Answer the following questions in about 150 words each: (a) Where does the Constitution of India vest executive power with…

(a) Executive Power over Concurrent List Subjects

Under the Indian Constitution, executive power is co-extensive with legislative competence, but its allocation over Concurrent List (List III) subjects requires harmonizing Article 73(1) and Article 162. Under the proviso to Article 73(1)(a), the executive power of the Union over Concurrent subjects does not automatically extend to a State unless the Constitution or a law made by Parliament expressly confers it upon the Union. Complementarily, Article 162 establishes that the executive power of the State extends to Concurrent subjects, subject to and limited by any executive power expressly vested by parliamentary law in the Union.

In Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (1955), the Supreme Court clarified that while executive power mirrors legislative power, the primary executive authority in Concurrent matters rests ordinarily with the States. The Union exercises overriding supremacy only when Parliament specifically enacts a statute transferring the execution of such law to Union authorities. Thus, the constitutional scheme establishes a presumption in favour of State executive autonomy over Concurrent subjects, while reserving overriding paramountcy for the Union through express parliamentary mandate.

(b) L. Chandra Kumar and the Raison d'Être of Administrative Tribunals

In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997), a seven-judge Constitution Bench held that the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and the Supreme Court under Article 32 is an inviolable feature of the Basic Structure. Consequently, it struck down the exclusion-of-jurisdiction clauses under Articles 323A(2)(d) and 323B(3)(d), ruling that tribunals act merely as supplemental courts of first instance whose decisions are compulsorily subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court.

Critics argue this defeated the tribunals' primary *raison d'être*—providing expeditious, expert adjudication by eliminating intermediate appellate tiers and relieving High Courts of arrears, as originally envisioned in S.P. Sampath Kumar (1987). By inserting the High Court as an inevitable intermediary, it introduced another layer of litigation. However, critically assessed, L. Chandra Kumar saved tribunals from becoming bureaucratic enclaves lacking judicial independence. It successfully balanced specialized quasi-judicial efficacy with indispensable constitutional safeguards, subordinating institutional efficiency to the supremacy of the rule of law.

(c) Advisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 143

Article 143 empowers the President to consult the Supreme Court on questions of law or fact of public importance under Clause (1), and on pre-constitutional treaties under Clause (2). In In re Kerala Education Bill (1958) and In re Special Courts Bill (1978), the Court affirmed that while it has discretion to decline an opinion under Clause (1), it is obliged to answer references under Clause (2), provided they do not present vague or academic queries.

Crucially, an opinion rendered under Article 143 is advisory and lacks the binding character of a judgment under Article 141, as reaffirmed in In re Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (1992). Nevertheless, these opinions carry persuasive weight and establish authoritative constitutional guidance. However, the mechanism risks executive misuse when political controversies are referred to circumvent legislative deliberation, as seen in the Ayodhya Reference (1994), where the Court rightfully declined to answer. Thus, Article 143 remains a vital mechanism for constitutional clarification, provided the Court exercises self-restraint against politicized questions.

(d) Article 21 and the "Right to Die"

Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, which encompasses the right to live with human dignity. The question whether this includes a "right not to live" witnessed major constitutional shifts. While P. Rathinam v. Union of India (1994) held that the right to live includes the right to die, a Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996) overruled it, holding that Article 21 protects natural life and cannot be expanded to include the right to extinguish life, thereby upholding the validity of Section 306 and Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code.

The jurisprudence evolved in Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011), which distinguished active euthanasia from passive euthanasia and permitted the latter under strict judicial oversight. Finally, in Common Cause v. Union of India (2018), the Constitution Bench held that the right to die with dignity forms an integral part of Article 21, recognizing passive euthanasia and advance medical directives (living wills). Therefore, constitutional law does not recognize a positive "right to die" via suicide or active termination, but firmly recognizes the negative right to a dignified, unprolonged dying process.

(e) Doctrine of Separation of Powers in Classical vs. Modern Context

The classical structural doctrine propounded by Montesquieu mandates three strictly distinct organs of state with watertight functional and personnel boundaries. Historically and functionally, this pure model is not realized in any contemporary democracy. Even in the United States, which adopts the strictest structural separation, the system operates through institutional interlocks such as the presidential veto, Senate confirmation of judges, and judicial review. Conversely, the United Kingdom exhibits an institutional fusion of the executive and legislative branches.

India follows a nuanced, functional separation of powers rather than a rigid structural division. Under our parliamentary democracy, the executive is embedded in and collectively responsible to the legislature. The judiciary remains integrated and independent, exercising judicial review over legislative and executive acts, while Parliament exercises constituent and impeachment powers. As established in Kesavananda Bharati (1973) and Indira Nehru Gandhi (1975), separation of powers is part of the Basic Structure in India not as an unyielding structural compartmentalization, but as an operational system of constitutional checks and balances. The claim is entirely accurate: modern governance relies on functional differentiation and mutual accountability rather than classical structural isolation.