(a) Critically examine the International Law relating to development and use of nuclear weapons with special focus on the Treaty…

(a) Nuclear weapons and the TPNW

International law on nuclear weapons is divided between disarmament norms and security realities. The NPT, 1968 (in force 1970), remains the central framework: non-nuclear states forgo acquisition (Article II), the five recognised nuclear-weapon States undertake to pursue disarmament negotiations in good faith (Article VI), and all states may use nuclear energy peacefully under IAEA safeguards (Articles III-IV). Other instruments include the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996, not yet in force; Russia withdrew its ratification in 2023), regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties such as Tlatelolco (1967) and Pelindaba (1996), and Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-State actors. The TPNW, adopted on 7 July 2017 and in force from 22 January 2021, goes further by creating an absolute prohibition, drawing on the 'humanitarian initiative' about the catastrophic effects of nuclear use. Article 1 bars developing, testing, producing, acquiring, possessing, stockpiling, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons, and also stationing them or assisting anyone in prohibited activities. Article 4 requires each State Party to eliminate its nuclear weapons through a verified, time-bound plan submitted to the Meeting of States Parties; Article 6 obliges assistance to victims and remediation of contaminated areas; Article 7 provides cooperation and assistance. Unlike the NPT, the TPNW does not recognise any State as a lawful nuclear-weapon State; it has more than seventy States Parties, but none of the nine nuclear-armed States and no NATO member has joined, and they have declared that it does not bind them or create customary law. India has not participated, arguing that the treaty does not address the security environment, does not engage nuclear-weapon states, and may fragment the NPT-based order. The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 1996 held that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the principles of international humanitarian law, but in an extreme circumstance of self-defence where survival of a state is at stake, it could not definitively determine legality; it also held unanimously that there is an obligation to pursue and conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. In 2016 the ICJ dismissed the Marshall Islands' cases against India, Pakistan and the UK for want of a dispute, showing how hard such obligations are to enforce. Thus, nuclear weapons remain governed by customary law, the law of armed conflict, and treaty obligations, but no universal prohibition exists. The TPNW strengthens the humanitarian norm and may influence customary law, yet its legal force is limited by the non-participation of nuclear states. Its humanitarian focus is significant because it frames nuclear weapons as incompatible with IHL, but its exclusion of nuclear states means it cannot by itself end arsenals. India’s refusal to sign the NPT and CTBT as discriminatory reflects a preference for inclusive, security-sensitive disarmament.

(b) Types of asylum

Asylum is protection granted by a State to a person fleeing persecution; it is not meant to shield ordinary criminals from prosecution, who remain liable to extradition. Its types include territorial asylum, extraterritorial asylum (diplomatic asylum in embassies and legations, consular asylum, and asylum on warships), and neutral asylum given to belligerent forces in wartime. Territorial asylum is granted within the granting state’s own territory, usually to a person already present, and rests on sovereignty; it is not automatic and must respect extradition and human-rights obligations. It may be denied where the claimant is a war criminal or threat to public order, as Article 14(2) of the UDHR and Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention recognise, and the grant is governed by Article 14 of the UDHR, the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum (1967) and the principle of non-refoulement. India's grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama in 1959 is an example. Extraterritorial asylum is granted outside the state’s territory, such as in embassies, consulates, or warships. Diplomatic asylum is only one form of extraterritorial asylum, as is naval asylum on a warship in a foreign port. The distinction turns on locus and consent: territorial asylum occurs in the state’s sovereign space, while extraterritorial asylum depends on the territorial state’s consent, treaty, or exceptional custom. The ICJ in the Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru, 1950) treated diplomatic asylum as a derogation from the territorial State's sovereignty, not generally recognised without a treaty or proven custom, and in the Haya de la Torre Case (1951) held that the asylum should end but Colombia was not obliged to surrender him. Diplomatic asylum is recognised mainly in Latin America through the Havana (1928), Montevideo (1933) and Caracas (1954) Conventions; Julian Assange's stay in Ecuador's London embassy (2012-2019) showed the friction it causes elsewhere.

(c) Negotiation and mediation

Negotiation is the simplest mode: the disputing states communicate directly, may be bilateral or multilateral, and control the outcome. It may be assisted by technical or facilitative bodies, but no third party formally directs the process. Mediation adds a neutral third party who facilitates dialogue and may propose solutions. Article 33 of the UN Charter lists negotiation first among peaceful means, followed by enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement, and the Manila Declaration (1982) reaffirms free choice of means. The Simla Agreement (1972) reflects India's preference for bilateral negotiation with Pakistan. The Indus Waters Treaty, 1960, arose from nearly a decade of negotiations in which the World Bank's good offices came close to mediation; India placed the treaty 'in abeyance' in April 2025, showing that even a negotiated settlement depends on continuing trust. The Tashkent Declaration, 1966, after the India-Pakistan war, was mediated by the Soviet Union, and the Camp David Accords (1978) between Egypt and Israel were mediated by the United States, showing mediation’s value when parties cannot negotiate directly. Negotiation is best where parties can communicate, want sovereignty over the result, and seek to preserve relations. Mediation is better where urgency, power asymmetry, complexity, or broken trust makes direct talks difficult. Mediation can also help preserve bilateral relations by providing a face-saving third-party channel, but its success depends on the parties’ willingness to accept proposals. On balance, negotiation is the most generally suited mode because it preserves party control and is least intrusive, but mediation is the better choice when direct negotiation is blocked or the dispute is too acute to manage alone.