(a) There may be various reasons for the failure of the Security Council of United Nations in maintaining international peace and…

(a) UNSC composition and power imbalance

The Council's failure is not one-dimensional, but composition and voting are central. Article 23, amended in 1965, gives five permanent and ten non-permanent members; the amendment raised non-permanent seats from six to ten but left the P5 unchanged. Article 27 requires nine affirmative votes for substantive decisions, including the concurring votes of the P5, so each P5 member has a veto (though an abstention is not treated as a veto, and parties to a dispute must abstain in decisions under Chapter VI). This 1945 bargain secured great-power participation, yet it has become a structural weakness. In Syria, Russia and China cast more than a dozen vetoes blocking accountability and humanitarian measures; in February 2022 Russia vetoed the resolution on its own invasion of Ukraine; and the United States has repeatedly vetoed ceasefire resolutions on Gaza since 2023 — showing that every P5 member uses the veto to protect itself or its allies. The veto turns legal decisions into political calculations. G4 reform proposals (India, Japan, Germany, Brazil) and the African Group's demand for more permanent seats expose the same fault line: the Council reflects 1945 power, not present-day demographic, economic or security realities. Africa and Asia remain underrepresented, and regional inequities weaken the legitimacy of Council decisions. Uniting for Peace Resolution 377A (1950) lets the General Assembly recommend collective measures when the Council is paralysed, as in the emergency special session on Ukraine in 2022, and GA Resolution 76/262 (2022) now requires a debate after every veto, but neither can replace binding Chapter VII action. Other causes compound the problem: the Article 43 agreements for standing forces were never concluded, so enforcement depends on willing members, and the Council acts selectively. Reform talks in the Intergovernmental Negotiations have stalled for years. On balance, composition is not the sole cause of failure, but it is a principal one: the veto can protect great-power interests at the cost of collective legitimacy.

(b) Innocent passage and India's position

Under UNCLOS Part II, Section 3, Article 17 grants all ships innocent passage through the territorial sea. Articles 18-19 make passage continuous, expeditious and not prejudicial to the coastal state's peace, good order or security. Unlike transit passage through straits used for international navigation (Part III, Article 38), which cannot be suspended and extends to aircraft and submerged submarines, innocent passage applies only to ships on the surface and may be temporarily suspended in specified areas for security (Article 25(3)). Submarines must surface and show their flag. Prejudicial acts include weapons exercises, spying, propaganda, pollution, fishing, boarding or serious crimes. India's position is in the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976. Under Section 4(1), all foreign ships other than warships enjoy innocent passage through the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea. Section 4(2) requires foreign warships, including submarines and other underwater vehicles, to give prior notice to the Central Government before entering or passing through Indian territorial waters, and Section 4(3) allows the Central Government to suspend innocent passage of any class of foreign ships in the interest of peace, good order or security. On ratifying UNCLOS in 1995, India also declared that other States may not carry out military exercises or manoeuvres in its exclusive economic zone without its consent — a position contested by maritime powers such as the United States. India thus accepts the UNCLOS right while preserving sovereign control. The MV Enrica Lexie incident of 2012, though not squarely an innocent-passage case because it arose in the contiguous zone, not the territorial sea, shows India's insistence on jurisdiction over foreign vessels and refusal to accept blanket immunity. In Republic of Italy v. Union of India (2013), the Supreme Court held that the Union (not Kerala) had jurisdiction and set up a special court, but the arbitral tribunal under Annex VII of UNCLOS ruled in 2020 that the marines enjoyed functional immunity as State officials, while India was entitled to compensation; the Supreme Court closed the Indian proceedings in 2021 after Italy paid it. The episode shows both India's assertion of jurisdiction and the limits set by international law.

(c) Acquisition of territorial sovereignty by newly emerged states

The classical modes of acquiring territory are occupation of terra nullius, prescription, accretion, cession and conquest; conquest is now unlawful under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the Friendly Relations Declaration (1970), and the ICJ held in Western Sahara (1975) that territory inhabited by organised tribes was not terra nullius. Newly emerged states usually acquire territory through succession, not fresh occupation. Uti possidetis juris, applied in the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) (1986), stabilises colonial boundaries at independence; it prevents border wars but can freeze arbitrary lines. Effective occupation, per Island of Palmas (1928) and Eastern Greenland (1933), requires continuous and peaceful display of sovereign authority, but for new states it often evidences inherited title rather than free-standing acquisition. Self-determination can create states, yet it does not automatically confer territorial sovereignty. The Kosovo Advisory Opinion (2010) held that a unilateral declaration of independence did not violate international law, but did not decide statehood or title; under the prevailing declaratory view, recognition confirms rather than creates statehood, though in practice it strongly influences acceptance. India and Pakistan inherited the Radcliffe Line and treated it as the sovereignty baseline, even where disputes persist; the Rann of Kutch dispute was settled by an international tribunal in 1968, and India's integration of Goa (1961) and Sikkim (1975) raised questions about self-determination and the legality of force. Post-Soviet states largely accepted former Soviet borders, again reflecting uti possidetis. The 2014 Bangladesh-India Bay of Bengal arbitration is not a title case; it shows newly emerged states' inherited baselines and maritime zones must later be delimitated, so land sovereignty precedes maritime entitlement.