(a) "It is the mode of acquiring possession of property of other party with/without his consent, which determines the type of…

(a) All three offences involve the dishonest dealing with another's movable property. They are distinguished by how the accused came to have the property and when the dishonest intention arose.

Theft (IPC Section 378, now BNS Section 303) is dishonestly taking movable property out of another's possession without that person's consent, and moving it in order to take it.

• Possession is taken wrongfully, without consent, and the dishonest intention must exist at the time of taking.
• A bona fide claim of right negatives dishonesty (Chandi Kumar Das Karmarkar v. Abanidhar Roy (1965)).
• Even a temporary removal causing wrongful loss is theft. In Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan (1963), a government servant took a file home for a day to replace papers, and this was held to be theft. See also K.N. Mehra v. State of Rajasthan (1957), where trainees took an aircraft on an unauthorised flight.

Criminal misappropriation (IPC Section 403, now BNS Section 314) is dishonestly misappropriating, or converting to one's own use, movable property.

• The property comes into the accused's possession innocently or neutrally, for example by finding it or receiving it by mistake, without entrustment.
• The dishonest intention arises later (Explanation 2 and the illustrations, for example a finder who keeps property without trying to trace the owner).
• If the property was taken without consent in the first place, the offence is theft, not misappropriation.

Criminal breach of trust (IPC Section 405, now BNS Section 316) arises where a person entrusted with property, or with dominion over it, dishonestly misappropriates or converts it, or uses or disposes of it in violation of the law or of the contract prescribing how the trust is to be discharged.

• The possession is lawful and consensual, by entrustment. The breach lies in the dishonest misuse of that trust.
• Entrustment is the essence (Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay (1956); R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration (1962)).
• A husband who withholds his wife's stridhan commits criminal breach of trust (Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar (1985)).
• The aggravated forms by carriers, clerks, public servants, bankers and agents are now in BNS Section 316(3)–(5).

In summary:

• How possession is obtained: in theft it is taken without consent; in criminal misappropriation it is obtained innocently, without entrustment; in criminal breach of trust it is entrusted by the owner.
• When the dishonest intention arises: in theft at the time of taking; in misappropriation after possession; in criminal breach of trust after entrustment.
• Property: theft requires movable property in another's possession; misappropriation applies to movable property; criminal breach of trust covers movable or immovable property over which the accused has dominion. Movable | Movable or immovable (dominion) |

Conclusion: the statement is correct. The same act of dishonest conversion may be theft, misappropriation or criminal breach of trust depending on whether possession was taken without consent, came innocently, or was entrusted.

(b) Public nuisance (IPC Section 268, now BNS Section 270) is an act or illegal omission that causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public, or to people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity. It includes acts that are bound to cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use a public right. A common nuisance is not excused because it causes some convenience or advantage.

Remedies

Criminal:

• punishment for public nuisance not otherwise provided for (IPC Section 290, now BNS Section 292);
• specific offences such as negligent acts likely to spread infection (IPC Sections 269–270, now BNS Sections 271–272) and acts endangering public safety;
• a magistrate's conditional order for the removal of nuisance (CrPC Section 133, now BNSS Section 152). Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand (1980) held that a municipality must carry out its statutory duties even if it pleads lack of funds.

Civil:

• a suit for declaration or injunction by the Advocate-General, or by two or more persons with the court's leave, without proof of special damage (CPC Section 91);
• an individual may sue in tort only on proving special damage beyond that suffered by the public (Rose v. Miles (1815), where a navigable creek was obstructed and the plaintiff's barges were delayed; Fritz v. Hobson (1880), where a passage was obstructed and a shop lost business).
• What counts as "the public": it must be a class of the public, not an isolated individual (Attorney-General v. PYA Quarries (1957), on quarry dust and vibration).

Types of nuisance

• Public nuisance: obstruction of highways and waterways, pollution, noise, and unsafe structures. On noise, see Church of God (Full Gospel) in India v. K.K.R. Majestic Colony Welfare Association (2000) and In re Noise Pollution (2005).
• Private nuisance: an unlawful interference with a person's use or enjoyment of land, or of a right over it. It takes two forms:
• injury to property, such as encroachment or physical damage (for example, tree roots);
• injury to comfort or health, such as smoke, dust, smell and noise (Dr. Ram Raj Singh v. Babulal (1982), dust from a brick-grinding machine affecting a doctor's clinic; Radhey Shiam v. Gur Prasad (1978), noise from a flour mill).
• Statutory nuisance: under municipal laws, and the Air and Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Acts.

Defences: prescription (20 years, for private nuisance only), statutory authority, and act of God. "Coming to the nuisance" is no defence.

(c) False imprisonment is the total restraint of a person's liberty, for however short a time, without lawful justification. It is actionable per se, without proof of damage.

Elements

• Total restraint: a partial obstruction, leaving another way out, is not imprisonment (Bird v. Jones (1845)).
• No lawful justification: once restraint is shown, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify it.
• The plaintiff's knowledge of the restraint is not essential (Meering v. Grahame-White Aviation (1919)).
• Reasonable conditions: restraint subject to reasonable contractual conditions may not be false imprisonment (Robinson v. Balmain New Ferry Co. (1910); Herd v. Weardale Steel (1915)).

Indian courts Indian courts award public-law compensation for illegal detention:

• Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983), for 14 years' detention after acquittal;
• Bhim Singh v. State of J&K (1985), for the illegal arrest of an MLA.

The corresponding offence is wrongful confinement (IPC Sections 340 and 342, now BNS Section 127). Compensation for groundless arrest is also available under CrPC Section 358, now BNSS Section 399.

Malicious prosecution is the institution of criminal (or certain civil) proceedings against the plaintiff maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. The plaintiff must prove:

• a prosecution by the defendant;
• termination of the proceedings in the plaintiff's favour;
• absence of reasonable and probable cause;
• malice, meaning an improper motive;
• damage to reputation, person or property (Savile v. Roberts (1698)).

See West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Dilip Kumar Ray (2007) and Mohammad Amin v. Jogendra Kumar Bannerjee (1947, PC), which held that prosecution begins when the complaint is set in motion before a judicial officer.

The differences can be summarised:

• Interest protected: false imprisonment protects personal liberty; malicious prosecution protects freedom from unjustified legal process (reputation, liberty, property).
• Nature: false imprisonment is direct restraint by the defendant; malicious prosecution is abuse of judicial process through a judicial officer.
• Proof of damage: false imprisonment is actionable per se; in malicious prosecution damage must be proved.
• Malice: irrelevant in false imprisonment; essential in malicious prosecution, together with absence of reasonable cause.
• Burden of proof: in false imprisonment the defendant must justify the restraint; in malicious prosecution the plaintiff must prove every element.
• Outcome of proceedings: irrelevant in false imprisonment; in malicious prosecution the proceedings must have ended in the plaintiff's favour. Proceedings must have ended in the plaintiff's favour |

Conclusion: if a person is arrested by the police acting on their own authority without legal justification, that is false imprisonment. If the restraint follows an order of a court obtained by a malicious and baseless complaint, the remedy is malicious prosecution.