(a) What are the powers, privileges and immunities of Houses of Parliament in India? Do they have the power to expel any of their…

(a) Parliamentary privileges and expulsion

Article 105 gives Houses of Parliament freedom of speech (105(1)), protection for proceedings and publications made by or under parliamentary authority (105(2)), and provides that powers, privileges and immunities of Houses, members and committees are to be defined by Parliament by law (105(3)), continuing, until so defined, as they stood immediately before the 44th Amendment, 1978. Under Article 105(2), no member is liable in any court for anything said or any vote given in Parliament or its committees. Privileges protect Parliament’s dignity and effective functioning, not personal immunity. They include freedom from arrest in civil cases during a session and for forty days before and after it, the right to regulate internal proceedings, the right to exclude strangers and prohibit publication of proceedings, and the power to punish for contempt or breach of privilege. Parliament has never codified them, and conflicts with Article 19(1)(a) were resolved in favour of privilege in M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha (1959), while In re Keshav Singh (1965) held that the courts can still examine a committal for contempt on a habeas corpus petition.

A House may expel any member for gross misconduct or breach of privilege; this power flows from Article 105(3), not from the disqualification provisions of Article 102, and expulsion (which the member can contest again at a by-election) differs from disqualification. In Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007), arising from the expulsion of eleven MPs in the 2005 cash-for-questions sting, a Constitution Bench upheld this power but required fair procedure, a reasonable hearing and non-arbitrariness. It held Article 122 does not bar judicial review of whether the House acted within its competence; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillu supports such intra vires review. Article 122(1) bars courts from questioning proceedings only on the ground of irregularity of procedure; it does not protect gross illegality, irrationality, mala fides, violation of the rules of natural justice or of fundamental rights. Courts will not, however, re-weigh the evidence or sit in appeal over the House's decision. The issue is live again: the Lok Sabha expelled Mahua Moitra in December 2023 on an Ethics Committee report, and her challenge raised the same questions of fair procedure. P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998) had given wide immunity to parliamentary statements, but Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024) overruled that broad immunity, holding privilege does not shield criminal liability for bribery or corruption.

(b) DPSP and legislation

Article 37 makes the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) non-justiciable but fundamental in governance, imposing a duty on the State to apply them in making laws. MGNREGA, 2005 (now succeeded by the VB-G RAM G Act, 2025) implemented Article 41 by guaranteeing wage employment through public works. The Right to Education Act, 2009 implements Article 21A and the pre-86th Amendment Article 45, providing free and compulsory education for children aged 6–14; after the 86th Amendment, Article 45 was recast for early childhood care below six, which RTE does not itself implement. The Forest Rights Act, 2006 gives effect to Article 46 by protecting weaker sections, including tribal communities, and their forest rights. The Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 implemented Article 39(d) by prohibiting sex-based discrimination in pay, a guarantee now carried into the Code on Wages, 2019 (in force from November 2025), which also covers minimum wages under Article 43. Other examples include: land reform and zamindari abolition laws (Article 39(b) and (c)); the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 (Article 39(e) and (f)); the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (Article 39A, inserted by the 42nd Amendment); the 73rd and 74th Amendments on panchayats and municipalities (Article 40); the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (Article 42); the National Food Security Act, 2013 (Article 47); the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 (Article 48A); the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 (Article 49); the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which separated the judiciary from the executive in magistracy (Article 50); and the Uttarakhand Uniform Civil Code, 2024 (Article 44). Courts have also used DPSPs to uphold such laws, as in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (1952) on land reform, though in Property Owners' Association v. State of Maharashtra (2024) a nine-judge Bench held that not all private resources are 'material resources of the community' under Article 39(b). These enactments show DPSP as a normative guide to legislation.

(c) Basic structure and amendment

The “facile” remark was Dr. Ambedkar's, who told the Constituent Assembly that the Constitution provided a most facile procedure for amendment: most Articles can be amended by a special majority of Parliament alone under Article 368(2), and only federal provisions in its proviso also need ratification by half the States. Early decisions such as Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan treated amendment as plenary. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967) then held that Fundamental Rights could not be amended at all, and Parliament responded with the 24th Amendment (1971). Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala held that Parliament cannot alter the basic structure, significantly limiting Article 368. Waman Rao v. Union of India affirmed that post-Kesavananda amendments, including Ninth Schedule additions after 24 April 1973, can be tested against the basic structure. Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) struck down clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368, inserted by the 42nd Amendment (1976), and placed limited amending power, judicial review and the FR-DPSP balance beyond amendment; I.R. Coelho (2007) applied the doctrine to Ninth Schedule laws. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India recognised federalism and secularism as basic features. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) struck down clause (4) of Article 329A, inserted by the 39th Amendment, as violating free and fair elections and judicial review. In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015), the 99th Amendment (2014) creating the NJAC was struck down as impairing judicial independence. Yet the limit is narrow in practice: well over a hundred amendments have been made and only a handful struck down, and major changes such as the 103rd Amendment on EWS reservation were upheld (Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, 2022). The doctrine therefore does not freeze the Constitution; it protects only its core identity, while its uncertain content gives the judiciary the final word on what that core is.