(a) In recent years, the concept of 'Cooperative Federalism' has played a pivotal role in constitutional governance of the nation…

(a) Cooperative federalism means that the Union and the States act as interdependent partners in pursuing shared national goals, rather than as rivals in watertight compartments. The Indian Constitution is federal, with a strong Union bias: K.C. Wheare called it "quasi-federal", and State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1962) held that it is not a traditional federation. It nonetheless provides many instruments for cooperation.

Constitutional and institutional basis

Coordination bodies:

• the Inter-State Council (Article 263);
• the Zonal Councils (States Reorganisation Act, 1956);
• the GST Council (Article 279A), a forum for pooled fiscal sovereignty;
• NITI Aayog, which replaced the Planning Commission in 2015.

Fiscal transfers:

• devolution recommended by the Finance Commission (Articles 270 and 280); the 15th Finance Commission set the States' share at 41%, and the 16th Finance Commission has retained 41% for 2026–31;
• grants-in-aid (Articles 275 and 282);
• centrally sponsored schemes.

Administrative cooperation and delegation:

• Articles 256–258A;
• disputes over inter-State rivers are adjudicated under Article 262;
• the joint response to COVID-19 under the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897.

Judicial affirmation:

• S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) held federalism to be part of the basic structure and curbed the misuse of Article 356.
• Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022) held that GST Council recommendations have persuasive value and are not binding, and stressed "cooperative and contestatory" federalism.
• Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018 and 2023) stressed collaborative federalism and accountability through elected governments.

Challenges

Fiscal:

• cesses and surcharges fall outside the divisible pool;
• GST compensation ended in 2022;
• there are limits on State borrowing. Kerala's suit under Article 131 on borrowing limits was referred to a Constitution Bench in 2024.

Governors:

• delay in assenting to State Bills. State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) set timelines for assent.
• However, the Presidential Reference opinion of 20 November 2025 held that courts cannot fix timelines and there is no "deemed assent", while leaving limited judicial scrutiny for prolonged inaction.
• Central agencies: the use of central agencies, and disputes over the withdrawal of general consent to the CBI (State of West Bengal v. Union of India, suit under Article 131, 2024).
• Uniform national policies in areas of State interest: NEET, the NEP and farm legislation.

Institutions and inter-State friction:

• the Inter-State Council has rarely met;
• inter-State water and boundary disputes continue;
• regional imbalances.

Conclusion: cooperative federalism has become the working method of Indian governance, especially through the GST Council and crisis management. It needs trust-building: a regularly functioning Inter-State Council, fiscal predictability, and convention-bound conduct by Governors, as recommended by the Sarkaria (1988) and Punchhi (2010) Commissions.

(b) The statement reflects the Supreme Court's approach since Kesavananda Bharati (1973). Part III (justiciable fundamental rights) secures political democracy and individual liberty, the means. Part IV (Directive Principles, non-justiciable but "fundamental in the governance of the country" under Article 37) sets out the goal of a social and economic democracy, the end: the welfare State of the Preamble, with justice, social, economic and political.

Evolution of the relationship

• Primacy of fundamental rights: State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951) held that Directive Principles must conform to fundamental rights. The First Amendment (Article 15(4)) followed.
• Harmonious construction: In re Kerala Education Bill (1958) held that courts should give effect to both Parts as far as possible. Directive Principles guide the reasonableness of restrictions: State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (1951), on prohibition (Article 47); Mohd. Hanif Quareshi (1958); State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi (2005), on cow protection (Article 48).
• Article 31C: the 25th Amendment (1971) inserted Article 31C to protect laws giving effect to Article 39(b) and (c) from challenge under Articles 14 and 19. It was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati, except for the clause that barred judicial review.
• Balance: Minerva Mills (1980) struck down the 42nd Amendment's extension of Article 31C to all Directive Principles. The Court held that the harmony and balance between Parts III and IV is a basic feature; they are "two wheels of a chariot", and neither can be sacrificed for the other.
• Recent clarification: Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra (2024, nine judges) held that not every privately owned resource is a "material resource of the community" under Article 39(b), while holding that Article 31C, as upheld in Kesavananda, survives.

Directive Principles enriching fundamental rights

• The right to education (Mohini Jain (1992), Unni Krishnan (1993)) led to Article 21A (86th Amendment, 2002).
• The right to livelihood (Olga Tellis (1985); Article 39(a)).
• Equal pay for equal work (Randhir Singh (1982); Article 39(d)).
• Legal aid (Hussainara Khatoon; Article 39A).
• A healthy environment (Articles 48A and 51A(g), read into Article 21).

Analysis: the means–end formulation captures the complementarity of the two Parts. Rights cannot be abrogated in the name of Directive Principles, and Directive Principles give content and direction to rights. Directive Principles still depend on legislative will and resources, but they influence interpretation and the reasonableness of restrictions.

(c) Article 123 (the President) and Article 213 (Governors) allow an ordinance to be promulgated when:

• the legislature, or either House, is not in session; and
• the executive is satisfied that circumstances exist requiring immediate action.

An ordinance has the same force as an Act, but:

• it is limited by the legislature's competence and by fundamental rights (Article 13(3)(a));
• it must be laid before the legislature and ceases six weeks after it reassembles, unless disapproved earlier;
• it may be withdrawn at any time;
• under the proviso to Article 213(1), a Governor needs Presidential instructions for ordinances on certain matters, for example where a Bill on the subject would require Presidential sanction or reservation.

Pragmatic value Ordinances provide flexibility in emergencies when Parliament is not sitting, for example the bank nationalisation ordinance of 1969, economic measures, and COVID-19 measures in 2020.

Potential for overreach and judicial checks

• Repeated re-promulgation: Bihar re-promulgated some ordinances for up to 14 years. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1987) held that re-promulgating ordinances without placing them before the legislature is a fraud on the Constitution and subverts democratic legislative processes.

Satisfaction:

• R.C. Cooper (1970) left open whether the executive's satisfaction is justiciable.
• The 38th Amendment (1975) made satisfaction final, but the 44th Amendment (1978) deleted that clause.
• A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) treated ordinance-making as legislative power, open to review in suitable cases.
• T. Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P. (1985) held that an ordinance cannot be struck down on the ground of improper motive, just as a statute cannot.
• ***Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar* (2017, seven judges):**
• satisfaction is not immune from judicial review, on grounds such as fraud, oblique motive or the absence of relevant material;
• laying before the legislature is a mandatory constitutional obligation;
• re-promulgation is a fraud on the Constitution;
• an ordinance that lapses does not automatically create irreversible or enduring rights; the question depends on the public interest and constitutional necessity.

Concerns

• The use of ordinances for major policy changes, such as the farm ordinances of 2020, shortly before sessions or after Bills stall in the Rajya Sabha.
• Their use to bypass bicameral scrutiny.
• Governors promulgating ordinances on contested matters.

Conclusion: the ordinance power is a necessary safety valve, but it is an exception to the separation of powers. Judicial review of satisfaction, mandatory laying, and the bar on re-promulgation keep it on the right side of the "razor's edge". Institutional restraint, such as using ordinances only in genuine urgency, is equally essential.