(a) "Justification for introduction of 'plea-bargaining' in India was that it will reduce delay in case of undertrial prisoners…

(a) Plea bargaining was introduced by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005 as Chapter XXI-A of the CrPC (Sections 265A–265L). It is now Chapter XXIII of the BNSS (Sections 289–300). It followed the Law Commission's 142nd (1991), 154th (1996) and 177th Reports and the Malimath Committee (2003). The aim was to reduce pendency and the long pre-trial detention of undertrials, who form about three-fourths of India's prison population (NCRB, Prison Statistics). Earlier, courts had disapproved of informal bargains: Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra (1976); Kasambhai Abdulrehmanbhai Sheikh v. State of Gujarat (1980); State of U.P. v. Chandrika (1999).

Present framework

Scope:

• available for offences punishable with up to 7 years;
• excluded for offences affecting the socio-economic condition of the country and offences against a woman or a child below 14;
• not available to a person previously convicted of the same offence.

Application and consent:

• the accused applies voluntarily; under the BNSS, the application must be made within 30 days of the framing of charge;
• the court examines the accused in camera to ensure voluntariness (Section 290 of the BNSS; Section 265B of the CrPC).
• Disposition: a "mutually satisfactory disposition", including compensation to the victim, is worked out with the prosecutor and the victim or complainant (Section 291 of the BNSS; Section 265C of the CrPC).

Sentence concession:

• the court may release the accused on probation or admonition;
• otherwise it may award half the minimum sentence, or one-fourth of the maximum where no minimum is prescribed;
• the BNSS adds further concessions for first offenders: one-fourth of the minimum, or one-sixth of the maximum (Section 293).

Finality and safeguards:

• the judgment is final, with no appeal except by special leave petition under Article 136 or writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 (Section 294 of the BNSS; Section 265G of the CrPC);
• statements made by the accused cannot be used for any other purpose (Section 298 of the BNSS; Section 265K of the CrPC).

Should it continue in the same form?

In its favour:

• it is consensual and supervised by the court;
• it compensates victims;
• it reduces the trial burden;
• it is useful for first offenders and petty crime.

Against its present form:

• uptake is negligible because of its narrow scope, the absence of incentives for prosecutors, poor awareness, and the stigma of conviction;
• only sentence bargaining is allowed, with no charge bargaining, so the incentive is limited;
• the chapter is largely irrelevant to undertrials charged with serious offences, who form the bulk of the prison population;
• poor accused held in custody risk being pressured into pleading guilty, and the victim's role may delay settlement.

Conclusion: the institution deserves to continue, but not in the same form. Reform should include:

• structured charge bargaining under judicial control, with guidelines to safeguard voluntariness;
• mandatory legal aid (Article 39A) and prosecutorial guidelines;
• time-bound disposal;
• pairing with the undertrial release provision (Section 479 of the BNSS) and with diversion.

These measures would make plea bargaining an effective tool against delay.

(b) Intoxication can prevent a person from knowing the nature of the act or forming the intention required for an offence. The law distinguishes between involuntary and voluntary intoxication, for reasons of public policy.

• Involuntary intoxication: IPC Section 85, now Section 23 of the BNS.
• Nothing is an offence if it is done by a person who, at the time, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that it is wrong or contrary to law, because of intoxication.
• The intoxication must have been administered without the person's knowledge or against their will.
• This is a complete defence, similar to insanity.
• Voluntary intoxication: IPC Section 86, now Section 24 of the BNS.
• Where an offence requires a particular intention or knowledge, a person voluntarily intoxicated is treated as having the same knowledge as if not intoxicated.
• There is no presumption of intention, which must be proved from the circumstances.

