44th Amendment.
• Article 30(2): the State must not discriminate against minority institutions in granting aid.

The right is not absolute: decided cases

• In re Kerala Education Bill (1958) and Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay (1963): the right is couched in absolute terms, but the State may regulate in the interest of educational standards, provided the regulation does not destroy minority character. The requisitioning of the institution's building in Sidhajbhai was struck down.
• Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College v. State of Gujarat (1974): the right to administer is not a right to maladminister. Regulations on teachers' qualifications, conditions of service, discipline and affiliation are valid.
• T.M.A. Pai (2002): unaided minority institutions have maximum autonomy. Aided institutions must admit a reasonable number of non-minority students, because Article 29(2) applies. The State may prescribe merit, transparency and a bar on profiteering.
• Islamic Academy of Education (2003) and P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005): the State cannot impose reservation or seat quotas on unaided minority institutions. It can require admissions by a fair, transparent, merit-based process, and regulate fees against capitation.
• Secretary, Malankara Syrian Catholic College v. T. Jose (2007): general laws on service conditions apply, if they do not interfere with management.
• Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014): the RTE Act does not apply to minority schools. Article 15(5) itself excludes minority institutions from reservation.
• Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal (2024, seven judges, 4:3): overruled S. Azeez Basha (1967). A minority institution does not lose its character merely because it was incorporated by statute. The test is who established it and for what purpose; AMU's own status was left to a regular bench.

Conclusion: Article 30 protects minority identity and autonomy. Regulation for excellence, fairness and the prevention of maladministration is permissible so long as it does not destroy minority character.

(c) Procedure under Article 368

• A bill may be introduced in either House of Parliament, not in a State Legislature, by a minister or a private member.
• It must be passed in each House by a special majority: a majority of the total membership, and two-thirds of the members present and voting. There is no joint sitting.
• Ratification: if it affects the matters in the proviso to Article 368(2), it must also be ratified by at least half the State Legislatures. These matters are:
• election of the President (Articles 54–55);
• extent of Union and State executive power (Articles 73 and 162);
• Article 241 and Article 279A (the GST Council);
• the Union and State judiciaries;
• legislative relations (Chapter I, Part XI) and the Seventh Schedule lists;
• representation of States in Parliament;
• Article 368 itself.
• The President must assent (Article 368(2), after the 24th Amendment). An amendment is not "law" under Article 13 (Articles 13(4) and 368(3)).
• Simple-majority changes are expressly excluded from Article 368: for example Articles 2–4 (new States), Article 169 (Legislative Councils), and the Fifth and Sixth Schedules.

Restrictions and judicial development

• ***Shankari Prasad* (1951) and Sajjan Singh (1965):** amendments were not "law" under Article 13, so fundamental rights could be amended.
• ***I.C. Golak Nath* (1967):** Parliament could not amend fundamental rights. The 24th Amendment responded to this.
• ***Kesavananda Bharati* (1973): Parliament may amend any part of the Constitution but cannot destroy its basic structure**. This overruled Golak Nath.
• ***Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain* (1975):** struck down Article 329A(4) because it violated free elections and the rule of law.
• ***Minerva Mills* (1980):** invalidated Article 368(4) and (5), which were inserted by the 42nd Amendment. Limited amending power and judicial review are basic features.
• ***Waman Rao* (1981):** the doctrine applies to amendments made after 24 April 1973.
• ***Kihoto Hollohan* (1992):** paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule was void because it had not been ratified by the States. This is a procedural limit.
• ***L. Chandra Kumar* (1997):** judicial review under Articles 226 and 32 is a basic feature.
• ***I.R. Coelho* (2007):** laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 are subject to basic-structure review.
• Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India (2015, the NJAC case): the 99th Amendment was struck down for violating judicial independence.
• Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2022): the 103rd Amendment (EWS reservation) was upheld as not violating the basic structure.

Conclusion: India's amendment process combines flexibility with rigidity. The basic structure doctrine is the principal substantive restraint, and it keeps constituent power subordinate to constitutional identity.