(a) 'If an enterprise is permitted to carry on any hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for its profits, the cost of any…

(a) The statement comes from M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987), the Oleum gas leak case from Shriram Foods and Fertiliser Industries, Delhi. Bhagwati C.J. held that an enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry, which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of workers and residents nearby, owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community. It must ensure that no harm results. If harm results, the enterprise is absolutely liable to compensate everyone affected, and none of the exceptions to strict liability are available to it.

*Departure from Rylands v. Fletcher (1868)*

• The strict-liability rule applied only to the non-natural use of land and to the escape of a dangerous thing.
• It allowed defences: act of God, act of a stranger, the plaintiff's own default, consent and statutory authority.
• The Court found this 19th-century rule unsuited to a developing country with hazardous industries. It evolved a new rule under Articles 21 and 32, with no requirement of escape and no exceptions.

The rationale behind the "overheads" formulation

• Enterprise liability and loss-spreading: the enterprise profits from the risk, is best placed to discover and guard against hazards, and can spread the cost through insurance and pricing. The cost of accidents is therefore a cost of doing business.
• Deterrence: compensation must be related to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise, to have a deterrent effect.
• Victim protection: victims do not have to prove negligence against technically superior defendants.

Later development

• Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India (1990), on the Bhopal gas disaster.
• Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India (1996): the rule was reaffirmed and linked to "polluter pays".
• Deepak Nitrite (2004) and Sterlite (2013).
• Statutory recognition:
• the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 provides no-fault relief;
• Section 17(3) of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 applies no-fault liability for accidents;
• the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 channels liability to the operator.

Comment

• For the rule: it is just and efficient, and it fits the constitutional commitment to life and the environment (Articles 21, 48A and 51A(g)).

Concerns:

• the potential for unlimited liability may deter investment;
• "hazardous" is not defined;
• the Bhopal settlement and the capped nuclear liability show a gap between doctrine and delivery.

Conclusion: the statement correctly captures the principle. Internalising accident costs is fair to victims and deters risk. Its effectiveness requires compulsory insurance, prompt interim relief and firm enforcement.

(b) Kidnapping has two forms (IPC Section 359, now BNS Section 137(1)):

• Kidnapping from India (IPC Section 360, now BNS Section 137(1)(a)): conveying any person beyond the limits of India without their consent.
• Kidnapping from lawful guardianship (IPC Section 361, now BNS Section 137(1)(b)): taking or enticing a minor (under 16 if male, under 18 if female, under the IPC; a "child", meaning anyone under 18, under BNS Section 137) or a person of unsound mind out of the keeping of the lawful guardian without the guardian's consent.

The offence is complete as soon as the child is taken out of guardianship. The consent of the minor is immaterial, the motive is irrelevant, and no further criminal purpose is needed. Kidnapping is therefore a substantive offence, punishable in itself (IPC Section 363, now BNS Section 137(2): up to 7 years and fine).

• ***S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras* (1965):** a minor who is nearly of age and leaves voluntarily, without any active part played by the accused in the "taking", is not kidnapped.
• ***Thakorlal D. Vadgama v. State of Gujarat* (1973):** enticement by earlier inducements amounts to taking.
• ***State of Haryana v. Raja Ram* (1973):** "keeping" includes the guardian's constructive control.

Abduction (IPC Section 362, now BNS Section 138) means compelling a person by force, or inducing a person by deceitful means, to go from any place.

• It applies to persons of any age.
• It is a continuing offence, lasting as long as the person is moved from place to place. Kidnapping is complete once and for all.
• Abduction as such is not punishable unless it is accompanied by one of the specified intents:
• to murder, or for ransom (IPC Sections 364 and 364A, now BNS Section 140(1) and (2));
• to secretly and wrongfully confine (IPC Section 365, now BNS Section 140(3));
• to compel a woman to marry, or for illicit intercourse (IPC Section 366, now BNS Section 87);
• to subject the person to grievous hurt or slavery (IPC Section 367, now BNS Section 140(4)).
• The same aggravated forms also apply to kidnapping.

The two offences differ as follows:

• Victim: kidnapping from guardianship applies to a minor or a person of unsound mind (kidnapping from India to any person); abduction applies to any person.
• Means: kidnapping is by taking or enticing; abduction is by force or deceit.
• Consent of the victim: immaterial in kidnapping; free consent is a defence to abduction.
• Nature: kidnapping is a substantive offence complete on taking; abduction is punishable only with a specified intent and is a continuing offence. Punishable only with the specified intent; continuing |

Conclusion: the statement is correct. Kidnapping is criminal in itself because it violates a guardian's right and protects the child. Abduction becomes an offence only through the purpose with which it is committed.

(c) Abetment (IPC Section 107, now BNS Section 45) is committed when a person:

• instigates another to do a thing;
• engages in a conspiracy with others for doing it, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of the conspiracy; or
• intentionally aids, by an act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

The mental element of the abettor, that is, the intention to bring about the offence, is the essence of the offence.

Why liability depends on the abettor's intention and not on the principal's act

• Explanation 2 to IPC Section 108 (now BNS Section 46): it is not necessary that the act abetted is committed, or that the effect needed to constitute the offence is caused. For example, A instigates B to murder C and B refuses; A is still guilty of abetting murder (IPC Section 115, now BNS Section 55).
• The person abetted may be incapable: they may be a child, of unsound mind, or without guilty knowledge (IPC Section 108, Explanation 3, and the illustrations), and the abettor is still liable. Abetting an abetment is also an offence (Explanation 4).
• Punishment: IPC Section 109, now BNS Section 49, applies where the offence is committed in consequence of the abetment. IPC Sections 115–116, now BNS Sections 55–56, apply where it is not committed. The abettor is punished according to their own intention and knowledge. Where a different act is done, the abettor is liable if it was a probable consequence (IPC Sections 111–113, now BNS Sections 51–53).
• Acquittal of the principal: this does not necessarily mean the abettor is acquitted (Jamuna Singh v. State of Bihar (1967)).
• Intention in instigation: instigation requires active suggestion or provocation made with intent. Words said in anger without intending the consequence are not abetment (Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001); Sanju v. State of M.P. (2002), both on abetment of suicide under IPC Section 306, now BNS Section 108).

Abetment and criminal conspiracy

• Abetment by conspiracy requires an act in pursuance of the conspiracy.
• Criminal conspiracy under IPC Section 120A, now BNS Section 61, is complete on agreement to commit an offence.
• An abettor who is present when the offence is committed is deemed to have committed it (IPC Section 114, now BNS Section 54).

Conclusion: the statement is correct. Abetment punishes the abettor's culpable intention to bring about an offence, independently of whether, or by whom, the offence is completed.