Leading cases

• ***Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard* (1920):** intoxication is a defence only if it rendered the accused incapable of forming the specific intent. Mere proof that the mind was affected, so that the accused more readily gave way to passion, is not enough.
• ***Basdev v. State of PEPSU* (1956):** a retired jamadar, though drunk, shot a boy at a wedding. The Court applied Section 86 and Beard: he was attributed knowledge that the act was likely to cause death, and he was not so intoxicated as to be incapable of forming the intention (he could move about and talk coherently). His conviction under Section 302 was altered to Section 304 Part II, and the Court held that intention was not presumed and had to be judged on the facts.
• ***Bablu alias Mubarik Hussain v. State of Rajasthan* (2006):** the Court reiterated that Section 86 creates a presumption of knowledge, not of intention.
• ***DPP v. Majewski* (1977):** in English law, voluntary intoxication is no defence to crimes of "basic intent"; it may negate "specific intent".
• ***R v. Kingston* (1994):** involuntary intoxication does not excuse an intent actually formed; the defence works only where intent could not be formed.

Assessment: the statement explains why intoxication can negate the capacity to foresee consequences. The law nevertheless refuses to let voluntary intoxication excuse knowledge-based liability, because a person who chooses to drink bears the risk. Only intoxication so extreme that the specific intent could not be formed, or involuntary intoxication, reduces or removes liability.

(c) The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PCA) consolidated the anti-corruption provisions previously found in the IPC (Sections 161–165A) and the 1947 Act. It widened the definition of "public servant" (Section 2(c)), which covers MPs and MLAs (P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998)).

The 2018 Amendment:

• recast the offences around the concept of "undue advantage";
• criminalised bribe-giving and commercial organisations;
• added attachment and forfeiture of property (Section 18A);
• introduced the requirement of prior approval before any inquiry or investigation (Section 17A).

Offences and punishments (after 2018)

• Section 7: a public servant obtaining, accepting or attempting to obtain an undue advantage in order to perform a public duty improperly: 3 to 7 years and fine.
• Section 7A: using personal influence over a public servant for an undue advantage: 3 to 7 years.
• Section 8: giving or promising an undue advantage (bribe-giving): up to 7 years, or fine, or both. A person compelled to give a bribe is protected if they report it to the police or an investigating agency within 7 days.
• Section 9: a commercial organisation whose associated person bribes: fine. The organisation has a defence if it had "adequate procedures" in place.
• Section 10: persons in charge of a commercial organisation who consent or connive: 3 to 7 years and fine.
• Section 11: a public servant obtaining an undue advantage without consideration from a person concerned in business with them: 6 months to 5 years.
• Section 12: abetment: 3 to 7 years.
• Section 13(1)(a) and (b): criminal misconduct by dishonest or fraudulent misappropriation, or by intentional illicit enrichment (disproportionate assets). Under Section 13(2): 4 to 10 years and fine.
• Section 14: habitual offenders: 5 to 10 years.
• Section 15: attempt to commit misconduct: 2 to 5 years.

Procedure

• Special Judges: cases are tried by Special Judges (Sections 3–4), with trials to be completed within two years as far as possible.
• Presumption: once acceptance of an undue advantage is proved, a presumption arises against the accused under Section 20.
• Sanction: prosecution requires sanction under Section 19. Requests for sanction must be decided within time limits (Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh (2012)).

Why it is an important instrument

• Its definitions are broad, and it now covers the supply side and corporate liability, in line with the UN Convention against Corruption.
• The presumption and the power of forfeiture add teeth.
• Neeraj Dutta v. State (GNCTD) (2022, Constitution Bench) held that demand and acceptance can be proved by circumstantial evidence even if the complainant turns hostile.
• Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024) held that legislators have no immunity for bribery.

Limitations

• Section 17A prior approval and Section 19 sanction delay investigations and are seen as shields for the corrupt.
• Conviction rates are low and trials long.
• Investigating agencies depend on the executive (Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998)).
• "Obtaining a pecuniary advantage without public interest" (the old Section 13(1)(d)) was deleted in 2018, which weakens action against collusive decisions.
• Protection for whistle-blowers is weak.

Conclusion: I agree, with reservations. The PCA is the backbone of India's anti-corruption law, strengthened by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 and by the CVC. Its effectiveness depends on independent investigation, time-bound sanction and speedy trials.